The parties to the R-ARCSS were expected to embark on a series of security stabilization activities, including cessation of hostilities, permanent ceasefire, de-escalation, disarmament, cantonment, joint training, and integrated deployment of necessary unified national forces across the country. Unfortunately, this opportunity was missed as the revitalized coalition government got established and reconstituted partially in a rush that brought Dr. Riek Machar and other opposition leaders to Juba where President Salva Kiir is in full control of his own forces while other parties kept their forces separately too. This unpredictable situation has been causing isolated fatal clashes here and there due to defections by some field commanders. The mobilization of sections of tribal communities has continued with attacks on each other or looting of properties through involvement of resentful youth.
The impact from the presence of UNMISS has been questioned by citizens and partners, especially as the parties continued to defy the spirit and letter of the R-ARCSS and the associated commitments.
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The UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011) established the UNMISS followed by other resolutions. The deployed peace keeping forces were mandated to enhance peace and security using all necessary means to protect civilians, create conducive conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, support peace processes, and investigate human rights abuses. The troop ceiling of 17,000 personnel and 2101 police were authorized to guard the Protection of Civilians (PoCs) sites and conduct targeted patrols in hot zones with insecurity threats. Their mission has been enhanced by complementary peace-building engagements of the citizens by civil and political affairs divisions as well as human rights and gender sections of UNMISS. Nonetheless, the impact from the presence of UNMISS has been questioned by citizens and partners, especially as the parties continued to defy the spirit and letter of the R-ARCSS and the associated commitments. The same criticism has been levied against the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), the chair of which has so far not been appointed by the Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
The situation of no-peace-no-war has hampered the required humanitarian assistance and prevented governance reforms, including the restructuring of the justice system and reconstitution of the legislature. Reconciliation and healing have not taken root yet. The parties have not started to write a people-led federal constitution under which general elections would take place. The Ministry of Finance and Planning has not come up with clear planning, budgeting, policies, and implementation modalities for reformed macroeconomic and aid management systems. The old status quo is still seen in the central Bank of South Sudan, General Audit Chamber, Anti-Corruption Commission, National Revenue Authority, Ministry of Petroleum and Ministry of Mining, among others. The parties have not yet established the agreed Economic and Financial Management Authority with Advisory Committee comprising the World Bank, IMF, AfDB, COMESA, PTA Bank, UNECA, UNDP and 3 major donors (Troika) to safeguard natural resources and public revenues for the purposes of inclusive growth. They have failed to establish the approved Youth Enterprise Development Fund, Women Enterprise Development Fund, and Social Security Fund to promote well-being of the people by providing access to micro or medium financial credits for least privileged citizens. There is also no transparency and accountability in the public service.
The one year left for the implementation of the pending provisions of the R-ARCSS has created pessimism for South Sudan’s peace and revitalisation.
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There are three main reasons cited for the slow implementation of the R-ARCSS and fears about relapses of this ambitious peace deal. At the top of these is the lack of political will from the principal leaders to honour their commitments. These leaders have resorted to taking actions outside the confines of the peace agreement and the amended transitional constitution. They have been exercising powers that are contradictory to the spirit and letter of the R-ARCSS, partly due to less pressure from regional guarantors and international actors like the Troika (USA, UK and Norway). The second reason is lack of funds for implementing the matrixed activities of peacebuilding. The international donors and friends of South Sudan have been hesitant to fund the RTGoNU, except on a restricted and limited basis through regional or international agencies. The income from oil sales and other revenues has not been sufficient to pay the salaries of the public servants in time. This is also affected by the sharp drops and fluctuations in the prices of the black crude internationally, and how concessions for the sale of the unprocessed oil cargoes have been privatized to the advantage of unscrupulous tycoons. Corruption sprees and misappropriation of public assets have left the coffers in public institutions empty and bankrupt. The third reason is the unprecedented spread of COVID-19. The lockdowns and restriction of movement of people have created undesirable limitations to security, political, economic, and social activities. Some government officials have been left free to take advantage of the pandemic for their selfish financial gains and to spread politicized conspiracies against their opponents. The citizens have been suffering from psychological stress associated with positive results from the tests and related death cases.
Peace without good leadership, reliable security, economic growth, and democratic transition, is a worthless endeavour that will never yield dividends as expected for the good of the citizens.
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In conclusion, the one year left for the implementation of the pending provisions of the R-ARCSS has created pessimism for South Sudan’s peace and revitalization. The citizens are starting to feel that slow peace without dividends is nothing but a waste of time and resources. They are questioning the usefulness of UNMISS, especially when it is abandoning the sole mandate of protection of civilians in a situation where the government has failed to fulfil its responsibility to protect the vulnerable South Sudanese and safeguard their well-being peacefully. The exploitation of COVID-19 to relegate the duties of government and delay the peace process with ulterior motives for extending the transitional period indefinitely, is another cause for real concern. Peace without good leadership, reliable security, economic growth, and democratic transition, is a worthless endeavour that will never yield dividends as expected for the good of the citizens. Experts would advise that the agreements that are signed must be implemented competently by the parties concerned. Otherwise, they will collapse and result in serious repercussions.
James Okuk is a Senior Research Fellow at the South Sudan Centre for Strategic and Policy Studies (CSPS). He holds a PhD in Political Philosophy from the University of Nairobi and is a renowned analyst on governance, peacebuilding and development with focus on South Sudan.
