On 31 October 2000, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed resolution 1325, which categorically linked violence against women during conflict and their marginalisation during peace processes with the short and long-term challenges of maintaining international peace and security. Based on a review of 1325 debates and literature, I present some of the main obstacles to the resolution’s widespread realisation and explore opportunities for its implementation in the decades to come. The analysis in this brief is meant to inform policymakers and practitioners about the overall concepts and framework of 1325, including its limits; but it also points to concrete action in some problematic areas of the 1325 agenda. The brief therefore concludes with a discussion of participation in peace processes; gender mainstreaming; and protection, followed by three detailed policy recommendations:
A short overview of gender conceptsGender: The general distinctions in behaviour, attitudes, beliefs and actions used to distinguish between female and male human beings. As with race and class, gender is a cross-cutting variable determined by social constructs and systems. Gender roles, which are formed by social and cultural norms dictate the behaviour of women and men. They are learned through socialisation. Gender systems are institutionalised through political, legal and economic structural mechanisms and culture and tradition. Gender equality: An outcome whereby the human rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men are not determined by gender. Evenness in representation and participation of women and men is an established strategy for increasing gender equality. This refers to: 1) balancing the number of women and men inside institutions at every level, but also 2) incorporating the perceptions, interests, needs and priorities of women as well as men in analyses, planning, decision-making and activities, in order to produce impacts that are equal. Women’s empowerment is viewed as a tactic for increasing gender equality. Gender mainstreaming: An intensified focus on gender(ed) perspectives in the work of an institution, its governance, objectives, operating culture and its substantive work. The goal of gender mainstreaming is not to create more programmes for women, but to devote more resources to understanding, and then transforming gender inequality in standard-setting, decision-making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Adapted from the UN Office for the Special Advisor for Gender and Women’s Advancement, 2001. |
Resolution 1325 situated a social problem – the inequality of women and the disproportionate hardships they face in contemporary conflict – in the UN Security Council, a body that had never before addressed issues beyond traditional security threats. The resolution came about following a long line of processes and international agreements including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979); the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995); and the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (2000). Decades of difficult work coalesced in a standard-setting framework in 1325 which would at last draw political, economic and security resources to address the way women’s inequality intersected with exceptional suffering in war. In this regard, 1325 was normative because it established expectations and prescriptions for the international system’s response to the problem. Yet, in some ways the normative scale of 1325 surpassed the pace of its practical implementation in the decade that followed.
A review of the principal 1325 debates and literature finds opportunities for enhancing the resolution’s future execution. It is however important to note some inter-related observations that have arisen during the course of research and unavoidable in analysis. First, policymakers and practitioners find it difficult to navigate the complex, contradictory demands that have emerged as the 1325 agenda. The resolution is many things, to many people. It has become both a rallying point for women’s organisations and a source of frustration due to its slow implementation. Its normative value has been questioned by feminist scholars who do not see how securitizing women’s situations in conflict will transform patriarchal structures. Traditional security policymakers have viewed gender and the 1325 agenda as puzzling, unwieldy and tangential to hard threats. Despite these reservations, there is increasing and constant evidence that women’s security is indeed part of wider, societal security.
Secondly, 1325 has established a new debate on the subject of women, peace and security. Distilled, this debate is value-laden, making it complex and open to a wide range of contradictory interests and actions. This only confirms that 1325 is similar to other norms in the international system. As such, the resolution’s meaning and effect will be widely debated in theory, policy and practice for decades to come. As with other norms, meaningful implementation will be controversial, and require political and financial resources in the long-term, rather than through short-term technical programmes. This brief does not attempt to resolve all of these contradictions, but acknowledges their respective values and provides a general overview of 1325’s main political and legal framework. And, bearing in mind that it is not that simple, I conclude with a discussion of three key areas for future action: participation in peace processes; gender mainstreaming; and protection.
The implementation of 1325 has proven quite daunting. The resolution’s clauses call for a range of changes in the practice of conflict prevention, resolution and management. These changes include:
Although 1325 was unanimously adopted by the Security Council’s members, it is not of a legally binding nature. The resolution, notes Torunn Trygestad, was passed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Council resolutions under Chapter VI are meant to induce good behaviour from member states following violations of international peace and security (Trygestadd, 2009:544). Unlike Chapter VII resolutions which are coercive instruments used by the Council to address international peace and security violations, or treaties and conventions, 1325 has “no mechanisms for ratification, compliance or verification” (Willett, 2010:142). As such, it is not surprising that 1325 supporters have depicted its implementation as slow and insufficient.
Early on, the UN adopted a code of conduct for its peacekeeping forces and appointed gender advisers to its operations in the field of war. Advocates of the resolution played a partnering role with the UN, and through their work on the ground with humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) provided valuable reports on the status of women in conflicts. But the first appointment of a gender adviser to the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping took place only in 2004 and by 2005 just ten out of 18 peacekeeping and political missions had staffed these vital positions (CCR, 2005:16). According to Peace Women’s Resolution Watch, 39.6% of country-specific UN Security Council resolutions contained specific language on women or gender as of November 2009. According to my own preliminary review of PeaceWomen’s online record of Security Council resolutions, the percentage by September 2010 had risen to 45%. In Africa, the conflict with the least resolutions addressing women and gender issues is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). While Darfur ranks at nearly 100% – all 5 resolutions of the Council address issues such as protection from sexual violence and the involvement of women in peacemaking – only about 37.5% of the resolutions for the UN peace support operations in the DRC have clauses of a similar nature (Peacewomen.org, 2010). Still, signaling that gender has become a legitimate security concern at the highest level, the Council now deals with these issues as part of its functions and powers. Most importantly, gender and women are now included in resolutions which do have Chapter VII clauses.
At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has instituted instruments and policies including the Protocol of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003), the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004) and a new AU Gender Policy (2009). A central commitment of the AU Gender Policy is to increase the level of gender equality within peacekeeping operations. The AU Commission will also produce a training manual for AU peacekeepers. Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have followed suit. At the national level, a number of countries have put in place 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs) for the systematic implementation and monitoring of the 1325 agenda. Yet, out of 19 NAPs in existence, 12 are in Europe, 5 in Africa and one each in Latin America and Asia. Because armed violence has been particularly persistent in Africa, the delay in developing and implementing national policies is cause for concern.
Three more resolutions have since joined 1325. In June 2008, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1820, which, among other key normative claims, recognized sexual violence as a security problem. Two additional UN Security Council Resolutions, 1888 and 1889, went further to deal with the mechanisms for implementation of 1325. These resolutions have led to important steps including the appointment of the UN Secretary-General’s first Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström. Finally, a critical test for the UN came in late July and early August 2010, when militias1 in North Kivu, DRC, raped 235 women, 52 girls, 13 men, and 3 boys (UN Joint Human Rights Office, 2010:3). The acts of sexual violence (and theft and assault) took place over a period of four days. Despite the conflict’s documented high concentration of sexual violence, the nearby UN Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO) and the DRC government failed to protect these civilians.
1325’s past shows mixed outcomes. Future 1325 action will also produce a combination of positive and negative contributions to women’s security in conflict and peace processes. But the alternative of doing nothing is unacceptable. Three key areas – participation in peace processes; gender mainstreaming; and protection – require special action by future policymakers and practitioners:
The job of increasing women’s participation has been particularly difficult at the international level. A UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) study found that only 7% of negotiators in peace talks were women (UN Security Council, 2009:2). Through an enigmatic closed network among member states, positions as the UN Secretary General or the AU Chairperson’s special envoy or special representative in peace talks are meted out to senior diplomats and military leaders. In many conflicts, former heads of government, foreign ministers or generals are asked to serve as official mediators. Across the world, women are underrepresented at this level. Five years into the implementation of 1325, Africa only had three women vice presidents and two prime ministers (CCR, 2005:21). The first African female head of state, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia, was elected in that year. Of the foreign ministers sitting in the Executive Council of the African Union in 2006, only six were women; while there were no more than three women members of the Permanent Representatives Council (Byanyima, 2008:324-325). Although women leaders have represented their governments across the globe, they remain outnumbered at every level by men. This has allowed peacemaking to continue to be dominated by men.2 The way that the UN and other actors identify who is qualified to be a high-level peacemaker leaves out many women who have prestige and legitimacy in other sectors such as the sciences, the arts, education, commerce and national politics, and who could serve as special envoys and special representatives. At the same time, concentrated lobbying for greater participation through high-level designations limits the scope for change, and ignores the need for gender equality and women’s empowerment at the local level.
Learning from the past, gender advisers in peace operations are another illustration of the mixed success of 1325. These focal points (sometimes offices rather than single individuals) have wide mandates that may include mainstreaming gender into personnel matters; integrating gender into reports; liaising within the mission and with local women’s groups; and training troops, police and civilian observers in gender mainstreaming (Nduku-Agwu, 2009; UN-DPKO, 2010). In missions involving hundreds of personnel these tasks require generous funding and committed, knowledgeable staff. Without adequate funding, the capacities of gender focal points are constrained (Mobbek, 2010; Barrow 2009). In-mission achievements appear difficult to measure. In the UN Mission for Liberia (UNMIL) for example, the work of the Office of the Gender Advisor (OGA) has been criticised for a lack of a visible impact. Still, although understaffed, the OGA contributed to policymaking that led to the inclusion of women and girls who were cooks or sexual slaves in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes.The programme led to the disarmament and demobilisation of 21,000 women and girls. Otherwise only active fighters would have been included in the DDR process (Nduka-Agwu 2009:190). Finally, reporting lines influence the efficacy of today’s classically positioned gender advisors. Junior officers are relatively powerless to pursue a gender agenda; just as more experienced officials in gender offices with no senior management profile and level of responsibility are less likely to influence the allocation of resources to a 1325 framework. Some missions are already correcting this problem. In 2009, the Office of the Force Commander of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) established a male Military Gender Officer, under the direct supervision of the Force Commander (UNIFEM/UN-DPKO, 2010:43). Regardless of the gender of the appointed person, this decision signalled a high prioritization of gender within the military hierarchy of the operation.
The UN’s preliminary report on the rapes and assaults in July/August 2010, in North Kivu, clearly highlight several mistakes made by leadership of MONUSCO. Although MONUSCO carried out weekly meetings in the area, and market patrols, it had no regular, daily communication with locals or their representatives. The mission’s leadership seemed unable to establish how to gather information on sexual violence as a whole (UN Department of Public Information, 2010). Even though the conflict in North Kivu had already been permeated by sexual violence and the number of rapes reached high levels before the August violence, MONUSCO was ill-equipped to interact with the local community and thus establish relationships with local women or men, who might have been able to speak of the crimes being committed in their midst. The record of sexual violence in conflict in Africa suggests that this incident and the manner it was handled are not isolated examples of the failure to protect women from sexual violence during war.
There is a need to reclaim the protection norms of 1325, and to see how the security of women is part of a corpus of humanitarian values. First, the struggle for gender equality is enshrined in a range of legal instruments not exclusive to 1325 and the gender equality body of normative documents,but part of universal values. Second, protection of women in conflict is part of the same body of norms as the protection of all civilians in interstate and intrastate conflict. These include regional legal instruments such as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981) and the AU’s Constitutive Act (2002), but also global customary law and legal instruments in the form of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); the Geneva Conventions (1949) and particularly their additional protocols;3 the Refugee Convention (1951); and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which entered into force in 2002. The journey to realise greater gender equality, even in the midst of war, and to protect women and men from gender-based humanitarian and human rights crimes should not forego this legacy, the precedents that exist in international law, or the lessons learned in protecting civilians in conflicts by bodies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In this regard, relating 1325 to the protection of all civilians will increase normative relevance and coherence.
Notes
