Mediation in situations of civil conflict are never easy. It requires travel, both air and on the ground, sometimes to far off areas where the terrain may not be easy to traverse. It also requires confidential face-to-face discussions and, when momentum towards an agreement is detected, then time becomes a valuable commodity, and shuttling between parties to narrow differences, and edge towards a compromise, becomes vital.
It will take more than just the political will of international and national actors to pave a smooth path for long-term stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Based on its security, social, and political dynamics, the DRC needs a total rebuilding of its institutions.
South Sudan’s peace process is still largely up for negotiation. A new South Sudan must emerge through a civilian technocratic government. This will require transforming the way security forces control the state. It also means being serious about addressing the root causes of conflict, implementing a transitional parliament, drafting a new constitution, deciding what type of federalism best suits the country and strengthening the electoral commission.
The peace process in South Sudan is still highly vulnerable to relapse. Although the Revitalized Peace Agreement has brought large-scale fighting to an end, inter-communal conflict has flared up and will most likely be a major cause of instability and displacement in the year ahead. The implementation of the peace agreement has been slow and uneven with the parties mainly focused on elite power-sharing arrangements. In the meantime, the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has contributed to delaying the full implementation of the peace agreement and it has also disrupted the work of the United Nations. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has implemented enhanced mitigation and prevention measures after a recent significant increase in COVID-19 cases in South Sudan, which has been mirrored by an increase in cases among UN personnel.
After seven years of deadly conflict and repeated attempts to reach peace deals in South Sudan, former rebel leader Dr. Riek Machar returned to Juba in February 2020 to be sworn in as Vice President as a part of the implementation of the September 2018 agreement. A combination of factors, including a lack of political will from the top leadership, the COVID-19 pandemic, flooding, and economic crises, has ensured very little progress during the implementation period from 22 February 2020, to 22 February 2021. During this time, the parties hesitatingly managed to form a government, but the parliament and national commissions are yet to be created.
March 2021 marks a year after the executive branch of the Revitalized Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) was established partially in South Sudan at the national level. Since then the reconstituted Council of Ministers has been operationalized under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, assisted by five Vice Presidents who represent the principal parties to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). These top political leaders were entrusted with running the machinery of the government through clusters of ministries, commissions, authorities, and independent specialized mechanisms. However, the peace process has been moving at a slow pace as key provisions of the R-ARCSS could not be implemented in time. The presence of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has become questionable too for pushing the parties into creating a conducive environment for the unification of forces, institutional reforms, humanitarian responses, return of displaced citizens, economic reforms, constitutional making, conducting population census and holding general elections towards the end of 36-month transitional period. The scourge of COVID-19 and associated restrictions have further complicated the peace process since 2020.
The African Union (AU) mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been deployed in Somalia since 2007 and has significantly improved the security situation in Somalia. The main insurgency group, Al-Shabaab, is still present in most areas of Somalia. The postponed elections have created increased political tension and confrontations between the security forces and opposition supporters. The deterioration in the political situation constitutes a direct threat to the gains made since 2007. This takes place against the backdrop of COVID-19, which in recent weeks, has caused a rise in positive cases thereby exacerbating an increasingly difficult humanitarian crisis.
At the time of writing, the term of Somalia’s bicameral parliament and the presidency have both expired. Between July and September 2020, four conferences were held and attended by leaders of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS). Led by Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmaajo’, three out of the four conferences ended without an agreement that had the full consensus of all parties. Since the establishment of a Federal Somalia in 2004, there has been a contentious relationship between the centre (FGS) and periphery (FMS), stemming from the lack of consensus on the nature and the scope of Somalia’s federation. This tense relationship has contributed to a fragmented political environment that has hindered a common agenda on national priorities. With no meaningful amelioration during President Farmaajo’s four-year term, this state of affairs has negatively impacted Somalia as it enters national elections in February 2021.
The impact of COVID-19 has become far-reaching and multidimensional in nature. It ranges from social, cultural, physical, economic to political dimensions. While many countries are working hard to ensure that the impact is minimised, new challenges are emerging. It is clear that the pressure of the pandemic has exacerbated a mounting economic crisis.
Climate change is contributing to shaping the security and development context around the Lake Chad Basin. The governance deficits, underdevelopment and socio-economic plight of communities living in the Lake Chad Basin have been further exacerbated by environmental stresses and, most recently, also by the COVID-19 pandemic. Climate-related droughts exacerbate water shortages and related stresses, aggravate existing social vulnerabilities and impair the abilities of communities to adapt to changes in their social-ecological systems.