The violence in Mogadishu was a low point for Somalia, a country that was slowly but steadily recovering from its devastating civil war in the 1990s. Dozens were killed, and tens of thousands of people fled districts in the capital after the Somali National Army (SNA) split into two factions: one supportive of President Farmaajo’s controversial mandate extension and another against it.
President Farmaajo’s decision to unilaterally extend his mandate by two years unleashed raw emotions. It was the first time in 20 years that an incumbent president attempted to change the rules of electoral process by fiat @Aynte
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It was a stark contrast to 21 October 1969 when the generals in charge of SNA took power in a bloodless coup after the country’s democratically elected president was assassinated a week earlier. For 21 years after that, the commander of the SNA at the time, General Mohamed Siyad Barre, ruled Somalia with an iron fist after suspending the constitution and disbanding the legislative and judicial branches. His so-called “scientific socialism” coupled with his brutal dictatorship ultimately led to the 1991 civil war that ousted him and plunged the country into widespread chaos. It was not until 2000 that Somalia re-established a broadly acceptable government under the mediation of the president of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Guelleh.
That traumatic experience is deeply ingrained in the minds of many people in Somalia who jealously guard their standing as the first multiparty democracy in postcolonial Africa. And that is precisely why President Farmaajo’s decision to unilaterally extend his mandate by two years unleashed raw emotions. It was the first time in 20 years that an incumbent president attempted to change the rules of electoral process by fiat.
The April 2021 violence in Mogadishu was a low point for #Somalia, a country that was slowly but steadily recovering from its devastating civil war in the 1990s. Dozens were killed, and thousands of people fled the capital @Aynte
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Elite Compact
For two decades since the establishment of the Third Republic in neighbouring Djibouti, Somalia was held together by a tenuous but profoundly resilient set of normative agreements known as the “elite compact”. Among other things, this social contract was undergirded by sustained reconciliation among the country’s deeply polarized clans. Key elements of this pact include federalism as a system of governance that allows for greater autonomy for the five federal member states plus the capital city Mogadishu, and sharing of power and resources.
President Farmaajo came to power in early 2017 with a determined political ideology to dismantle the elite compact, for he viewed it as an inherently flawed system that unfairly empowered dominant clans that control federal member states and marginalized others who do not. Naturally, many Somali clans hold deep grievances against the current federal system for umpteen reasons, not least for the intra-clan power dynamic associated with it.
The sustained assault on the elite compact by president Farmaajo and his administration has shaken the foundation of Somalia over the past four years. The country is demonstrably more polarized today than at any time in the past two decades, and localized conflicts over power and resources are brewing under the surface. Federal elections, previously held every four years with manageable bumps on the road, have become the latest aspect of the social contract systemically undermined by President Farmaajo. His predecessors not only organised elections they ultimately lost, but they handed over power peacefully in a region where dictatorship is the name of the game.
Had it not been for the rejection of some army units of the mandate extension and sustained international pressure—including threats of sanctions—President Farmaajo would have plunged Somalia into a full blown civil war with devastating consequences. Following the armed conflict in Mogadishu, Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble, alongside two federal member states who were previously aligned with President Farmaajo, have broken ties with him and joined the chorus rejecting the president’s mandate extension.
Despite extraordinary challenges, it appears that #Somalia is back on track for presidential and parliamentary elections in the next few months @Aynte
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New electoral agreement
Once Prime Minister Roble categorically distanced himself from the mandate extension, which quickly became radioactive, he was able to rapidly redeploy army units who had revolted. In collaboration with opposition leaders and federal member states, he was also able to create an environment conducive to dialogue over an electoral process that was acceptable to all stakeholders. The international community also endorsed his bid to calm the situation and re-engage in a dialogue.
Within a few days of high-level dialogue between the FGS and FMS, and in regular consultations with opposition leaders, the prime minister was able to snatch a victory out of the jaws of defeat. Virtually all stakeholders signed a new electoral agreement that would lead to parliamentary and presidential elections in the next few months. Although the new agreement is broadly similar to the 17 September 2020 agreement that previously failed, the key difference here is that the prime minister is empowered to oversee its implementation, and President Farmaajo is notably disenfranchised for he was widely seen as a divisive figure.
On 27 May 2021, #Somalia’s leaders signed a major agreement that put the country back on an electoral pathway after months of intense of political standoff over the type and process of elections @Aynte
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The way forward
In the coming weeks, the actions—or inactions—of Prime Minister Roble will be under intense scrutiny for a hint of residual influence over him by President Farmaajo. Given the enormous political capital invested in him, the Prime Minister is expected to implement the new electoral agreement independently and decisively. That would be easier said than done, but the stakes are too high for the PM to wobble at this critical juncture.
The first litmus test of Roble’s posture would be the appointment of the Federal Electoral Management Body (EMB). A previous EMB, which was stacked with Farmaajo aides, loyalists and activists, was disbanded after nearly all stakeholders complained about its composition. The second test would be how the Prime Minister manages the electoral security apparatus. The agreement calls for an inclusive security committee that can win the confidence of all stakeholders.
Despite extraordinary challenges, it appears that Somalia is, once again, headed for an electoral process that is acceptable to the major stakeholders of the country. However, international pressure on political leaders should remain in place until a president is elected.
Abdi Aynte is the Managing Director of Laasfort Consulting Group and a former Minister of Planning and International Cooperation of Somalia
