Theme: Political Unrest or Violence

On 9 July 2021, South Sudan commemorated its 1o-year anniversary as an independent, sovereign state. The celebrations across the country were quiet. The exuberant scenes of 2011 gave way to pensive stocktaking as South Sudan emerges from a vicious cycle of civil war and a weakened economy brought to the brink by the COVID-19 pandemic. What has remained however is the resilience of the people of South Sudan, and their ability to look toward a future of peace, stability, and development. Their hope rests on the permanent ceasefire which has continued to hold since 2017, and the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), signed in 2018 following the breakdown of the previous peace agreement.

One cannot stabilize the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) without building a trustworthy and effective local and national political leadership, desecuritizing the national political narrative, and depoliticizing national security operations.

IGAD upgraded its presence in various IGAD Member States namely; Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda to full time presence instead of ad hoc engagements or small liaison offices, while Djibouti remains the seat of the Secretariat and the Executive Secretary. The IGAD presence in the Republic of South Sudan started with a liaison office at the sub-national regional government of southern Sudan in 2005 to follow up on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and upgraded to a small Juba Liaison Office after South Sudan’s independence on 9 July 2011.

The 9th of July 2021 marks the first decade of independence of the Republic of South Sudan and the challenges of nation-state building. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) paved the way for separation of Southern Sudan from the Sudan in 2011 through a referendum for self-determination. Though the parties pledged to make unity of the Sudan attractive, the people did not believe.

On 25 May 2021 Mali saw its second coup within less than a year. The developments in May presented an interruption in Mali’s transitional process that makes a successful transition less likely than ever. Mali is again at a crossroads.

On the afternoon of 24 May 2021, the Malian Transitional President, Bah N’Daw, and his Prime Minister Moctar Ouane were arrested by elements of the Malian Armed Forces and taken to the Soundiata Keïta military camp in Kati. Wild rumours circulated in Bamako. Finally, the Malians were informed of the events that they have become used to for some time. They were wondering about this umpteenth coup d’état.

The coup d’état in Mali which occurred on 24 May 2021, the second in nine months, marks another critical juncture for the country. Mali continues to face a multi-faceted crisis: a resilient jihadist insurgency which is highly active in northern, central and increasingly southern parts of the country, communal violence and the rising prominence of self-defence militias.

This month, the United Nations Security Council will renew the mandate of the 8-year-old United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) at a time of multiple transitions and great uncertainties, which we have analysed in this recent EPON report.

Since May 2020, violent conflict has killed 2,070 people in Mali. Insecurity has forcibly displaced more than 300,000 people, of whom 56 per cent are women. The drivers of Mali’s multiple conflicts are not arcane. Meaningful dialogues around poverty, marginalisation, limited livelihood opportunities, weak governance, political instability and more, can open doors to engaging with the community militias and armed groups that operate in the country. More reason, then, to ensure that the turbulent winds of climate change do not blow those doors shut.

The conflict in the North of Cabo Delgado has been presented in international media as a phenomenon of terrorism and Islamic radicalization. This kind of analysis does not pay due attention to the political economy of the region, nor does it capture the complex internal and external causes of the phenomenon.