At the time of writing, it is unclear what the long-term negative impact of these developments on the Somali Security Forces (SSF) will be, because clan loyalties and family ties are generally more important than other loyalties. The crisis in the SSF and the question marks being raised around loyalties of force members exposes one of the main weaknesses of the Somali state-building project. The power struggle and uncertainty about the distribution of power and roles between the central government and the five regional member states highlight the dangers of building strong regional entities if the ambition is to build a strong state.
The @_AfricanUnion mission in Somalia (@amisomsomalia) has significantly improved security since 2007. However, current political tensions in #Somalia threaten all the gains achieve to date @MandrupThomas
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Regional security forces, often established with international assistance, have proven effective in fighting the insurgency, but might turn out to be a Trojan horse if the ambition is a strong Somalia based on a strong national government. Quick fixes and regionally based militias can be a useful tool in providing security in the short-term and as part of a COIN strategy, but risk undermining the bigger vision of a state-building project. Somalia is not unique in this case. A similar phenomenon can be found in DR Congo, Afghanistan, Darfur, and now Mozambique, where a weak central government results in security provision being sub-contracted to regionally-based entities. This is not a sign of strength but a result of weakness at the centre, which is a double-edged sword since it creates decentralised powerbrokers, which can be challenging to control.
This crisis in Somalia is unfolding at the same time that AMISOM’s mandate is up for renewal on 25 February 2021 in the United Nations Security Council. The mission was scheduled to either leave or reconfigure itself by the end of 2021. Such a follow-up mission’s nature and configuration are yet to be determined but were initially structured around providing the necessary enablers to support the SSF in taking up the primary responsibility for providing national security. Such a force should focus on Somali led counterterrorism and organised crime operations. The central issues here are making sure that the strategic gains made by AMISOM so far are not lost in the process and to establish what the future role is of a reconfigured AMISOM in 3 to 5 years. However, these plans have been called into question by the current political crisis.
A likely scenario is that AMISOM, in the foreseeable future, will have to play a stabilising and more active role in Somalia than was anticipated. The question, therefore, facing the Security Council is whether AMISOM will be reconfigured to support the SSF and their operations, or will it go back to being the primary provider of security for Somalia because of the political crisis and a subsequent institutional collapse?
Security in Somalia – where are we?
Despite its significant achievements, AMISOM has been criticised for not reaching its mandated objectives of creating space for peace and stability in Somalia, for insufficiently adapting and reconfiguring to meet the security challenges at hand, and for being too static and reactive. The Al-Shabaab, and a range of other armed actors, remain active in most parts of South-Central Somalia. The ambition of providing the SSF and the Somali state with the capacity to take over the responsibility for security in Somalia has been slow and partly a failure. The reality is that if AMISOM were to withdraw now, it is unlikely that the SSF would be able to withstand the pressure from the Al-Shabaab. Somalia largely consists of islands of security, within a “sea” of insecure areas outside urban centres. Al-Shabaab is still perceived to have a relatively high level of legitimacy amongst broad sections of the Somali population and effectively use strategic communication and social media to promote its Somali-nationalist, jihadist narrative.
The core question facing the Security Council this week is whether @amisomsomalia should be reconfigured now, or if the priority, in light of the current crisis, is to confirm and strengthen its role as the primary provider of security and stability in #Somalia @MandrupThomas
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The political deadlock has hampered the creation of effective security forces and coordinated security responses to the insurgents’ challenge. Recent military confrontations between SSF and Jubaland security forces is an illustration of the distrust existing between the FGS and FMS, and the recent confrontation between opposition supporters and SSF elements could be an indication of what is to come. The lack of an effective security sector in Somalia means that the Somalis so far have not been able and willing to take over the security responsibility from AMISOM as outlined in the Somali Transition Plan (STP), and are unlikely to be able to do so in the short to medium term. The lack of a clear political project has resulted in several missed opportunities for the Somalis. AMISOM has, despite its deficiencies, created the security space for a genuine political process to be initiated.
Challenges facing AMISOM and the international community.
AMISOM is, like other large peace missions, expensive, and resources are generally scarce. For political and financial reasons, pressure has been placed on the Somalis to take over the responsibility for their own security, allowing the international community to reduce its presence. Some donors initially used the lack of will by the Somalis to live up to the STP guidelines as an argument for rapidly closing the AMISOM military footprint, forcing the Somalis to take over the responsibility for their own security provision and state functions. The recent deterioration of the political situation revealed that the actors in Somalia do not have a viable political project, a precondition for sustainable peace. This highlights the fact that the Somali state-building project’s current failings are essentially political and developmental in nature, rather than a story of a failed military mission. There is no military solution to what is fundamentally a political problem, but the military can create space for a political solution to be found – provided the will is there.
Professor Thomas Mandrup serves in the faculty of the Royal Danish Defence College and is an Extraordinary Professor with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA), Stellenbosch University.
