After three failed conferences in the capital of Galmudug State, Dhusamareeb, a fourth conference was scheduled for September in Mogadishu. With domestic and international pressure mounting for a consensus on national elections, the FGS and FMS leaders signed the Mogadishu Agreement in September 2020. The Mogadishu Agreement brought an end to the debate on an election model as the leaders agreed on the “Electoral Constituency Caucuses”, which is consistent with the 4.5 power-sharing systems, and a half-hearted attempt at expanding the 2016 Indirect Elections model. The Electoral Constituency Caucuses Agreement comprises 15 points. The major takeaways are: 101 clan-delegates to select each federal parliamentarian, thus doubling the number of delegate-voters compared to the 2016 parliamentary election; the selection of Somalia’s Upper House or Senate comprising 54 Senators would be determined by five State Parliaments. Furthermore, in order to decentralise the election process, the federal government and regional states would appoint a number of independent electoral bodies that would manage the election process. Finally, Somaliland, a self-declared breakaway nation in Somalia’s northwest, would have a separate body to manage the elections of MPs and Senators who hail from the region. The Somali leaders and many Somali stakeholders believed that this would bring an end to the election crisis but the electoral model deferred the details of important electoral processes. The generic nature of the agreement created a blank canvas for diverse interpretations of the electoral agreement that would go on to endanger the viability of the electoral agreement.
This election is markedly different due to the unprecedented level of concerted opposition to the Federal Government of Somalia, suggesting a potential for heightened volatility.
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Electoral Woes
It was clear by November 2020 that there were issues with the electoral agreement as Puntland and Jubaland State governments had not sent their appointed members of the federal election bodies to Mogadishu for induction training and failed to appoint their state electoral bodies. Only weeks after the Mogadishu agreement, Jubaland State had voiced their concerns with the electoral agreement as the State’s President Ahmed Mohamed Islan “Madoobe” had objected to the presence of the Somalia National Army (SNA) in the Gedo region which falls under the jurisdiction of Jubaland State. The motivations behind the deployment of SNA forces in Gedo region which borders Kenya were questioned by the United Nations, and came at a period when Kenya and Somalia’s legal dispute over territorial waters had intensified. Souring diplomatic relations between the two nations put the Jubaland leadership, which shares close ties with Kenya, in a precarious position. The deployment of SNA forces in Gedo region was perceived as an armed provocation by the Jubaland leader. Without addressing this charged political issue between Farmaajo and Madoobe, elections were scheduled in Garbaharey, a city in Gedo region, under the control of SNA forces perceived as beholden to President Farmaajo. President Madoobe back tracked from the Mogadishu Agreement claiming that the SNA were destabilizing the Gedo region, making it impossible for elections to be held in Garbaharey. The second major issue of contention has been the composition of electoral bodies which were not clearly defined in the Mogadishu Agreement. The opposition council – a body comprising presidential candidates including former presidents – was the first to question the composition of the federal electoral body claiming that the appointees were part of the “National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)”, the “Presidential Palace” and “allies of the president”. This claim was later supported by Puntland State and in the meantime, the elections were put on standby as both Puntland and Jubaland refused to implement the election agreement.
The third issue of dispute, that has thrown Somalia into an electoral deadlock, is the electoral management of Somaliland’s seats. Initially, this was raised by the Upper House Chairman and representative of Somaliland Senator Abdi Hashi who appointed an electoral management body for Somaliland seats the night before the FGS administration appointed theirs.
Failed Attempts at Consensus, Negative Rhetoric and Growing Insecurity
Successive efforts by state leaders to mediate the elections deadlock have failed. In December, attempts by civil society to engage the opposition council, federal and state leaders had no impact on the electoral deadlock. FGS attempts in December to engage Puntland State also fell short of any breakthrough with regards to the impasse. As the expiry of President Farmaajo’s term of office drew closer, a last ditch effort was made to reach an agreement on the implementation of the electoral model. On 3 February, a consultative meeting between FMS and FGS leaders was convened and after three days the stalemate remained. Nonetheless, the FGS held a press conference after the failed meeting stating that it had made headway on two out of the three issues. The issue where no progress was achieved was the issue of Gedo according to the FGS. President Farmaajo speaking to parliament largely blamed Puntland and Jubaland for the lack of consensus on the national elections. On the other hand, Jubaland and Puntland have stated that Farmaajo has been intransigent and has not engaged in discussions based on compromise. Meanwhile, the opposition council and Jubaland and Puntland have continued to paint Farmaajo as a “dictator” who is leading Somalia down the same path that led to civil war in 1991. Drawing on the clan affinity shared by President Farmaajo and former dictator Mohamed Siyaad Barre, negative rhetoric propagated by the political opposition and the failure of the FGS’ management of the elections, has undoubtedly contributed to an increasingly turbulent situation in Somalia. This is felt very much in the capital, Mogadishu, which has experienced a significant increase in violence over the past months. There have been several attacks on hotels, assassinations of former and current officials and limited mobility in the capital. But in the past week this has spiralled further out of control when a protest led by the opposition council was reportedly fired upon by FGS forces. This led to widespread calls for restraint and condemnation of violence by the international community. Moreover, this violence has led to reports that Jubaland and Puntland will boycott any further discussions until a number of conditions are met, despite urgent calls by the United Nations for federal and state leaders to convene quickly to reach an agreement.
Going Forward
Somalia’s two previous elections were delayed beyond the governments’ mandate and strained social cohesion so Somalia is not in uncharted territory. However, this election is markedly different as there has been an unprecedented level of concerted opposition to the FGS, suggesting a potential for heightened volatility. Negative rhetoric, the FGS attempts to ban protests under the auspices of COVID-19, violent skirmishes between opposition parties and the FGS, severe political fragmentation, rigidity and a lack of political clarity and consistency all contribute to weakening progress made in the country. For example, the country was making strides in its battle against violent extremist organisations. The long-term implications of political deadlock on the psyche of the Somali public is still unknown but it more than likely does not inspire confidence to cooperate with its nascent federal leadership/institutions. Somalia is still at the beginning of its state-building process following a lengthy civil war. To overcome the current impasse requires political maturity and real compromise on behalf of the long suffering population of the country and where outside mediation is needed to achieve a breakthrough, many international actors of goodwill stand ready to assist the country through this rough patch.
Yusuf Mussa is the Executive Director of New Access International (NAI) Somalia.
