The coup d’état in Mali which occurred on 24 May 2021, the second in nine months, marks another critical juncture for the country. Mali continues to face a multi-faceted crisis: a resilient jihadist insurgency which is highly active in northern, central and increasingly southern parts of the country, communal violence and the rising prominence of self-defence militias.
This month, the United Nations Security Council will renew the mandate of the 8-year-old United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) at a time of multiple transitions and great uncertainties, which we have analysed in this recent EPON report.
Since May 2020, violent conflict has killed 2,070 people in Mali. Insecurity has forcibly displaced more than 300,000 people, of whom 56 per cent are women. The drivers of Mali’s multiple conflicts are not arcane. Meaningful dialogues around poverty, marginalisation, limited livelihood opportunities, weak governance, political instability and more, can open doors to engaging with the community militias and armed groups that operate in the country. More reason, then, to ensure that the turbulent winds of climate change do not blow those doors shut.
The conflict in the North of Cabo Delgado has been presented in international media as a phenomenon of terrorism and Islamic radicalization. This kind of analysis does not pay due attention to the political economy of the region, nor does it capture the complex internal and external causes of the phenomenon.
For many Chadians, news of the sudden death of President Idris Déby Itno on 20 April 2021, crowned the past year as an annus horribilis, while sending shockwaves through the wider Sahel and around the world. Sixty-eight-year-old Déby, who took power in 1990 when his rebel forces deposed then-President and autocratic leader Hissène Habré, died from gunshot wounds sustained on the frontlines of fighting rebels belonging to a group called “Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad” (French acronym, FACT) in the north of Chad. The shock news came just a day after the veteran ruler won his sixth term as president amid boycotts from the main political opposition.
On 5 October 2017, unknown armed men attacked the town of Mocimboa da Praia, in the far North of the Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado. The attack primarily targeted government institutions, with a focus on police stations. The attack was later determined to have been carried out by members of the local communities, primarily young Muslim men. The government’s security forces acted quickly to stop the attacks and keep the situation under control. As a result, some of the attackers were either killed or arrested. This appears to have infuriated them, as they simply went underground and metamorphosed into guerrilla units capable of confronting government security forces after three years.
What can we learn from the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for Cabo Delgado? One key lesson from the Somalia experience is that a security operation like AMISOM can create the opportunity for stabilisation, but for that opportunity to be turned into reality one needs a significant focus on political engagement, governance, rule of law, basic services and socio-economic development.
Peace is undoubtedly the basis for the development of any society, especially for developing countries. In Africa, peace may be accepted as the absence of armed conflicts or the silence of weapons – even though poverty, the result of injustice and social inequalities, exacerbated by the unequal distribution of wealth, as well as corruption, unemployment and natural disasters, among other evils, are prevalent throughout the continent – and this much desired laying down of arms and absence of armed conflicts by a considerable number of African countries is an essential condition for combating poverty, restoring justice, socioeconomic and political stability, and sustainable development, including at regional and continental levels.
On 22 March 2020, the first case of COVID-19 was announced in Mozambique, followed by the government’s declaration of its first state of emergency on 1 April 2020. In the northern region of Cabo Delgado and neighbouring provinces, the spread of the virus is of additional relevance as, at the time of writing, more than 670,000 people have been displaced due to violent extremist attacks.
Among other things, Cameroon has responded to the pandemic by relying on local political practices as well as diplomatic experiences with neighbouring countries in order to maintain its sub-regional leadership. By analysing how COVID-19 shapes local governance, this piece looks on the one hand at the entanglement between conflicts and the pandemic and on the other hand, it shows how the ‘sedimentation’ of the new pandemic unveils local political practices which affect Cameroon’s relationships with neighbouring countries.