The comparison between the situations in Zambia and Zimbabwe was also reflected in a discussion at the Southern African Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust Policy Dialogue Forum on 17 August, just as the Zambia election results were being announced.
An important lesson, from #ZambiaDecides2021 is that it cannot be business as usual in the face of newer and younger voters who are armed with social media and international benchmarks with respect to electoral and governance issues
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The first observation to make in this regard is confirmation of the pattern, not only in Africa, but almost universally, that a massive voter turnout – usually on the back of mass voter registration, particularly of new and young voters – is almost always a protest against the incumbent. The 2021 election in Zambia is almost a perfect fit to the pattern: Hichilema polled almost 60% to Lungu’s 38%, in a turnout of more than 70%. A total of 4 858 193 votes was cast out of the 7 023 499 registered voters; with over one million first-time voters, mostly youth. This was due to an organisational framework, on the part of the opposition, that translated the massive voter registration exercise into a high turnout at the polls across the country, thereby defying whatever rigging had been planned, and defending the vote through a systematic deployment of both polling agents and volunteers at every polling station.
That has been the history of elections for most of post-colonial Africa: the reality of the African condition in which there has been an inexorable decline of economic and social conditions; one in which the inherited dispensation at independence – or with post-apartheid – cannot cater for the new demands for democratisation and access to such fruits of independence as education and health facilities for the mass of the population, and with the quality and level of delivery as it had been for the white settler colonial minority. The strain on the budgetary requirements for the democratisation of economic and social spheres grows inevitably, and, likewise, the deficits and gradual decline in economic performance, with the passage of time and attendant to the burden of continuity of economies that have historically benefitted a minority. This is exacerbated by the modes of production based on extraction of raw materials for export as opposed to the beneficiation of the latter and the increase in employment opportunities for a growing population, especially that of the youth, who constitute an average 65-70% of those under the age of 30 in Africa.
These are the conditions that have invariably translated into political and electoral nightmares for incumbent regimes and the ‘Big Man’ in Africa. The era of the one-party state, not to mention the accompanying rhetoric of post-liberation promises, has long departed with the end of a Cold war behind which the ‘Big Man’ thrived under “democratic centralism” which yielded for him electoral victories of 90% or more as a matter of course.
So, since 1991 when Kenneth Kaunda so gracefully conceded to the new march of multi-party democracy, it has since become commonplace to witness the decline and collapse of the parties of independence in Africa. Those who have survived the onslaught, like the Chama Chama Mapundizi of Tanzania or even the former liberation movements of Southern Africa, do so by the skin of their teeth. In Zimbabwe in particular, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) last won an election only approximating the conditions of a free and fair election in the 1990’s, even though some will argue that there has never been a truly democratic poll in Zimbabwe since Independence. The main reason, therefore, that ZambiaDecides2021 has shaken the very edifice in Harare: the realisation that were it not for the military and the related securocrat state, ZANU PF could have certainly faced the same fate – in 2008, 2013 & 2018 – as visited the incumbent president and his party in Zambia; and the palpable fear at the prospect of another déjà vuin 2023, and how, given the precedent of ZambiaDecides2021, to repeat the previous electoral frauds.
Therefore, an important lesson, for both incumbent and incoming regimes, from ZambiaDecides2021 is the following: it cannot be business as usual in the face of newer and younger voters who are armed with social media and best references with respect to electoral and governance issues; and the primacy for comprehensive policy agenda through which to address the challenges that confront contemporary African societies, particularly youth unemployment, service delivery and, above all, an accountable executive under the watchful eye of a vibrant legislature and a fiercely independent judiciary.
It is interesting to note that ZambiaDecides2021 took place against the backdrop of allegations of systematic vote rigging in 2016, not to mention the attempt by the incumbent regime to adopt Zimbabwe-type militarisation of politics, intimidation of and violence against the opposition. And even though the Electoral Commission of Zambia will in retrospect have acquitted itself admirably in ZambiaDecides2021, there was the lingering suspicion that it could be manipulated by the powers that be, as alleged in 2016. Hence, the reports that Hakainde Hichilema and his United Party for National Development (UPND) invested as much as $5 million in a Parallel Voting Tabulation (PVT); and, happily, it is also reported, there was a close tally in the numbers of the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) and those of the PVT.
Since 1991 when Kenneth Kaunda so gracefully conceded to the new march of multi-party democracy, it has since become commonplace to witness the decline and collapse of the parties of independence in Africa
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As Phillan Zamchiya stated during the SAPES Trust Policy Dialogue last Tuesday, “election rigging has a ceiling”, and that is evident when an opposition movement is organised ahead of and during the election, on the back of a massive voter registration exercise, a mobilised high voter turnout, especially on the part of the youth most of whom were first time voters, and a systematic defence of the vote right up to the end of the counting and collation process.
In the final analysis, ZambiaDecides2021 was definitive in its outcome, especially on the presidential front where Hakainde Hichilema beat the incumbent by more than a million votes. It was an outcome against which even the most reluctant of incumbents would have been an obvious rogue not to concede. All the same, the role of the former presidents, particularly Rupiah Banda, the diplomatic nudges by the various ambassadors (e.g. the British and the UN), and even, according to some reports, such heads of state as Cyril Ramaphosa – all helped Edgar Lungu to concede, thereby ensuring a democratic and peaceful transition for ZambiaDecides2021.
One has to echo the point made by Phillan Zamchiya: Democracy needs strong institutions and not strong men; therefore, invest in reforms of institutions, including the reorganisation and revitalisation of the opposition movement. An obvious message to Zimbabwe where institutions such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s reputation is in tatters, where militarisation of politics is now almost legion, and where the coup needs to be cured through the restoration of constitutionalism, the rule of law and the return of the military to the barracks.
But is this possible before 2023, or are we here to witness a repeat of the same come the next elections in Zimbabwe, when the opposition forces are not organised and vital enough to overcome and overtake the securocrat state through a resounding electoral victory?
The ZambiaDecides2021 precedent should inform us on the following, if there is to be a free and fair election in Zimbabwe in 2023: the minimum conditions such as an unbridled voter registration programme, a reformed Electoral Commission, and a transparent voting and vote tabulation system; the presence of experienced domestic and international observers, before and during the electoral process; and the requisite diplomatic scaffolding on the part of regional and international factors/personalities.
Above all, it is inconceivable that all this can take place without the requisite and effective isolation and sanitisation of the military and security apparatus from the electoral process. This is the major challenge for the democratic forces in Zimbabwe, with the necessary support of the regional, continental and international factors. The question is whether this is attainable in less than the 24 months to the election in July 2023.
Ibbo Mandaza is a Zimbabwean academic, author and publisher; convenor of the SAPES Trust Policy Dialogue Forum; Co-convenor of the Platform for Concerned Citizens (PCC); and designate Distinguished Visiting Professor, School of Governance, University of the Witswatersrand.