Theme: Cross-border / Inter-State tensions

Tensions between the Ethiopian government and regional government of Tigray came to a head on 3–4 November, after the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) attacked a federal government position in Mekelle, Tigray’s capital. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed responded immediately with air strikes and ground attacks. While the underlying causes of the conflict relate to competing visions over the nature of the Ethiopian state, the immediate cause of the fighting was the National Election Board of Ethiopia’s (NEBE) decision in March to indefinitely postpone the elections that were scheduled for August 2020, due to COVID-19.

A blended approach to stabilisation is emerging in Africa. It is characterised by a response to crisis-affected settings, which combines the predominance and sometimes necessary means of hard-security interventions and soft-security measures associated with political and development responses. The Lake Chad Basin experience represents a model that could create prospects for enduring stability in the region. It could also resonate in other parts of Africa, especially in the Horn, where there is a growing policy debate by the African Union (AU) and partners for reimagining regional and international support to the security environment in Somalia and the region.

On 31 October 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed the landmark resolution 1325. The resolution represents a victory for women as a global recognition of their legitimate right to protection and participation in peace processes at all levels, and an acknowledgement of the world’s responsibility to prevent and address gender based violence.

The African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) were scheduled to adopt a new strategic partnership agreement at an AU–EU summit in October, but it had to be postponed due to COVID-19 risks and related delays. This may be a blessing in disguise, as it gives the negotiators more time to adapt the relationship to COVID-19 and to craft an agreement that expands the focus, scope and scale of African–European relations for the next two decades.

Despite its obvious limits and constraints, the African Union (AU) has been doing its utmost to address peace and security challenges in Africa. However, over the past few years, the involvement of external powers has drastically increased at the expense of seeking African solutions to African problems. This trend has deepened during the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent reduction of meetings, field visits and peace initiatives by the AU.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development predicted a fall of 27% in global trade in the second quarter of 2020 as a result of the measures imposed to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Whilst the exact impact COVID-19 will have on specific African countries is not yet known, it is already clear that some countries’ trade will be significantly affected, among others due to the disruption of cross-border cargo movement.

The future of international cooperation will demand deep and far-reaching institutional reform. It would also necessitate a rethink of the current configuration of the global governance architecture and a rekindling of its tools.

The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly disrupted peace operations. In the short-term activities have been reduced to the most critical, rotations have been frozen, and most staff are working remotely. Most of the missions have adapted remarkably well. However, even more changes are likely in the medium term when the global economic recession, that is expected to follow in the wake of the virus may force peace operations to drastically contract in size and scope.

Borders in Africa and their management are a factor of the complex socio-economic, political, environmental, and demographic challenges that Africa faces. The arrival of the Covid-19 pandemic has created a new and unprecedented challenge that can exacerbate existing vulnerabilities in Africa.