Theme: Political Unrest or Violence

By 7 October 2020, African countries will have been managing the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic for approximately 29 weeks. While the rate of infections and deaths has been high in many countries in other parts of the world, this has not been particularly so for Africa. Apart from South Africa, which is among the top 10 countries with the highest infection rate, the reported rate of infections and deaths has been low in many other African countries. Early precautionary measures were taken, before many (in some countries any) infections and deaths. This strategy seems to have been effective at containing the virus, but it compromised livelihoods, thus exacerbating existing socio-economic and political vulnerabilities.

There is an important need for relevant stakeholders to adopt strategies aimed at reaching out to farming and pastoralist communities, if the fight for the mitigation and possible eradication of the COVID-19 pandemic is to have any meaningful effect.

COVID-19 has affected all sectors of Malian society, especially the security, economic and social dimensions. In terms of security, the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic have enabled jihadists to firmly re-establish themselves in central Mali and to make new inroads towards the west of the country. Economically and socially, COVID-19 and the measures introduced to prevent it have severely disrupted the lives of many people in Mali.

Since independence, the Republic of Mali has been faced with situations of political, institutional and security instability. Although the state of governance in Mali is weak and fragile, and is now under further pressure from COVID-19, it has adopted several policies and programmes to advance the youth and engage in the future development of the country. However, these initiatives do not address the specific needs of young women.

Long before the arrival of COVID-19, the Sahel and West Africa were two particular regions in Africa that were confronted by many complex and interrelated security and humanitarian challenges. From violent conflict to famine and other humanitarian difficulties, the spread of COVID-19 is magnifying the threats to the region’s most vulnerable populations. Arguably, the most challenging of these issues are the toxic atmosphere and insecurity created as a result of the activities of armed violent extremist groups.

More than one year after the signing of the landmark Constitutional Declaration, Sudan’s ongoing transition remains one of the most important political transformations on the African continent. The country’s transition is fluid and complex, and undeniable areas of progress and reform continue to come up against deeply entrenched interests and inequalities, which have been compounded by COVID-19.

The COVID-19 pandemic is directly and indirectly affecting governments’ ability to secure their populations. This is also the case of the core Sahel countries – which, in this brief, are defined as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Officially, none of them have been severely affected by the pandemic. However, this does not mean that COVID-19 effects could not materialise. The effects of COVID-19 will come, and while they may mainly be indirect, the consequences could be an additional burden on political and social systems that are already close to the brink.

For several years, the Sahel has been facing insecurity. Niger, by virtue of its geographical position, is the Sahel country most affected by this insecurity, due to persistent attacks by non-state armed groups in its western region bordering Burkina Faso and Mali, and in its eastern region (the Lake Chad Basin), where Boko Haram is active. In addition to this, there is now the added threat of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The call for a global ceasefire by United Nations (UN) Secretary General António Guterres came at an appropriate time, when the world needed to stop fighting and focus on the danger of the COVID-19 pandemic looming over us. However, more collective and inclusive action is required to make this a reality.

West Africa and the Sahel, which have been in the throes of insurgencies since the early 1990s and have had to deal with extremist violence from the mid-2000s, are faced with a new challenge: how do already underfunded, resource-constrained and, in most cases, poorly trained security forces respond to new threats?