For more than three decades, African mediation has rested on a powerful assumption: that conflict can be prevented, managed and resolved through dialogue; that parties can be brought to the table; that African institutions can build norms, mechanisms and capacities to support peace; and that mediation can create the political space for negotiated settlements. That assumption was not naïve. It emerged from one of the most hopeful periods in modern African political history.
The late 1980s and early 1990s were marked by profound change. The Cold War had ended. Apartheid was coming to an end. Namibia had become independent. Mozambique was moving towards peace. South Africa was negotiating its transition. Across the continent, there was a renewed belief that dialogue could achieve what war had failed to deliver. It was in this context that the Organisation of African Unity established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Cairo in 1993. This was an important moment. It signalled that Africa would not simply wait for others to resolve African conflicts. It was an early expression of African agency in peace and security.
The creation of the African Union (AU) deepened this shift. With the AU, Africa moved from the old doctrine of non-interference towards the more ambitious principle of non-indifference. The Peace and Security Council Protocol, adopted in Durban in July 2002 and entering into force in December 2003, laid the foundation for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Its pillars – the Peace and Security Council, Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, African Standby Force and the Peace Fund – represented an African answer to a painful question: how do we prevent another Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone or Somalia?
APSA was more than an institutional architecture. It was a political statement that Africa must develop its own capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflict. However, today we must ask honestly whether the conflict landscape has changed faster than our mediation architecture. The answer is yes.
The first generation of post-Cold War mediation in Africa dealt largely with intra-state conflicts, rebel movements, civil wars, transitions and power-sharing arrangements. The mediator’s task was difficult, but the political map was often clearer. There were governments, rebel movements, liberation movements and armed opposition groups. There were leaders who could sign agreements and, at least sometimes, command compliance. Today, the landscape is far more complex.
We are no longer dealing only with civil wars. Increasingly, we are dealing with what may be called civic wars. A civil war is fought between armed actors over the state, territory or power. A civic war is fought inside the social fabric of society. It is fought through identity, fear, disinformation, exclusion, institutional mistrust and the collapse of common civic space. It may not always begin with guns, but it erodes the trust that makes peaceful politics possible. This is why mediation today cannot only ask who the armed parties are. It must also ask what has happened to the civic fabric, to trust in institutions, to the relationship between citizens and the state, and to truth itself.
A second major shift is the rise of insurgencies and violent extremist movements. Many of today’s armed groups do not operate like the rebel movements of the 1990s. Some do not seek a conventional peace agreement. Some are embedded in transnational ideological networks. Some survive through taxation, illicit trade, smuggling and local governance. Some use violence not only to defeat the state, but to replace the state in areas where the state has already failed. The mediator is therefore no longer dealing only with grievances. The mediator is dealing with systems of violence that have become political economies.
A third shift is climate change. In the 1990s, climate was not central to mediation practice. Today, it must be. Climate stress affects water, land, pasture, livelihoods, migration and food security. It does not automatically cause conflict, but it intensifies vulnerability and competition where governance is weak. A peace agreement that does not address land, water, livelihoods and local governance may silence the guns temporarily while leaving the drivers of conflict intact.
A fourth shift is the rise of private military companies and external security actors. External involvement in African conflicts is not new, but today it is more direct, more transactional and more opaque. Private military actors, state-linked contractors, foreign trainers, drone suppliers and resource-backed security arrangements are changing the battlefield and the political incentives of conflict parties. This matters for mediation because external security backing can reduce the incentive to compromise. If a government believes an external military partner can deliver victory, it may delay dialogue. If an armed group believes external patrons will protect it, it may also avoid compromise. Mediation must therefore engage not only the visible parties, but the hidden political economy behind the war.
A fifth shift is organised crime. Criminal syndicates are no longer peripheral to conflict. In several theatres, they are central. They move gold, fuel, drugs, arms, people and money. They corrupt officials, finance armed groups, provide livelihoods, distort local economies and undermine state authority. We cannot mediate political grievances while ignoring the criminal economies that make conflict profitable.
A sixth shift is the erosion of civic space. Mediation depends on civic actors: women’s groups, youth movements, faith leaders, traditional authorities, local peace committees, professional associations, business leaders and community networks. Yet across much of Africa, civic space is shrinking. The very actors who can help rebuild trust are often constrained, intimidated or excluded. A mediation process that includes only armed actors and political elites may stop violence temporarily, but it cannot rebuild society.
The seventh shift is geopolitical fragmentation. We have moved from a period in which multilateral norms were imperfect but influential, to a period in which global powers increasingly pursue transactional interests. External actors compete for minerals, ports, military access, data, markets, influence and ideological alignment. African conflicts risk becoming arenas for global contestation. This is where the idea of ‘Peace through Dialogue’ confronts the new reality of ‘Peace through Strength’.
Peace through Dialogue was based on moral authority, persuasion, legitimacy, inclusion and negotiated settlement. Peace through Strength is based on leverage, coercion, military capacity, economic pressure, information control and strategic advantage. Peace through Strength is not replacing dialogue completely, but it is narrowing the space for it. It empowers actors who believe victory is possible and rewards those who control territory, money, weapons, narratives and external relationships. Most importantly, it erodes African agency.
African agency is not a slogan. It means Africans defining the problem, setting the agenda, designing the process, convening the parties, mobilising legitimacy, managing external actors and owning the outcome. Yet today, African agency is often diluted by multiple competing mediation tracks led by African institutions, neighbouring states, external powers, private envoys and ad hoc coalitions. The issue is not whether external actors should be involved. They often have influence and resources. The issue is whether African institutions shape the process, or whether Africa becomes the theatre in which others negotiate their interests.
African agency is not a slogan. It means Africans defining the problem, setting the agenda, designing the process, convening the parties, mobilising legitimacy, managing external actors and owning the outcome
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Can African mediation still be done today? Yes – but not if it remains trapped in the methods of the 1990s. African mediation must now evolve in several important ways.
First, mediation must become strategic rather than episodic. Too often it is treated as an event: a meeting, a shuttle mission, a communiqué or a signing ceremony. But modern conflicts are systems. They require sustained political architecture. A mediator must ask: who benefits from the conflict, who finances it, who arms it, who legitimises it, who fears peace, who can spoil the process and who can protect it? Mediation must begin before formal talks and continue long after an agreement is signed.
Second, mediation must be intelligence-informed. This does not mean intelligence in the narrow security sense, but deep political analysis. The mediator must understand local grievances, elite incentives, military balances, criminal economies, external interests, social media narratives, religious dynamics, youth mobilisation, gendered impacts and climate pressures. A mediator who enters the room without understanding the conflict economy is no longer mediating the real conflict, but only its visible symptoms.
Third, mediation must reconnect elite settlement with social legitimacy. Many peace processes fail because elites sign agreements that societies do not own. The agreement may redistribute positions but not rebuild trust. Every mediation process therefore needs two tracks: an elite political track and a civic legitimacy track. The civic track must include women, youth, traditional leaders, faith leaders, local authorities, displaced communities, victims’ representatives, business actors and civil society – not as window-dressing, but as sources of legitimacy, implementation and accountability.
Fourth, mediation must address security realistically. Dialogue without security can become empty. Security without dialogue can become repression. African mediation must be able to speak to ceasefires, civilian protection, humanitarian access, disarmament, security sector reform, local security arrangements, monitoring mechanisms, withdrawal of foreign forces and the accountability of private military actors. But security must serve a political settlement. It must not replace it.
Fifth, mediation must confront criminal economies. This does not mean mediators become law enforcement agencies. It means mediation teams must include expertise on political economy, illicit finance, sanctions, border economies and local livelihoods. You cannot build peace while leaving the war economy untouched.
Sixth, mediation must become climate-aware and livelihood-sensitive. In farmer-herder conflicts, pastoral routes matter. In coastal areas, fishing rights matter. In drylands, water governance matters. In fragile communities, youth employment matters. In climate-stressed areas, adaptation is peacebuilding.
Finally, mediation must restore African agency. Africa needs stronger mediation capacity, but also stronger mediation confidence. This requires a revitalised AU-REC mediation ecosystem, stronger links between institutions and practitioners, deployable rosters, capable mediation support teams and African funding. Without African resources, African agency will remain vulnerable.
The African mediator of today must be part diplomat, part political analyst, part systems thinker, part listener, part strategist and part institution-builder. Mediation is no longer only about getting signatures. It is about rebuilding the political conditions for coexistence.
The African mediator of today must be part diplomat, part political analyst, part systems thinker, part listener, part strategist and part institution-builder. Mediation is no longer only about getting signatures. It is about rebuilding the political conditions for coexistence
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The 1990s gave Africa hope that dialogue could end wars. The 2000s gave Africa architecture through APSA. The 2010s showed how insurgency, terrorism and state fragility could overwhelm formal institutions. The 2020s are teaching us that conflict is now entangled with climate, crime, geopolitics, technology, disinformation, civic breakdown and private force.
African mediation can still be done. But it must be mediation for this era, not the last one: African-led, politically intelligent, socially legitimate, security-aware, climate-sensitive, economically informed and strategically backed. The future of African mediation will not be secured by nostalgia for the age of dialogue, nor by surrender to the age of force. It will be secured by building a new African practice of strategic mediation: dialogue with legitimacy, dialogue with leverage and dialogue anchored in African agency!
Vasu Gounden is the Founder and Executive Director of ACCORD, established in 1992. This article is informed by his more than 35 years of experience working with the UN, the OAU/AU, Regional Economic Communities, governments, civil society and business in conflict management and mediation. He has provided mediation support to leaders including Presidents Nelson Mandela and Ketumile Masire, trained government and rebel negotiating teams, and provided direct mediation services in conflicts across Africa and globally.
