South Sudan has once again postponed its scheduled elections, originally planned for December 2024, by another 24 months, pushing the election to 2026. This delay is not just a logistical issue but rather a reflection of the deeper structural crises within the country’s governance and peace processes. The postponement follows a history of failed attempts to hold elections, beginning with the first planned election in 2015, which was derailed by the outbreak of conflict in 2013 and 2016. This, in turn, led to the collapse of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). A revitalized version of the agreement (R-ARCSS) was signed in 2018 in an effort to revive the peace process, which was also extended in 2024 to theRoadmap. The Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU), established in February 2020, was tasked with overseeing the transitional period and ensuring free and inclusive elections by the end of the transition.
While the R-TGoNU has brought some degree of stability and reduced the risk of large-scale conflict, the lack of political will among South Sudan’s leaders has stymied effective implementation of the R-ARCSS and its associated Roadmap. This political inertia has led to frequent violations and selective adherence to the agreement’s provisions, creating a substantial delay in fulfilling the election timeline.
As of 22 September 2024, the R-TGoNU’s mandate and legitimacy has officially expired. However, in a predictable move, the signatories to the R-ARCSS unanimously extended their mandate until 2027. This decision was guided by the High-level Standing Committee (HLSC), a body tasked with assessing the progress of the agreement’s implementation. The committee’s findings highlighted the government’s failure to execute key activities outlined in the R-ARCSS, citing funding constraints and a general lack of preparedness for holding elections on schedule.
This postponement, and the claims of South Sudan’s unpreparedness, were anticipated by both internal and external observers. Reports from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC), and other stakeholders had long emphasised the need to create a conducive environment for democratic transition. These prerequisites include the drafting of a permanent constitution, the establishment of functional and adequately funded electoral institutions, the unification of security forces, and the guarantee of safety for all citizens. Despite these longstanding recommendations, the R-TGoNU has now formally acknowledged that these critical conditions remain unfulfilled.
While the R-TGoNU has brought some degree of stability and reduced the risk of large-scale conflict, the lack of political will among South Sudan’s leaders has stymied effective implementation of the R-ARCSS and its associated Roadmap.
Tweet
The election postponement, although expected, has been met with frustration by many South Sudanese citizens eager to exercise their democratic and constitutional rights through the ballot box. The delay raises critical concerns about the country’s ability to transition into a functional democratic state. More importantly, it questions whether the current liberal peace-building framework, as enshrined in the R-ARCSS, can effectively lead the country toward a stable and democratic future. In South Sudan, this framework increasingly appears to be a tool for political elites to maintain fragile peace, centred in Juba, while simultaneously legitimising their extended mandates without meaningful engagement with the broader population.
There are no easy solutions to this complex problem, but several key strategies could provide a path forward. One such initiative is the Tumaini Initiative, a high-level mediation effort facilitated by the Government of Kenya and the Community of Sant’Egidio. This initiative offers an alternative platform for political dialogue among the R-TGoNU, the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA), and other holdout groups, alongside various stakeholders. While this initiative presents a valuable opportunity for consensus-building and political reconciliation, its legitimacy may be compromised if it is seen as a standalone mechanism, disconnected from the broader peace process. Furthermore, if integrated into the extended R-ARCSS and the Roadmap, it risks being perceived as yet another iteration of the status quo, which has repeatedly failed to address the underlying causes of South Sudan’s conflict. For the Tumaini Initiative to succeed, it must tackle these systemic issues and avoid serving merely as a platform for elite-driven negotiations.
Another critical challenge lies in the nature of South Sudan’s peace framework. The peace process has largely been a normative construct, influenced by external ideals rather than the empirical realities on the ground. This disconnect has created significant obstacles to successfully implementing the agreement and fostering an inclusive political system. Regional bodies, particularly the African Union Ad Hoc High-Level Committee for South Sudan (C5), must intensify their engagement with the South Sudanese government. However, their approach should be more people-centred, focusing on tangible progress toward justice and accountability mechanisms.
The election postponement, although expected, has been met with frustration by many South Sudanese citizens eager to exercise their democratic and constitutional rights through the ballot box.
Tweet
In addition to external efforts, internal actors, particularly civil society organisations, must play a more active role in strengthening monitoring and accountability mechanisms. A robust system of checks and balances is crucial to prevent the type of unilateral decision-making witnessed during the implementation of the R-ARCSS/Roadmap, where political elites extended their mandates without proper oversight. To ensure that the 24-month extension period leads to meaningful progress, there must be a more rigorous mechanism for overseeing the transition. This could involve facilitated dialogue with members of key peace implementation mechanisms, e.g. the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC), to fully understand and implement their mandate to meet the expectations of the people of South Sudan.
Furthermore, any future extension of the transition period should be subject to a national referendum as provided in the transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan as amended, allowing the people of South Sudan to decide whether to maintain the current status quo or opt for a leaner, more efficient government. This would provide the necessary democratic legitimacy to any extension of political mandates and reinforce the principle that power in South Sudan should derive from the consent of the governed.
South Sudan’s postponed elections are a clear symptom of a deeper crisis in governance, politics and leadership. Without addressing the structural issues that have long plagued the country, the cycle of delays, elite-driven negotiations, and fragile peace will continue. The path forward requires not only stronger accountability mechanisms but also a shift toward more inclusive, people-centred governance that prioritises justice, security, and democratic rights for all South Sudanese citizens. Only through such a comprehensive approach can South Sudan hope to break free from the perpetual cycle of transitional government and build a sustainable peace.
Catherine Charles M. Vitaliano is a Fellow at the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London and an Analyst.
