When Jim O’Neill coined the BRIC acronym in 2001, the point he was trying to convey was that the global economic system needed to incorporate the world’s largest emerging economies. His advice fell on deaf ears and in 2009, Brazil, China, India and Russia decided to take matters into their own hands and formed the BRIC grouping. South Africa joined the group in 2010 to form the BRICS. This July the group held its 15th Summit in South Africa, and decided to add six new members: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Many more are likely to join in the future, including countries like Indonesia and Nigeria.
What these countries have in common is a frustration, if not a grievance, about being side-lined to the periphery of the world economy. Together, the BRICS represent approximately 40% of the world’s population. The combined size of their economies is approaching approximately 30% of the world’s GDP, which puts them roughly on par with the combined size of the economies of the G7 countries, depending on whether size is measured in GDP or PPP. More importantly, in the next few decades the combined size of the BRICS economies will surpass that of the G7. Despite this growing parity, all the members of the BRICS, with the exception of Russia, self-identify as being part of the Global South, i.e. they feel excluded from a global system dominated by the Global North. Their stated aim is to work towards a future system of global governance where they will have equal political and economic say in global institutions, and where no one state will dominate others. In pursuit of this aim they have established their own development bank, set up their own contingency reserve arrangement, are developing their own payment system, and the BRICS countries have started to trade with each other in their own currencies.
Whilst the BRICS countries share certain macro-economic and geo-political interests, many of the members also have competing interests in other domains.
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Whilst the BRICS countries share certain macro-economic and geo-political interests, many of the members also have competing interests in other domains. China and India are geopolitical rivals in South Asia, as are Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. Egypt and Ethiopia have not yet been able to resolve their dispute over the Nile. Egypt, South Africa and others compete for an African seat in the UN Security Council. Brazil, India, South Africa and now also Argentina are democracies whilst other countries in the group are governed by a diverse range of autocratic regimes – does this imply tensions among BRICS members around some core values? On the other hand, shared BRICS membership can also ease some of these tensions, or at least create opportunities for regular diplomatic contact between these countries that can help to manage some of these dynamics, and thus contribute to regional and global stability.
Many of the members of the BRICS also have close ties to the United States and Europe, including Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and South Africa. South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa, in a televised statement to the nation on the eve of hosting the BRICS Summit in South Africa, explained that South Africa remains non-aligned, and he announced that in 2023 the country will also host a major United States – Africa trade meeting and an EU-South Africa summit. South Africa will also host the G20 in 2025, the first in Africa. For many countries, BRICS membership does not necessarily imply prioritising one set of relations, e.g. with China, over others, e.g. the United States. The BRICS is a strategic partnership among its members around a set of shared values and interests, which can be summarised as a shared commitment to create a more equitable and just global order, where no single country, or group of countries dominates the system in their favour.
Where does this place the BRICS on the Russian war in Ukraine? The BRICS Summit in Johannesburg steered clear of taking a position on the war, other than welcoming mediation aimed at resolving the war through dialogue and diplomacy. Some BRICS members like Iran are clearly supporting Russia, whilst most others have stopped short of either supporting or condemning Russia. For many, for instance Egypt, the war has badly affected their economy. Two of the BRICS members, Egypt and South Africa, are part of an African initiative to seek a mediated end to the conflict, which is perhaps the first African initiative to mediate an international conflict. Overall, however, the BRICS have their eyes on the medium- to long-term transformation of the global macro-economic and financial system, and countries like China are probably frustrated that the Russian war in Ukraine has drawn attention away from this larger objective.
The shift in the centre of gravity of the global economy to the east is an unstoppable fact driven by demographics and economic factors like the cost of production.
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Are the BRICS and the West headed for a new Cold War? The shift in the centre of gravity of the global economy to the east is an unstoppable fact driven by demographics and economic factors like the cost of production. At the same time, Europe and the United States will remain major economic players. In tandem with these changes in the global economy, it is clear that the global political order will become more multipolar, with China, Europe, India and the United States representing some of the major centres of influence.
Many of the BRICS countries, including China, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and South Africa all have economies whose prosperity is currently closely tied to the Unites States. They will thus have an interest in a slow stable freeing up of the international financial system, and this should give the global economy and financial system time to adapt.
The same logic also applies to changes in global governance architecture. Apart from Russia, all the other BRICS countries have an interest in making sure that changes in the global order they are pursuing are managed at a slow and steady pace that does not generate instability. All the BRICS countries, apart from Russia, are also strong supporters of multilateralism, with the United Nations at its centre. Many western countries and BRICS members may thus have more shared interests than the doomsday headlines of a new Cold War suggest. Whilst it is prudent to be cautious, it may also be wise for all countries to explore cooperation in those areas where there are shared interests rather than assume that the BRICS and the west are strategic rivals on all fronts.
Cedric de Coning is a senior advisor to ACCORD and a research professor with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). A version of this paper was published by the Global Observatory on 30 August 2023.
