This piece analyses the implications of the most recent coup on national and international efforts at preventing violent extremism. The renewed crisis of authority could make it even more feasible for jihadists to extend their control in rural regions but could also stall prospects for a more cohesive political response to ongoing conflicts.
A national-level political strategy for dealing with conflicts where jihadist actors are involved in #Mali, is still missing. @natrupesinghe
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Status of the Jihadist Insurgencies
The main jihadist actors broadly consist of the Al-Qaeda affiliated Jamaa’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) which is a coalition of several jihadist groups and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Since the dismantling of the jihadist proto state which ruled northern Mali between 2012-2013, the jihadist insurgencies have since 2015 mobilised in the central regions of the country. Their activities triggered the counter-mobilisation of ethnically based militias, such as the Da Na Ambassagou, fuelling vicious cycles of inter-communal violence, including massacres. In 2019, activities by jihadist insurgents increased, triggering the scaling up of Sahelian military operations against these groups. 2020 was the deadliest year on record.
Despite counter-terror operations launched by the French operation, Barkhane and the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) in response to this escalation, jihadist insurgents are firmly implanted in rural areas in the centre, north and increasingly southern regions of Mali, imposing their form of governance on the local population. While in central Mali, a number of local-level peace initiatives have been implemented, ushering in ceasefires to quell the most intense violence, these are not yet linked to regional or nationally-led conflict resolution processes. A national-level political strategy for dealing with conflicts where jihadist actors are involved in Mali, is still missing.
The coup and implications for the jihadist insurgencies
The recent coup d’état represents a crisis in state authority which can provide a window of opportunity for insurgents to extend their control and governance in rural areas. Such events can be advantageous for insurgencies who seek to present themselves as offering an alternative to state authorities. Following the coup in 2012, jihadists were able to consolidate control over two thirds of Mali’s territory, paving the way for the development of a jihadist proto state. In neighbouring Burkina Faso, the coup d’état of 2015 dismantled the Burkinabé intelligence services and monitoring mechanisms in rural areas, which some analysts suggest contributed to insurgencies like Ansaroul Islam gaining traction early on.
It appears that jihadist insurgents already exploited the chance to signal resolve of their intentions to expand southwards when Bamako appears weak: days after the coup, on 30 May 2021, suspected jihadists launched an attack killing five in the region of Sikasso in southern Mali. This represents a growing trend of jihadist perpetrated violence affecting southern regions which have previously been spared these types of attacks. Nevertheless, it is too soon to tell what the operational advantage could be for the jihadist insurgency this time. Following the August 2020 coup, a dramatic and visible regaining of territorial control, did not materialise.
On the other hand, the jihadist insurgencies have demonstrated tenacity in expanding their influence between 2012 and 2020 when there was a relatively stable regime in place in Bamako under Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. Under his government and with support from a machinery of international actors, jihadists became firmly entrenched in central Mali, re-energised conflicts in north-eastern Mali, mobilised in southern regions, and became highly active in the border regions with Niger and Burkina Faso. Since the last coup, attacks increased against national and international forces. Thus, with or without a stable centre in Bamako, the jihadist insurgencies have proven themselves capable of expanding their influence.
A relevant consequence of the most recent coup for international efforts at countering violent extremism, is #France’s suspension of military cooperation with #Mali @natrupesinghe
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National and International Efforts to Prevent Violent Extremism
International
Last year’s coup marked a period of international disengagement from Mali. Sanctions introduced by ECOWAS hurt Mali’s economy which was already struggling to cope with the fallout of COVID-19. This time, ECOWAS and the AU suspended Mali from its institutions and did not re-introduce sanctions. But the World Bank has paused operations for payments to Mali and the US has halted military aid to Mali. Without a democratically elected government and with continued instability in Bamako, donors will be even more cautious about re-energising their commitments, which are sorely needed by the citizenry.
Perhaps the most relevant consequence of the most recent coup for countering violent extremism, is France’s suspension of military cooperation with Mali. This involves halting the provision of advice and training for the Malian military and joint military operations, until credible guarantees can be offered to ensure elections are held in February 2022. The FAMA will no longer benefit from French military equipment, intelligence or conduct operations alongside Barkhane. The impact will likely be felt by the FAMA, who have fought most of their successful counter-terror operations alongside France and which depend on its logistical, intelligence and military equipment. Equally, these counter-terrorism operations have ultimately proved ineffective in containing the jihadist threat and have involved widespread abuses against civilians, which has fuelled insurgent ranks and further aggravated anti-government grievances.
National
The coup also re-directs the focus of both Bamako and Kati on securing their positions in a new and redefined political transition, which detracts attention from other pressing policy agendas. The state’s reach in rural areas is already very limited. As of March 2021, seventeen percent of civil administrators were present in northern regions, while less than fifty percent of state representatives were present in their posts, while just over half of mayors were present in their communes in central Mali.
It has also unveiled how fractured the political centre really is and how difficult resolving Mali’s governance crisis will be without a stable and unified government to drive reforms forward. Renewed resolve to prevent jihadist insurgencies from mobilising, will at least require collaboration between political and military actors in Bamako. A national-level dialogue process which includes jihadist actors has been endorsed several times during Mali’s Conference of National Understanding, as well as by Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and the transitional government in February 2021. It is so far unclear what the position of a new transition government will be, but they will still face a bind between taking seriously domestic sentiment in favour of dialogue, assuaging France who is against this approach and the jihadists who will not negotiate until international forces depart.
It remains to be seen if the new transitional government under the stewardship of Assimi Goita as Transition President and Choguel Maiga as Prime Minister will engender the kind of broad-based legitimacy that the previous transition government was criticised for lacking. Without a unified government capable of defining an inclusive, political strategy to resolve ongoing conflicts and prevent jihadist mobilisation in unaffected regions, the prospect for resolving the crisis remains elusive.
Natasja Rupesinghe is a PhD fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Yida Diall is a doctoral student and Lecturer in Private Law at the Faculty of Legal and Political Sciences of the University of Bamako in Mali.
