



The danger of marginalisation: An analysis of Kenyan youth and their integration into political, socio-economic life¹

Daniel Forti and Grace Maina

Introduction

Conflicts between Kenya's major ethnic blocs have dominated the country's post-independence era. Society's elites have repeatedly created and exploited ethnic tensions between communities to incite violent outbreaks, aimed at achieving political and economic gains. The ethno-political framework dictating Kenyan political life is symptomatic of key issues that continue to undermine Kenya's democracy and development: land grievances, weak government institutions, growing income inequalities, and negative ethnic relations – all of which are evident in political practice. The violent aftermath of Kenya's 2007 general elections indicates the reality that Kenya's societal foundation must be improved if the country is to enjoy sustainable peace.

Following the announcement of the election results on 30 December 2007, violent clashes broke out across various parts of the country. Some argue that the violence – which resulted in 1 220 deaths, 3 600 injuries and 300 000 internally displaced people (IDPs) – was in revolt to the announced election results, which declared the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) the winner over the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) candidate,

1 Authors thank all interviewed for their contribution to this chapter.

Raila Odinga (OCHR, 2008). A government of national unity (GNU), which included members from the two disputing political parties, was formed to resolve the political crisis: its landmark achievement was the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, a key instrument for decentralising power from the Presidency and establishing widespread checks and balances throughout the government.

When speaking of Kenya's political landscape, it is imperative to address its largest demographic unit and political constituency: the youth. Since the term 'youth' is a generic expression embodying a diverse, dynamic and fluid constituency of people, different segments of Kenya invariably offer contending interpretations of both its practical definition and the demographic's place in society. The 2010 Kenyan Constitution defines any individual between 18 and 35 years in age as youth,² while many of the country's different youth development programmes identify youth as individuals between 15 and 35 years of age. Approximately 74% of the Kenyan population is under 34 years old; of these, 64% are under the age of 25 years (*The Economist*, 2010; Population Reference Bureau, 2011). In addition, youth make up 64% of the nation's total unemployed population (Saunders School of Business, 2009). Unlike the older generations, who previously benefited from ethnic favouritism and corruption, the youth have largely lived in poor conditions throughout the country. In the 2007 elections, over 3.7 million youths voted, making them a formidable political constituency (ICG, 2008). They were also primarily responsible for the physical fighting and humanitarian crisis during the post-election period. Many young people formed ethnically centred armed gangs that conducted ethnically motivated violent raids throughout the country. Some of these youth groupings existed prior to the elections, but the constant blending of politics and ethnicity continued to reinforce the place of such groups within Kenyan society. Of specific interest to this chapter is the Mungiki sect, which Atieno refers to as the Neo-Mau Mau group (Atieno, 2007). In defining the Mungiki, Ruteere (2008) summarises the group into four main interpretations: the Mungiki as a religio-cultural movement; the Mungiki as a local manifestation of anti-globalisation forces; the Mungiki as a criminal gang and vigilante; and finally the Mungiki as a political organisation. This chapter analyses the Mungiki as an illustration of

2 For the purposes of this paper, youth will be defined as per Kenya's constitutional definition of 18–35 years.

Kenya's failure to engage its youth constituency successfully and its damaging impact on the country's trajectory towards peace.

It is imperative to state here that as the post-election violence cost Kenya's economy over US\$1 billion, the youth are suffering disproportionately from the effects of economic loss and the slow pace of Kenya's recovery (Obulutsa, 2008). In anticipation of the next election, this constituency must be thoroughly engaged and involved in the task and dividends of political, economic and social life. Failure to do so will likely result in violent patterns during and beyond elections. The youth constituency is, therefore, an integral determinant of the country's stability following the 2012 elections.

This work will seek to interrogate and analyse the place of the youth in the Kenyan state. Taking into account the massive numbers of young people and the reality of the poverty that characterises most of Kenya, the youth's role within Kenya must not be understated. An analysis of the youth's place in society must also be juxtaposed with an assessment of the Kenyan state's ability to guarantee security for this constituency. The social contract prescribes a state in which the sovereign avails security in the sense of both physical security and the opportunity to survive. In instances where the state is unable to fulfil and to ensure these forms of security, who then is responsible? The Kenyan community is a critical illustration of this argument, where the state is incapable of fully executing its obligation to the social contract agreement with its citizenry. This chapter will first discuss Kenya's political history in a bid to contextualise the place and practice of the state today. The chapter will then address the question of youth and what that means in Kenyan society, as well as the challenges that continue to undermine the active and inclusive participation of the youth in Kenya's political and social realms. By examining some of the remedies that the government has applied to address youth concerns, we illustrate the dangers of ignoring and marginalising this constituency within the context of a state with weak societal institutions and infrastructure. This is highlighted by a case study of Mungiki life and political conduct. The chapter concludes by making recommendations as to how the youth population should be fully engaged within Kenyan society, and how their political marginalisation can be countered to secure peace. Our work rests on the presumption that in instances of violent

conflict, the youth are often assimilated as instruments of war, and that to transform previously war-torn societies effectively there is an urgent need to absorb the youth meaningfully to curtail exploitative forces that seek power through violence.

An overview of Kenya's political history and youth involvement

The forms of conflict that have been experienced in Kenya can be categorised as non-state or intrastate conflict – where neither party is connected to the government – or one-sided violence – where either the government or an organised group has used violence against a civilian group (UCDP, 2010). While Kenya's conflicts appear to revolve solely around ethnic tensions and rivalries, antagonisms also stem from intergenerational tensions between youth and elders. The relationship between these generations has often been marked by one generation using the next to further their stay in politics – as politically eligible youth, widely touted as 'Young Turks', were rendered powerless and kept in the service of their respective elders. For long periods of time, the youth have constituted a powerless counter-public to the hegemony of the elders who dominated the state, political parties and other instruments of power. The youth are often regarded as a fundamental group to engage in politics, but as masses used to reaffirm the desired ends of the political elite instead of equal members with active participation in leadership positions and policy decisions. In understanding the different conflicts and trends that continue to mar the Kenyan community, the youth and their role in political violence, it is important to note the major grievances that led to conflict within the Kenyan society.

Politicisation of ethnicity

A fundamental root of conflict in Kenya is the negative manipulation of ethnicity. Politicians consistently invoke and manipulate tribal identity so as to mobilise power around themselves. The country's government has always represented an elite club of businessmen and politicians in which the president surrounds himself with kinsmen from different ethnic communities so as to generate the

highest standing for their respective blocs. As a result, millions of ‘non-elite’ Kenyans continue to be marginalised and excluded from the political machinery on the basis of not only ethnicity but also class. While Kenyans define themselves in terms of national identity and not ethnic identity, multiple quantitative studies have proven that ethnicity plays an important role in determining how the country votes for its political officials (Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008; Rheault and Tortora, 2008; Kimenyi and Romero, 2008; Dercon and Romero, 2010; Ruteere, 2008). A national identity has yet to be achieved and thus many citizens will often see themselves within the tribal context before they regard themselves as Kenyans.

Land grievances

Land has been a foundational point of dispute in Kenya, as contestation over land has been prevalent both at the local and national level. The distribution of land since independence has been marked with excessive politicisation. Whilst many analyse the land conflict as one of ethnicity, it has become apparent that land has ultimately resided in the hands of a few ruling elites. Land wars in Rift Valley Province date back to the country’s immediate post-colonial history, where groups of the Kikuyu community, as well as the landless Mau Mau warriors, competed for territory owned by major corporations. Over the years, the Kikuyu community has grown in numbers and in wealth in Rift Valley Province, leading to one of the greatest disputes between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities (UKAid, 2010). Over the years, Kenyan politicians have manipulated ethnic identities, and this has further exacerbated competition for land and fuelled the violent methodology to ensure the acquisition of land. Following the 1992 tribal clashes and the post-election violence in 2008, many from the Kikuyu community were displaced from their farms in Rift Valley Province. The resettlement of thousands of IDPs and the illegal occupation of land by other communities continues to be a challenge that can easily escalate into more violence.

Economic inequalities

Kenya was placed 128th out of 169 countries with respect to the Income Gini Coefficient in 2010.³ The country's income inequality is only exacerbated by the rampant corruption and elite excesses that continue to see the ruling elite get wealthier. Donald Kaberuka, current president of the African Development Bank, told the *Financial Times* that the inequality is a chief source of Kenya's problems, saying: "Forty per cent of Kenya's people live in urban areas and many of them in slums. This is where this volatility arising from inequalities comes from" (Hanson, 2008). It is these continued inequalities that facilitate the rise of criminal gangs. Unemployment, especially among the urban youth, remains alarmingly high and the benefits from President Kibaki's macro-economic policies have only accrued to a select group of elites. Hundreds of thousands of Kenyans remain displaced from the 2007 conflict, and land in many parts of the country continues to be heavily contested by different stakeholders. Unless corrected, these inequalities will continue to grow in adversity to peace.

Weak government institutions

As the previous Kenyan Constitution was subject to constant criticism for the manner in which it vested excessive power within the executive, it is further contended that the weakness of Kenyan institutions have also contributed to conflict. Weak institutions preclude checks and balances on executive power. The new constitution, however, corrects many of these inadequacies by reinforcing such institutions, specifically a stronger and transparent judiciary and a powerful legislature. The significant power previously vested in the executive meant that all elections were a zero-sum game, increasing the odds that the election results would devolve into violence. The current GNU has largely been conscious and active in resolving some of the structural issues that have plagued

3 Gini coefficient of inequality: This is the most commonly used measure of inequality. The coefficient varies between 0, which reflects complete equality, and 1, which indicates complete inequality (one person has all the income or consumption, all others have none). World Bank. (2011) Available from: <<http://go.worldbank.org/3SLYUTVY00>> [Accessed 4 July 2011].

Kenyan society, by trying to decentralise power. The new constitution embodies the changes the people want, but in and of itself is only a document: it must be implemented properly if it is to address this vital cause of conflicts. Despite a marked improvement there nonetheless remains a crisis of confidence in the government's youth policies.

Elections

Elections in Kenya are truly contentious events, as politicians play one tribe against another to expand and protect their political space. The zero-sum framework of this democracy continues to challenge a country that is so ethnically divided. Questions of vote manipulation and electoral fraud dominate the electoral dialogue. The political character of ruling elites and the free use of hate speech are ever-present sparks for violence during electoral periods. Whilst there has been fundamental progress in dealing with these issues through the new constitution and improved judicial functions, it is of concern that habits might not so easily be relearned without incentives. The International Criminal Court's (ICC) prosecution of the 'Ocampo Six'⁴ sent the message that the law can still hold individuals responsible for their efforts to canvass and incite others to violence.

The challenges facing youth

In today's Kenya, the massive size of the youth cohort consistently demands more resources to meet their social and economic needs, to enable their survival and reasonable livelihood (Muthee, 2010). There is empirical evidence that investing

4 On 15 December 2010, the International Criminal Court's (ICC) chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, laid out charges against six prominent Kenyans who were allegedly responsible for planning and inciting the violence following the country's 2007 elections. The six accused are: Uhuru Kenyatta (former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister), William Ruto (former Agriculture and Higher Education Minister), Francis Muthaura (former Cabinet Secretary and head of Civil Service), Hussein Ali (former police chief), Henry Kosgey (former Industrialisation Minister and Chairman of the ODM) and Joshua Sang (radio producer of Kass FM, a Kalenjin-language station).

in the youth is beneficial to society as a whole (Knowles and Behrman, 2003 as cited in UNFPA, 2005) as their energy, creativity and networking capacity make them a significant resource for contributing to national development. Youth need an environment in which they can foster their talents and creativity to improve their security and well-being directly. It is imperative that the government remains cognisant of the expanding youth population, and it should endeavour to take advantage of this demographic dividend. Unemployed youth are an inactive and insecure demographic that can be mobilised for violence, raising the country's chances of relapsing into civil conflict. When more than 40% of the population is between the ages of 15 and 29, the country is 2.3 times more likely to experience an outbreak of civil conflict compared with countries with smaller youth populations (Cincotta et al., 2003).

Kenya's youth population has grown exponentially over the years, with those under 30 years old constituting over 70% of the country's population. This youth population makes up 60% of the total labour force, but many of these young people remain unemployed and have not been absorbed into the market. To further complicate the growing challenge of this constituency, more than 75% of those with HIV/AIDS are in the 20–45 year age bracket (Republic of Kenya, 2007). Coupled with this health challenge are different complexities that continue to shadow youth life in Kenya. This section delves into some of those social, political and economic challenges, which are as follows:

Generational relationship complexity

The intergenerational relationship between youth and their elders is complex at best. Although a number of tensions underline this conflict, it is suggested that modernisation is perhaps the most critical factor. In Kenya, it is evident that modernisation has watered down this relationship: many Kenyan youth are unaware of traditional social structures but are instead conversant with, and faithful to, modern trends. Youth have also been gravely under-represented in public policy and decision-making forums (NPI, 2009). Recent efforts to ensure youth representation within the country's development sphere – much of which emerged from the country's National Youth Policy – have been shrouded with

a general lack of transparency and political manipulation, so that selected individuals are not representative of their constituencies.

Exclusion or the lack of knowledge of government policy towards youth

Despite the implementation of a rigorous policy framework and various development initiatives to empower Kenya's youth, the majority of youth are either unaware of the existing National Youth Policy or misinformed of how it relates to them. This fundamental challenge inhibits any successful youth initiatives, as it remains impossible to engage an entire constituency successfully without their support for – let alone awareness of – such programmes. The current practice is that programmes are often designed and implemented by government agencies, and the youth are only engaged as beneficiaries as opposed to a credible constituency that can frame programmes and policies (Njonjo et al., 2009). The Youth Agenda, a Kenyan civil society organisation (CSO) that examines the youth's dynamic role in society, uncovered that 41.5% of Kenyan youth were not familiar with the former constitution, which was repealed in 2010 (The Youth Agenda, 2010). Furthermore, a survey conducted by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) determined that 87% of youth respondents believed that the government was reluctant to address youth policy issues, with specific reference to job creation (Ibid.). Another illustration of this is the Youth Enterprise Development Fund, where the youth lack the essential details on how a fund designed for their support is being managed to address their challenges. Fredericksen (2010) argues that the youth frustration in Kenya is a result of the failure to participate in political and economic life within society.

The consistent exclusion and marginalisation of the youth from decision-making positions on matters of national development also undermine the likely effectiveness of government youth policies. Youth representation in public life has been dismal, as existing governance structures have disempowered the youth acutely. Their presence can be seen as tokenism: youth policies disproportionately emphasise formal channels of youth decision-making and ignore critical informal channels and spaces. Fredericksen discusses 'legitimate' youth activity to include mainstream churches, sports clubs and non-governmental

organisations (NGOs), as these attract ‘respectable’ youth with salaried jobs and legitimate business positions. On the other hand, what would be considered ‘illegitimate’ youth activity takes place in indigenous or charismatic youth movements, gangs, subcultures and political youth wings, which often attract lower-class individuals who want to make money with less respect to legal/illegal methods. It is this narrow thinking that undermines the creative engagement with the youth constituency as a whole, and the subsequent marginalisation of particular sections of the youth population. While criminal activity must be discouraged, it is important to note that non-conventional youth groupings have a contribution to make and needs that must be met; the Kenyan government must, as such, creatively find a way to engage with them.

Economic challenges

With the realities of unemployment and the slow recovery of Kenya’s economic sector, the youth struggle to find jobs or access credit and loans necessary for starting their own businesses. Most youth are unable to own land for socio-economic reasons, and even in instances where they can own land, they lack capital to maintain its productivity. Starting new trade is also extremely difficult as the agricultural monopoly of big corporations impedes the youth’s competitive ability. Those young people who are employed more often than not earn too little to become economically independent. The Kenyan government’s inability to generate adequate jobs for the youth continues to be a challenge, as annually only 25% of the 500 000 eligible youth are absorbed into the labour market (NPI, 2009). Other factors that could contribute to this challenge include economic corruption, mismanagement and a generational domination by an older age group, tribal or family affiliations.

The growth of micro-enterprises provides the best opportunity for youth livelihood: *jua kali*, Kenya’s informal enterprise sector, has grown to engage some 70% of the labour force (often in part-time, underpaid, short-term jobs). Microfinance is key to resolving some of the economic challenges that plague the youth, and there are numerous youth-led informal enterprises and organisations that are testament to this as a method (USAID, 2009).

Growing insecurity

The atmosphere of constant insecurity that plagues urban centres interprets youth as both victims and suspects. There have been numerous reports of local authorities targeting and harassing youth, while the proliferation of gangs and organised crime have also ensnared youth who, ultimately, become easy prey. Over time, the youth have lost trust in Kenya's political institutions and social structures, and in their leaders' willingness and/or abilities to protect them (USAID, 2009). This has then resulted in their alienation from formal institutions and their subsequent reliance on militias and gangs for protection.

Skills and training

The lack of relevant education and vocational training among the youth is a growing concern.⁵ Kenya's modules of education rely on a rigid examination system that drives both curriculum and pedagogies but fails to integrate real-life applications, subsequently short-falling the market demand for Kenyans with sufficient qualifications (USAID, 2009). The high cost of education also feeds into this concern, as it excludes those who cannot afford education. Despite over 30 public and private universities, under 5% of university-aged youth are enrolled at tertiary institutions; further, less than 50% of those students who pass the nationwide matriculation exams actually attend university, as they are unable to win public or private sponsorships and thus cannot afford the cost (Otieno, 2009). Out-of-school youth want and need ways of achieving competencies that are practical and recognised as legitimate (USAID, 2009). There is a growing demand for technical education, but this must be market-driven to avoid an excess of workers without jobs, as witnessed in Kenya's *jua kali* sector.

Urbanisation

The majority of youth in Nairobi are migrant job-seekers from the countryside—the city continues to serve as the economic hub of Kenya and attracts people

5 Omaera, M., 2011. Interview on Youth in Kenya by Grace Maina, 4 August 2011.

from around the country in pursuit of employment, better standards of living and engagement in other economic activities. Most youth are either unemployed or are self-employed with menial jobs, and form part of the poor working class. These large numbers of youth easily constitute ‘an army of idle’, people who could easily be manipulated into mass action, which could result in political instability.

Credible organising

Despite the significant youth bulge throughout the country, their ability to organise and take advantage of such numbers is consistently challenged. Although there is uniformity in challenge and cause, often the youth demographic is easily manipulated and pulled by issues of ethnicity. While there are hundreds of youth organisations across the country, these organisations are incapable of reaching the entire youth population. An NPI study shows that in many instances, organisations will often bypass youth who are poorly educated, illiterate or under-resourced (NPI, 2009).

The danger of exclusion: An analysis of the legitimacy and growth of the Mungiki sect in Kenya

Militant youth groups in Kenya

Largely the result of the societal conditions outlined above, Kenya is turning into fertile ground for the proliferation of armed youth groups. Towards the end of former President Daniel Arap Moi’s reign, such groups emerged and started small but violent campaigns within their local communities. These youth groups exist within both urban and rural contexts, and have played significant roles in Kenya’s recent history. Most youth groups walk a fine line between the politics of protection and the violence of criminality, imposing security services on residents, restaurants and local businesses in exchange for fees and a modicum of security (Anderson, 2002). While some communities interpret these vigilante groups as an appropriate response to Nairobi’s lack of security, others lament

the groups' extortionary practices and penchant for indiscriminate violence and harassment. In October 2010, Kenya's police outlawed 33 such groups – including the Mungiki and its Nairobi rivals, the Taliban – under the 2010 Organised Crimes Act.⁶ While few appropriate measures have been taken to enforce this ban, the police have come to interpret this legislation as a licence to act with impunity against the youth. The Mungiki were among the primary executors of 2007–8 post-election violence and symbolise the increased politicisation of youth vigilantes. The rest of this chapter will provide a case study of the Mungiki sect: the decision to focus exclusively on the Mungiki lies in the fact that it is a complex organisation comprising competing cultural, political and social interests while representing an important cross-section of Kenyan youth life. Given their role in the Kenyan political processes, this group constitutes an important analytical pivot for dissecting the role of the youth in the country's conflicts.

Genesis of the group

The Mungiki sect cannot be defined as one thing; rather, it is part criminal organisation, part social movement, part political wing, and part ethnic and religious sect (Rasmussen, 2010). The Mungiki case is an illustration of the existing discord between a marginalised segment of the country's youth and Kenya's dominant socio-political structures. 'Mungiki' is a Kikuyu word for the masses (Ndūng'ũ, 2010). Members of the Mungiki are said to be commonly found around Nairobi and Central Province, Rift Valley Province and other parts of the country.⁷ Large segments of its membership are from the Agikuyu community, though alliances have formed with other communities over time (Ndūng'ũ, 2010).

Born in response to former President Moi's predatory government, the Mungiki have consistently reincorporated traditional Kikuyu practices and values – not

6 Such banned groups include the Mungiki, the Taliban, Jeshi la Mzee, Jeshi la Embakasi, Jeshi la King'ole, Majeshi la Wazee, the Kaya Bombo Youth, the Baghdad Boys, the Chinkororo, the Amachuma and Somalia's Al Shabaab.

7 Warugí, A., 2011. Interview on Youth in Kenya by Grace Maina, 1 August 2011.

only to create a niche within society but also to mobilise youth responses to pervasive political, economic and ethnic tensions. The Mungiki movement was formed by John Maina Njenga in the late 1980s, who was said to have received a vision from *Ngai* (God) commanding him to liberate his people (the Agikuyu) from oppression (at the time, oppression was perceived to stem from the Moi regime). On many levels, the movement is similar to that of the Mau Mau, as both share Agikuyu roots and practices. The Mungiki movement is founded on the liberating and revolutionary principles of the Mau Mau soldiers and traditional Kikuyu beliefs of youth empowerment (Dimova, 2010). Kagwanja describes how generational politics, found at the heart of Kikuyu culture and history, perpetuated the notion of a youth revolution by identifying two major traditional Kikuyu cultural ideologies (Kagwanja, 2003). First, the *ituika* system embodies a generational transfer of power that has fuelled Kenyan youths, dating back to the Mau Mau fighters of the 1950s. The *ituika* system comprises of two generations: the *Mwangi* (the generation that led the revolt against oppression, i.e. British colonial officials) and the *Irungu* (the subsequent generation responsible for fostering a new and inclusive society). This system thus “produced a political dispensation in which the whole Kikuyu nation was divided into two generations, the older one in power and the younger one waiting in the wings. It also formalised the alternating succession of ritual authority between the two generations” (Kagwanja, 2005:61). Second, the *iregi* myth has fuelled the military aspirations of this youth generation, as the *irigi* are “a revolutionary generation that rebelled against and overthrew tyranny and restored the right of citizenship and civic virtues in the mythical Kikuyu society” (Ibid.). Jomo Kenyatta, the country’s founding father and first president, incorporated the *iregi* into the *ituika* generational system in his book *Facing Mount Kenya*, which not only created a profound association between the *iregi* revolutionary fighters and the *Irungu* generation of the Kikuyu political dispensation, but also catalysed a meaningful connection between the Mau Mau independence fighters and the Kikuyu mythologies. Fifty years later, the Mungiki movement reincorporated such traditional paradigms into its struggle against Kenya’s political system.

The sect’s genesis and growth must be understood within both the context of traditional Kikuyu paradigms and the contextual realities of Kenya during the

1990s. First, the Mungiki youth's interpretations of Kenya's political system were heavily influenced by the Mau Mau traditional narratives. Mungiki leaders accused President Moi of pillaging the youth and starving the Kenyan nation; the Mungiki also insisted that the older generations must be removed from power as they had failed to ensure a successful transfer of generational power (Kagwanja, 2005). In this sense, the Mungiki reinterpreted its role as a new force that would re-establish the balance between the older and younger generations. It is this thinking that saw the Mungiki assume a revolutionary mentality and, subsequently, readjusted its cultural, political and social lifestyle to encompass the traditional warrior lifestyle.⁸ Other factors – such as corruption, rampant violence, rising economic inequalities and the ethno-politicisation of tribal identity – increasingly contributed to the Mungiki's militarised identity (Dimova, 2010). The organisation's violent practices arose from the ethnically motivated political violence in 1992 and 1997 when government-sponsored Kalenjin militia attacked, killed and uprooted thousands of Kikuyus in the Rift Valley (Ibid.). The Mungiki sought to empower its membership in every possible way, including through the use of violence. When the Mungiki movement stepped outside of the rural base and ventured into the urban areas it absorbed some criminal characteristics and was transformed into a largely violent gang that was gradually co-opted by sections of the ruling elite to serve its patrimonial interests (Anderson, 2002).

During the 2002 political succession period and election cycle, President Moi attempted to use generational politics to outmanoeuvre his opponents. Moi chose Uhuru Kenyatta, son of former president Jomo Kenyatta, as his successor on the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party ticket; Kenyatta's selling point was that he was a youthful candidate.⁹ This appealed to the Mungiki grouping, which responded by supporting the nomination and seeing this as a generational transfer of power. What is unique about the Mungiki political choice was that

8 Includes assuming the name *munjama* (translated as 'warrior'), incorporating combat lexicons and warrior dances into non-militant environments, and choosing a diet of meat and milk (the preferred food of Kikuyu warriors preparing for war) (Kagwanja, 2005).

9 Kenyatta was also seen as a proxy candidate through which Moi intended on extending his patrimonial rule over Kenya (Kagwanja, 2005).

it endorsed Kenyatta not on the basis of his ethnic grouping, but because he represented youth. His subsequent defeat by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) party under the leadership of Mwai Kibaki, a veteran politician, was perceived to be a betrayal of the youth constituency. For the Mungiki, ethnic identification has become synonymous with discourses of youth and poverty. Generational transfers of power are central to its understanding of an ideal political culture (Fredericksen, 2010). Age-sets are a key structure in the Kikuyu ‘traditional’ social organisation, where the transfer of power from one generation to the next is a socially sanctioned ceremony enshrouded with rites of passage. When this transfer did not occur, the Mungiki directly fuelled social disarray and revolt: the periods following the elections evidenced numerous counts of destruction from the Mungiki, which even, at times, confessed to sponsorship from a KANU Member of Parliament (Kagwanja, 2005). The NARC government immediately resolved to destroy the Mungiki sect, which then responded by resorting to absolute violence (Ibid.) – a battle waged over a number of years.

As mentioned earlier, the state’s inability to maintain a monopoly over the use of violence and its unwillingness to uphold its responsibilities to the social contract have resulted in the continued growth of the Mungiki sect. The organisation has, in recent years, taken control of significant portions of Nairobi’s slums and taxed access to basic services including water, sanitation, rent and transportation (Dimova, 2010). Through this provision of basic services, the Mungiki has legitimised itself as a powerful stakeholder within both Kenyan society and politics (Ibid.). Media reports highlight a continued growing influence of the movement in the control and management of basic services, such as water and security, in slum settlements in Nairobi (Ruteere, 2008). The sect also operates protection services for a host of clientele, including poor slum dwellers, small business owners and transport operators, while charging fees to those who pass through their areas. The group maintained a reputable portfolio of crusades against alcohol, drugs, prostitution and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) throughout the late 1990s, but then used such positive social capital to take over Nairobi slums (Country of Origin, 2010). It is important to note that most media classify the Mungiki as an organised criminal gang that relies on extortion and violence to achieve its goals.

In her thesis, Dimova (2010) argues that this organisation is fundamentally a by-product of the same factors that have consistently destabilised the state since independence in 1964: unequal resource distribution and the ethno-politicisation of Kenyan society. In terms of the preconditions for the rise of political society, the Mungiki sect has satisfied most of the prerequisites by having members that comprise the urban youth, women, poor peasants, migrants and the internally displaced (Fredericksen, 2010). In different ways, these are population groups that have consistently been failed or targeted by a state that has been unsuccessful in delivering on its social contract.

Mungiki – the plague?

In a bid to increase its standing and influence in Kenya, the Mungiki regularly used violent practices – the sect is not only responsible for a high proportion of violence in Nairobi but has also been implicated in attacks on both citizens and the police. As its practices are derived from traditional Kikuyu teachings and traditions, the media has often dismissed the Mungiki as a traditionalist sect. Further, this portrayal has played a significant role in the manner in which other communities perceive the Mungiki, subsequently fuelling the fear of those who do not belong to this group. Over time, however, and with the constructed alliances that it enjoys with members of other communities, there has been a shift in perception: the Mungiki is now regarded as one of the few urban youth groups to be founded upon a genuine social and political agenda (Servant, 2007).

The Mungiki, according to Servant (2007), has established itself to be one of most powerful actors within Nairobi's 143 slums; subsequently, it is a major player within Nairobi, as 60% of city's population lives in such slums. The Mungiki continues to play a part in many of Kenya's challenges – be they religious tensions, ethnic frictions, political struggles, property rights or issues of security. By choosing sides within these divisive societal debates, the Mungiki has unintentionally perpetuated the negative thinking and perceptions that some continue to hold of it. The movement is a dynamic player in the realm of violence, and acts as a force in areas that are ignored by the police. Its militant methods of dealing with defectors are another reason for suspicion and fear.

Most defectors will admit that they are afraid of being severely harassed or killed; most individuals who leave the movement will often move to other towns to ensure their security (Ndūng'ũ, 2010). The Mungiki is adamant that one can never retire or defect from the movement.

Even though the Mungiki sect was banned in March 2002, it remains a prominent constituency in today's politics and its numbers continue to increase.¹⁰ Servant argues that the Mungiki phenomenon is part of the erosion of political legitimacy of the government and the physical insecurity that plagues Nairobi. Its propensity to commit violent crimes, however – highlighted by the 2009 Mathira Massacre – reduces its legitimacy in society.¹¹ In response to such violent acts, the government has addressed the issue of the Mungiki with force. In 2007, the government arrested over 2 464 members of the sect. It also established the Kwekwe force, a paramilitary unit mandated to crackdown on Mungiki. The Kwekwe force was sanctioned to use force, leading to the sect operating as a hit-squad (Alston, 2009). Despite police crackdowns, most Mungiki enjoy relative impunity throughout society, begging the question as to whether the masses, or groupings such as Mungiki, can be silenced. While state structures have tried to eliminate the sect, the Mungiki's visibility and operation as a central actor in Kenyan socio-economic circles is ironic, as the state continues to fail in delivering basic services.

The complex relationship between the Mungiki and the Kikuyu community is unique. The Mungiki does not see itself as ordinary Kikuyu, and its outsider status has created a second layer of conflict for the dynamic youth sect. A portion of its negative reputation has been influenced by violence committed against fellow Kikuyu tribesmen. Antagonisms between the Mungiki and Kikuyu society have often been overlooked, and this antagonism is said to have precluded Mungiki from committing revenge on behalf of Kikuyu society (Peters, 2011). The Mungiki view the ruling Kikuyu elites as conservatives who wanted to use

10 Warugi, A., 2011. Interview on Youth in Kenya by Grace Maina, 1 August 2011.

11 The Mungiki took responsibility for the death of 29 villagers in the Nyeri district of Kenya's Central Province on 21 April 2009. The attack was in response to the death of a Mungiki member a day earlier, who was said to be killed by a villager in the Nyeri district (*Daily Nation*, 2009).

politics instead of force during the Mau Mau independence struggle (Ibid.). During the Kibaki administration, a large number of Mungiki were murdered by police in extrajudicial killings, as a result of the government's frustration with increasing crime in Nairobi. Such killings not only increased antagonism between the organisation and the PNU government, but also pitted the Mungiki against many Kikuyus. Peters (2011) argues that Mungiki members are more concerned with intra-Kikuyu class conflict than inter-ethnic antagonisms, which were viewed as a Kikuyu elite strategy to retain power (Ndūng'ũ, 2010). On the other hand, there is also evidence that the Mungiki can be bought by the political elite to ensure specific ends; it is this service that contributes to the sect's loss of legitimacy within its communities. A third consideration to add is that the Mungiki also fought during the post-election violence to protect its Kikuyu communities.

Mungiki involvement in the 2007–8 post-election violence in Kenya

As surmised above, the 2007–8 elections were followed by outbursts of violence across many of Kenya's regions. However, some have questioned the conclusion that the violence was solely because of the contested election results. The fact that coordinated attacks in the Rift Valley occurred before the final results were announced underscores the reality that the elections were a trigger, but not the root cause, of the violence. Kenya's political environment at the time had been inflated with ethnic hatred, stereotyping and suspicion throughout the campaigning period (CIPEV, 2008). Ethnic violence was systematically carried out by private armies/militias commissioned by particular politicians to safeguard their political interests (Ndūng'ũ, 2010). It is this creation and strengthening of militia groups by Kenyan politicians that legitimises these groups to their populations, and such legitimacy is difficult to withdraw. A March 2009 survey by the organisation Media Focus on Africa highlighted the widely held belief that politicians were seen as the main instigators of violence throughout Kenya's provinces, as the following percentages of respondents identified politicians as key antagonists: Rift Valley (95%), Western (92%), Central (91.8%), Coast (91.2%), North Eastern (89.3%), Nairobi (88.5%), Nyanza (83.5%) and Eastern

(55%) (Media Focus on Africa, 2009). What was significant in this election, as with the previous election, was the presence of the Mungiki during the post-election violence cycle, which symbolised the importance of generational politics as a counterforce to state power and government corruption.

During the 2007–8 post-election violence, a substantial proportion of the population participated in protests – a reality that Dimova (2010) attributes to the snowball effect of grassroots mobilisation. The forces behind grassroots youth mobilisation could be summarised as: political populism, flawed election results, historical continuities, an entrenched culture of political violence and the diffusion of formal monopoly on violence (Ibid.). Following attacks on Kikuyu tribesmen in the Rift Valley, there was a popular perception that the government was unable to maintain its monopoly on violence and, subsequently, that “the Kikuyu community seems to be slowly accepting the Mungiki sect in its stead” (Frederiksen, 2010:1084; Waki Commission 2008:215). It is at this juncture in the conflict when the Mungiki began offering security for a community with whom it had previously been at odds. The Mungiki’s actual involvement in post-election violence has been of great interest to many, as the NARC-led coalition government viciously targeted them for years while the Mungiki’s leadership was either in jail or hiding in fear of arrest (Ruteere, 2009). The Mungiki’s propensity to mobilise quickly and in great numbers was a surprise to many. When discussing the baffling nature of the Mungiki, Fredericksen (2010) summarises the grouping as one that is closely related to formal politics, negotiating with representatives of national political parties and seeking to register first as an organisation, then as a political party. At the same time, the Mungiki is a proscribed organisation, and its members and leaders are hunted down, harassed and sometimes killed. In Nairobi’s slums, the Mungiki compete with religious and welfare-oriented NGOs that offer promises of social mobility through voluntary work and access to foreign funding, and which are less active in their critique of the state (Fredericksen, 2010).

When studying the involvement of the Mungiki in the aftermath of the post-election violence, Ndũng’ũ makes an interesting observation that in the Mathare slums, many tenants from the Luo community refused to pay their rent as a demonstration of their solidarity against the Kikuyu community. The landlords in the area engaged the Mungiki to collect the rent for a commission (Ndũng’ũ,

2010) – a service that the sect has maintained to date.¹² The prevalence of crime and high levels of poverty in the slums is a big factor in explaining the success of Mungiki operations in the area (Ndūng'ũ, 2010). As the government has been incapable of responding effectively in Kenya's slums, groups such as the Mungiki, which can enforce some form of order, are able to flourish (Ndūng'ũ, 2010). However, it is important to note that during the periods following the elections, the police resumed their crackdown on the group: a number of the Mungiki's leaders were executed in 2008 and, controversy persists as to who was responsible for these executions (Ruteere, 2009). What is interesting is that this has not crippled the growth of the movement.

The Mungiki is but one useful illustration of a constituency that is growing as a result of disgruntlement and discontent. There are a number of youth groupings in Kenya that also continue to grow, with the same frustrations. The discussion of this group is illustrative of the danger that lies in marginalising a segment of the population – in this case, the youth.

Recommendations on enhancing the youth constituency to avert future conflict

Creation of preventive action platforms

The Kenyan government and CSOs need to formulate a preventive action plan that includes an early warning component which monitors different communities and potential violent outbreaks. This needs to be matched with adequate response mechanisms.

The alienation of the youth and their standing as a stakeholder rather than an actor inhibits serious efforts for the government to incorporate this demographic constructively. A culture of peace can only be created by working together: the platform being proposed here speaks to how government and CSOs can engage with one another and with the youth to promote peace.

Constant conversations on peace must be encouraged. It is ineffective to continue to deliberate on issues of peace without meaningfully involving the

12 Warugi, A., 2011. Interview on Youth in Kenya by Grace Maina, 1 August 2011.

youth constituency. Creative methods can be used to encourage dialogue, but these must never replace direct and encompassing conversation and negotiation. Panels formed to address particular national issues must always include a legitimate youth perspective, and this can be done by ensuring that youth from all segments of Kenyan society are represented in different policy dimensions. It goes without saying that the youth are passionate about participating; the question is whether the government and all other stakeholders are engaging them actively as partners to ensure the sustainability of peace. It is impossible to pre-emptively prevent conflict without addressing this large segment of Kenyan society.

Encourage youth economic growth

One of the most acute problems that confronts the youth is that of economic marginalisation: unemployment continues to be a big issue in Kenya for both skilled and unskilled individuals. Most political campaigns are dominated by promises for the creation of jobs, but these promises are often unmatched. The lack of jobs leads to idle and frustrated youth, making them a likely target for recruitment into destructive criminal or violent activity. In rural areas, land distribution grievances result in high numbers of angry, idle youth who could easily be manipulated into violence.

There is a need to seek creative ideas to rejuvenate the growth of the Kenyan economy and create more opportunities for youth to acquire technical skills. The Kenyan government must simultaneously increase the equitable distribution of resources and use affirmative action policies to encourage and harness youth initiatives. Economic policies – including on access to land and starting small businesses, as well as quotas for youth demographics – must be enacted and widely disseminated to help facilitate youth development.

Taking into consideration that most youth are in the informal sectors of society, it is imperative that investments are made into informal spaces and livelihood channels for youth. This would include reorienting the education system to include technical skills that could form a ready market for youth self-employment

opportunities. Whilst this is being done, creative ways in which to enhance such efforts should be encouraged, as this could be a vital method by which the youth can be engaged.

Meaningful security finds expression in freeing individuals from want. Therefore, it is imperative that if we are to speak of security for the youth, then this must include reasonable economic freedom – which, in turn, requires constant creative thinking that seeks to narrow the gaps of economic inequality.

Deliberate inclusion of youth in political life

Political life in Kenya needs to transcend the ruling elites and include new youthful leadership. Most of today's dominant figures have been in the political circles since the independence movement of the 1950s. This creates the impression that politics is the domain of the few, favouring the ruling elites.¹³ Gradually, there is a call to include the youth in the decision-making arena. Former President Moi is renowned for his statement that the youth is tomorrow's future leadership – but, as time has passed, the question has become: when will the future be?

The violent upheavals experienced over time in urban centres can be seen as youth attempts to overcome frustration, stemming from sentiments of inferiority. There is seemingly a battle between the ordinary citizens versus the ruling elites (Dimova, 2010). Violence, resulting from feelings of exclusion, then becomes a meaningful force of change. The concern, subsequently, is whether this demographic will seek to consolidate itself to counter the exclusion it experiences. This might take the form of social protests or outright violent attacks. Also, if the youth constitutes 75% of Kenya's population, it is only proper that representation be equitable.

Moving beyond paper protection and provisioning

There is a need to increase the knowledge and understanding of youth policies and platforms. The one finding of this work is that the limited knowledge of

13 Omaera, M., 2011. Interview on Youth in Kenya by Grace Maina, 4 August 2011.

what is contained in the policies has been the detriment of the youth movement. Most young people are hugely unaware of the policies and programmes that exist to enhance their lives (NPI, 2009). Also, a harmonised definition of what youth means is critical to ensuring that the constituency is properly engaged; while an increased knowledge of the policies would also act as a check to ensure that the government implements the articulated policy plans. A uniform concept of 'youth' would also help agencies and organisations coordinate policies and responses to youth challenges (Ibid).

The Kenyan Human Development Report looks into priority areas for the youth demographic and identifies issues of youth migration, youth unemployment, youth groups at risk (such as disabled and HIV-infected youths) and issues of gender. Taking these issues into consideration, there is a realisation that if the goals articulated in Vision 2030¹⁴ are to be realised, there must be a reasonable degree of inclusion of youth in the development agenda. This inclusion must bear a gender balance to ensure that the needs of female youth are met (UNDP, 2010).

Better coordination and integration of the various national policies would ensure that the youth are adequately provided for and represented. The World Development Report, in evaluating former Kenyan youth politics, recommended that there is a need to invest in youth citizenship, as this will have an implication on issues of participation and development (World Bank, 2007).

Effective service delivery

As already discussed in this chapter, the government's inability to deliver on its social contract mandate is of concern. It is a greater concern for populations that live in slum areas, where the government lacks the necessary infrastructure to deliver basic goods and services. The Mungiki, for example, has been operating like an underground government, delivering basic social services such as water,

14 Kenya Vision 2030 is a 2007 policy document, published by the Kenyan CSO "The Youth Agenda" that outlines economic, social, and political policies for enhancing future youth participation in Kenyan society.

sanitation and security.¹⁵ The problem with this is the increased legitimacy of groups such as the Mungiki, with people now looking to them to deliver rather than the government.

A question asked for the purposes of this research is how the Kenyan government can reclaim legitimacy over its citizens. The response echoed was that the government must be able to increase and enhance its service delivery. There must be no population groups that feel they are unprotected or uncared for by the government. As it is, there is the perception that the government is available in affluent areas but, other than occasional harassment by the police, they are unavailable in low-income areas where the majority of city populations live.

The security of a person cannot be regarded as the concern and responsibility of a vigilante group, and it is worrying that local populations have come to trust and accept these vigilante groups as their protectors. There is an urgent need to enhance the security sector throughout the country. Service delivery is key to averting conflict in Kenya: if people feel that their government cares, they are likely to engage more positively.

Enhancing the Kenyan identity

Throughout Kenya's history, politics has been the pawn of excessive ethnic manipulation. Identity in and of itself is not a bad thing, but the manipulation of one identity against another or the deliberate assumption that one ethnic grouping is greater than another is a cause of conflict. Election periods have often been characterised by ethnic 'pulling', where politicians appeal to their targeted constituents from an ethnic platform. This can only be countered by the realisation of one national identity. Over time, there has been an emphasis that every citizen is first a Kenyan. This, however, has constantly been undermined by politicians, who have used exclusionary ethnic platforms to consolidate power around themselves. There is the need to look into what it means to be a Kenyan, and to promote this ideal.

15 Osido, K., 2011. Interview on Youth in Kenya by Grace Maina, 11 August 2011.

Politicking on the basis of ethnicity needs to be discouraged, as this continues to undermine the whole political experience. In the recent past, action over hate speech has been taken, and this has resulted in politicians being more accountable for how they motivate the masses. The indictment of the ‘Ocampo Six’ has also been instrumental in showing that there are repercussions to inciting one community against the other.

The Kenyan identity is an ideal that can be realised in future generations and in this specific youth generation. As ironic as it may be, the analysis that the Mungiki sees itself as a youth bloc first before it is Kikuyu, is instructive – perhaps the youth generation can overcome tribal politics. However, it also raises a new concern: division on the basis of economic class. The Kenyan identity that is proposed here needs to counter not only tribal politics, but also class stratification and the associated exclusions.

Conclusion

This chapter identified the root causes of Kenyan conflicts to be the same over the years, as issues of ethnicity, marginalisation and exclusion continue to characterise socio-economic and political life in the country. An interesting dynamic is that the stratification in society is no longer confined to identity based on ethnicity, but transcends these divisions to issues of class and age. Gradually, populations excluded from the full benefits of Kenyan identity because of poverty and age are consolidating and mobilising themselves around the commonalities of their struggles and life. It is these similar life experiences that continue to solidify a common identity, which then legitimises the workings of social groupings such as the Mungiki. If the youth continue to be marginalised, they will find expression in these militia groupings, who offer them a platform to engage.

Issues of service delivery are pertinent to the whole youth constituency. To reverse the trend of underground governance, as discussed here with regard to the Mungiki, the government must engage effectively in service delivery. This is the only way the populations will begin to look upon the government

as the rightful custodian of the social contract. If local populations in slums and the lower-income areas of the country continue to receive social services from militia groups, the value of the government to those populations will always be questioned. Enshrining the need for and importance of youth development in Article 55 of the 2010 Constitution was an important first step for Kenya. However, a multifaceted approach is required to mobilise this constituency effectively.

Human security challenges must also be addressed to relieve the pressure arising from the rapidly increasing youth population. There is a danger when the internal security of any state is reliant on vigilante youth groups. The ease in which local populations seem to have adjusted to security offered by the Mungiki for a charge is worrying. The lack of security in low-income areas and the inability of the state to protect all citizens is a growing concern – and the gap that vigilante groups occupy continues to legitimise private security brokers over the state. Every citizen is entitled to security, and it is the responsibility of the state to ensure that each citizen is recipient of this security. The government must find creative ways through which to safeguard the citizens' right to security.

The argument for the generational transfer of power has merit. The political machinery of Kenya must make space for the youth. There is inherent danger in ignoring this constituency, as this is likely to result in youth mobilisation. As evidenced elsewhere in the world, the power of such mobilisation and social protests cannot be disregarded. Should the youth consolidate around this identity – and this can happen – the result could be mass action, which will demand political inclusion and transformation. There is thus an urgent need to find ways to absorb and engage the youth population meaningfully, so as to curtail their exploitation and ensure sustainable peace.

References

Alston, P. (2009) Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. *United Nations Human Rights Council* [Internet], 27 May. Available from: <<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4a3f526d2>> [Accessed 4 July 2011].

Anderson D. (2002) Vigilantes, violence, and the politics of public order in Kenya. *African Affairs*, 101, pp. 531–555.

Atieno, A. (2007) Mungiki: 'Neo-Mau Mau' & the prospects for democracy in Kenya. *Review of African Political Economy*, 34 (113), pp. 526–531.

Bratton, M. and Kimenyi, M. (2008) Voting in Kenya: putting ethnicity in perspective. *University of Connecticut Economics Working Papers* [Internet], 1 March. Available from: <<http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econwpapers/200809>> [Accessed 17 August 2011].

Cincotta, R.P., Engelman, R. and Anastasion, D. (2003) *The security demographic: population and civil conflict after the Cold War*. Washington, DC, Population Action International.

Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence (CIPEV). (2008) Kenya: Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence (CIPEV) final report. *Government of Kenya* [Internet], 18 October. Available from: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-319092.pdf> [Accessed 4 July 2011].

Country of Origin. (2010) Kenya: Mungiki – abusers or abused? *Landinfo Country of Origin Information Centre* [Internet]. Available from: <www.landinfo.no/asset/1123/1/1123_1.pdf> [Accessed 20 May 2011].

Dercon, S. and Romero, R. (2010) Triggers and characteristics of the 2007 Kenyan election violence. *Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford* [Internet]. Available from: <<http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2010-12text.pdf>> [Accessed 17 August 2011].

Dimova, M. (2010) Bullets beyond ballots: re-examining the 2007–2008 post-election violence through longer-standing youth mobilisation patterns in the slum areas of Kibera, Nairobi. M.A. thesis, Utrecht University.

Frederiksen, B. (2010) Mungiki, vernacular organization and political society in Kenya. *Development and Change*, 41 (6), pp. 1065–1089.

Hanson, S. (2008) Understanding Kenyan politics. *The Council on Foreign Relations* [Internet], 25 January. Available from: <<http://www.cfr.org/kenya/understanding-kenyas-politics/p15322>> [Accessed 11 August 2011].

International Crisis Group (ICG). (2008) Kenya in crisis. *International Crisis Group* [Internet], 21 February. Available from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/137_kenya_in_crisis_web.pdf> [Accessed 20 May 2011].

Kagwanja, P. (2003) Facing Mount Kenya or facing Mecca? The Mungiki, ethnic violence, and the politics of succession in Kenya, 1987–2002. *African Affairs*, 102, pp. 25–49.

Kagwanja, P. (2005) 'Power to Uhuru': youth identity and generational politics in Kenya's 2002 elections. *African Affairs*, 105, pp. 51–75.

Kimenyi, M. and Romero, R. (2008) Identity, grievances, and economic determinants of voting in the 2007 Kenyan elections. *University of Connecticut Economics Working Papers*

[Internet], 1 September. Available from: <http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1377&context=econ_wpapers> [Accessed 17 August 2011].

Knowles, J.C. and Behrman, J. (2003) Expert Meeting on Assessing the Economic Benefit of Investing in Youth in Developing Countries (Background Paper). National Research Council [Internet] 15 October. Available from: <http://www.youthnet.org.hk/adh/1_MakingcaseADH/World%20Bank%20-%20Assessing%20Economic%20Returns%20of%20Investing%20in%20Yout.pdf> [Accessed 17 August 2011].

Media Focus on Africa. (2009) Kenya national poll survey results: sources of conflict and approaches towards conflict transformation and sustainable peace in Kenya. *Media Focus on Africa* [Internet], April. Available from: <<http://www.mediafocusafrica.org/media/documents/REPORT%20Apr-09%20-%20Sources%20of%20Conflict%20and%20Approaches%20towards%20Conflict%20Transformation%20and%20Sustainable%20Peace%20in%20Kenya%20-%20National%20Poll%20Survey%20Results.pdf>> [Accessed 20 May 2011].

Muthee, M. (2010) Hitting the target, missing the point: youth policies and programmes in Kenya. *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars* [Internet]. Available from: <<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/hitting-the-target-missing-the-point-youth-policies-and-programmes-kenya>> [Accessed 4 July 2011].

Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI). (2009) A review of challenges faced by Kenyan youth: peace agenda in youth development. *Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa* [Internet]. Available from: <www.npi-africa.org/docs/peace_agenda_in_youth_development.pdf> [Accessed 4 July 2011].

Ndũng'ũL. (2010) Militia and conflict: the case of the Mungiki in Kenya. M.A. thesis, Hekima College.

Njonjo, K.S, Rugo, A.M. and Muigei, N.C. (2009) Youth Situation Review and Investment in Kenya. *UNICEF* [Internet]. Available from: <<http://www.ieakenya.or.ke/documents/UNICEF%20Youth%20Review%20%20Investment.pdf>> [Accessed 4 July 2011].

Obulutsa, G. (2008) Kenya turmoil may cost economy \$1bln: finmin. *Reuters* [Internet], 8 January. Available from: <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/08/us-kenya-violence-cost-idUSLA48182020080108>> [Accessed 20 May 2011].

Otieno, W. (2009) Kenya country profile: higher education system. *The International Comparative Higher Education and Finance Project – University of Buffalo* [Internet]. Available from: <http://gse.buffalo.edu/org/inthigheredfinance/files/Country_Profiles/Africa/Kenya.pdf> [Accessed 25 April 2012].

Peters, J. (2011) Revisiting Mungiki's role in the 2007–2008 Kenyan post-election violence. *Coalition on Peace in Africa* [Internet], 17 March. Available from: <http://copafrica.org/files/Revisiting_Mungiki's_Role_in_PEV.pdf> [Accessed 20 May 2011].

Population Reference Bureau. (2011) Kenya's population data sheet. *Kenyan National Co-ordinating Agency for Population and Development* [Internet]. Available from:

<http://www.ncapd-ke.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=166:kenya-population-data-sheet-2011&catid=66&Itemid=61> [Accessed 12 August 2011].

Rasmussen, J. (2010) Mungiki as youth movement: revolution, gender and generational politics in Nairobi, Kenya. *Young*, 18 (301), pp. 301–319.

Republic of Kenya. (2007) National youth policy for youth development. *Ministry of State for Youth Affairs, Republic of Kenya* [Internet]. Available from: <<http://www.g-youth.org/main/images/youth.pdf>> [Accessed 4 July 2011].

Rheault, M. and Tortora, B. (2008) In Kenya, most ethnic groups distrust 2007 election. *Gallup* [Internet], 30 October. Available from: <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/111622/kenya-most-ethnic-groups-distrust-2007-election.aspx>> [Accessed 17 August 2011].

Ruteere, M. (2008) Dilemmas of crime, human rights, and the politics of Mungiki violence in Kenya. *Kenya Human Rights Institute* [Internet]. Available from: <<http://srsn.com/abstract=1462685>> [Accessed 20 May 2011].

Saunders School of Business. (2009) Empowering Kenyan youth through business education. *Saunders School of Business* [Internet]. Available from: <<http://www.africa.saunders.ubc.ca/library/2PageDescription.pdf>> [Accessed 11 August 2011].

Servant, J.C. (2007) Kikuyus muscle in on security & politics: Kenya's righteous youth militia. *Review of African Political Economy*, 34 (13), pp. 521–526.

The Economist. (2010) Kenya and east Africa: can Kenya make its new deal work? *The Economist* [Internet], 28 October. Available from: <<http://www.economist.com/node/17373983>> [Accessed 20 May 2011].

The Youth Agenda (2010). The Youth Agenda: Strategic Plan 2011–2015. *The Youth Agenda* [Internet]. Available from: <http://www.youthagenda.org/images/stories/downloads/StrategicPlan2011_2015.pdf> [Accessed 4 July 2011].

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2010) Kenya national human development report; youth and human development: tapping the untapped resource. *United Nations Development Programme* [Internet], June. Available from: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/africa/kenya/Kenya_NHDR_2009_EN.pdf> [Accessed 4 July 2011].

United Nations Office of Civilian and Human Resources (OCHR). (2008) Report from OCHR fact-finding mission to Kenya, 6–28 February 2008. *United Nations Office of Civilian and Human Resources* [Internet]. Available from: <<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/OHCHRKenya-report.pdf>> [Accessed 11 August 2011].

United Nations Population Fund (UNPFA). (2005) The case for investing in young people as part of the national poverty reduction strategy. Paper commissioned by the United Nations Population Fund. New York, UNPFA.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). (2010) Uppsala Conflict Data Program. *Uppsala Universitet* [Internet]. Available from: <<http://www.ucdp.uu.se/database/>> [Accessed 20 May 2011].

UKAid. (2010) Embracing the practice of conflict-sensitive approaches: an analysis of the Kenyan conflict. *UKAid*, Department for International Development [Internet]. Available from: <<http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/publications/embracing-practice-conflict-sensitive-approaches-analysis-kenyan-context>> [Accessed 20 May 2011].

United States Agency for International Development (USAID). (2009) Cross-sectoral assessment for at-risk youth in Kenya. *United States Agency for International Development* [Internet], 16 November. Available from: <<http://kenya.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/Cross-sectoral%20Assessment%20of%20At-Risk%20Youth%20in%20Kenya.pdf>> [Accessed 4 July 2011].

Waki Commission. (2008) Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence: Nairobi. Republic of Kenya [Internet]. Available from: <<http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/PEV%20Report.pdf>> [Accessed 19 May 2011].

World Bank. (2007) World Development Report 2007: Development and the next generation. *World Bank* [Internet]. Available from: <http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/09/13/000112742_20060913111024/Rendered/PDF/359990WDR0complete.pdf> [Accessed 4 July 2011].