The mineral-rich eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has faced over 30 years of cyclical conflict involving a profusion of national, regional, and international military actors. Since 2021, the Congolese army (FARDC) has faced a resurgence of armed groups in this hyper-militarised region. Reports indicate that more than 100 armed groups operate in the eastern DRC, driven by complex political, socio-economic, and security interests and objectives. These groups often splinter and shift alliances, complicating military engagements.
Among these groups, the Rwanda-backed March 23 Movement (M23) stands out. Since late December 2024, the M23 has aggressively expanded its territorial control, benefitting from resource extraction and organised crime in the eastern DRC. Rwanda has seemingly decided to establish a controlled buffer zone in eastern Congo using the M23 group, similar to Israel’s actions in southern Lebanon from 1983 to 2000. The demotivated FARDC, struggling with well-documented operational and structural weaknesses, has shown little resistance. Efforts by the ill-fated Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) regional force (SAMIDRC) and the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to confront the M23 have also faltered, resulting in the deaths of at least 19 peacekeepers. The ongoing violence has led to substantial loss of life, human rights violations, displacement, and infrastructure destruction, worsening an already existing humanitarian crisis.
High-level summits of the African Union (AU) and regional blocs, specifically the East African Community (EAC) and SADC, as well as the United Nations (UN), have called for an immediate ceasefire. However, these calls have gone unheeded as the M23 continues its military advance. In response to this escalation, various armed groups opposing the M23 have united under the name “Wazalendo,” which means “patriots” in Kiswahili, collaborating with the Congolese government. This increased “militarisation of the local governance context” in eastern DRC has implications for future Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and Repatriation (DDRRR) efforts.
Adaptive DDRRR of armed groups in eastern DRC would involve comprehensive engagement with all stakeholders through a consultative, participatory, holistic process, ensuring that every stakeholder has a voice in the process
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Implementing DDRRR for combatants willing to leave armed groups and return to civilian life is essential for restoring peace. Disarmament and demobilisation can improve security and stability by removing weapons from the hands of combatants and detaching them from paramilitary groups. Rehabilitation, including disengagement and de-radicalisation efforts for the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and reintegration of all former armed group members or associates should ideally enable them to return to normal, sustainable civilian life. Repatriation should facilitate the return of foreign fighters, such as Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan troops, along with members of the Congolese government-backed Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), to their home countries. The FDLR, an ethnic Hutu group implicated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis, seeks to overthrow the Rwandan government, which in turn supports the M23 in its efforts to defeat the FDLR. The practice among neighbouring Great Lakes countries of supporting each other’s rebel movements to foster instability complicates the region’s security landscape.
This article aims to advise local, regional, and international policymakers on a potential comprehensive approach to peace in eastern DRC, integrating a DDRRR programme with dialogue and transitional justice initiatives. So far, the Congolese government and its regional partners have focused on military operations, notably the unsuccessful FARDC-SAMIDRC offensive to neutralise armed groups alongside diplomatic efforts through the Luanda and Nairobi processes facilitated by SADC member state, Angola, and the EAC, respectively. The AU has endorsed efforts by these regional blocs to consolidate the Luanda and Nairobi processes to maximise their effectiveness in addressing the crisis in eastern DRC. The EAC and SADC have appointed former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, former Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, and former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo as peace facilitators for the newly merged EAC-SADC peace process in eastern Congo. The AU has recommended a clear framework of how this integrated political process should proceed to maximise its effectiveness.
Despite the volatile situation in the eastern DRC, a new DDRRR programme that helps address the root causes of the conflict could be introduced to help stabilise the area in support of ongoing regional mediation efforts, or reinforce any future peacebuilding progress.
Opportunities for Adaptive DDRRR, Dialogue and Transitional Justice
The complexity and volatility of the eastern Congo necessitates an adaptive approach to DDRRR. Cedric de Coning’s definition of adaptive peacebuilding serves as a guiding principle: it is “a process where peacebuilders, together with the communities and people affected by the conflict, actively engage in a structured process to sustain peace and resolve conflicts by employing an iterative process of learning and adaptation.” This adaptive approach is essential for DDRRR and underscores the necessity of a balanced partnership between international support and locally driven peacebuilding solutions to achieve genuine success.
An adaptive, context-specific, whole-of-society peacebuilding approach to the DRC’s complex problems aligns with proposals for a second, inclusive Congolese National Conference, grounded in the country’s experience, with crucial regional and international cooperation. This conference should assemble all political and social stakeholders, including armed and unarmed groups, under the guidance of respected religious leaders in the country, mirroring the model of the 1992 conference. Such a gathering is essential for the Congolese to cultivate locally and nationally owned strategies to address the complex conflict in eastern DRC effectively. The lessons from previous peacemaking efforts, such as the Inter Congolese Dialogue (2002-03) and the Lusaka Peace Process (1999), which offered an entry point for UN-supported DDRRR, must be applied meticulously in order to avoid past mistakes and build upon successes.
Adaptive DDRRR of armed groups in eastern DRC would involve comprehensive engagement with all stakeholders through a consultative, participatory, holistic process, ensuring that every stakeholder has a voice in the process. This inclusive, whole-of-society collaboration is vital to establish a collective understanding of the root causes and structural drivers of the conflict and insecurity; the typologies of armed groups and their intricate connections to local, national, and transnational actors; and varying motivations behind armed mobilisation, demobilisation, and remobilisation to innovatively develop and adapt effective home-grown DDRRR initiatives. This is crucial as, for example, the M23’s military escalation, backed by Rwanda, is accompanied by radically different narratives regarding the conflict’s origins, complicating the identification of the most appropriate and sustainable responses.
The opportunity for adaptive DDRRR in eastern DRC is fortified by the lessons that can be learned from a series of previous UN-assisted DDRRR programmes. Each earlier programme offers insights that can either advance or hinder current efforts. For instance, the M23 claims to have resumed fighting in 2021 due to failed secret negotiations with the Congolese government, as well as a response to a sudden attack by the FARDC following the government’s declaration of martial law against armed groups, thus refusing to join a new DDRRR programme. The M23 was established in 2012 by disgruntled former officers of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), named after the date of a crucial accord signed with the Congolese government on March 23, 2009. A key security sector reform/governance (SSR/G) component of the peace deal and subsequent 2013 Nairobi Declarations, which ended the 2012 M23 rebellion, the integration of CNDP military units into the FARDC, has been contentious. An adaptive DDRRR approach thus presents an opportunity to strengthen the critical link between DDRRR and SSR/G, contributing to a professional, operationally effective, and accountable FARDC that could improve human rights conditions in the region, thereby addressing the core grievances exploited by non-state armed actors.
In the eastern Congo context, an adaptive DDRRR approach can harness the complementarities between DDRRR, transitional justice, and reconciliation processes to rebuild trust between former combatants and communities, as well as between non-state armed groups and the state, ultimately culminating in the cessation of cyclical violence and insecurity
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Moreover, leveraging an adaptive peacebuilding approach can solidify the DDRRR-transitional justice and reconciliation nexus in eastern DRC. It facilitates the establishment of essential links between DDRRR and transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives from the outset, incorporating both top-down and bottom-up strategies. The sustainable exit of ex-combatants from armed groups is significantly influenced by the capacity of recipient communities, which have endured the brunt of the armed conflict, to transform relationships. Simply providing a blanket amnesty for all military actors, without meaningful reconciliation and restorative justice initiatives, can perpetuate fear, trauma, and resentment among victims-survivors of human rights violations towards former combatants. In the eastern Congo context, an adaptive DDRRR approach can harness the complementarities between DDRRR, transitional justice, and reconciliation processes to rebuild trust between former combatants and communities, as well as between non-state armed groups and the state, ultimately culminating in the cessation of cyclical violence and insecurity. Importantly, adaptive DDRRR allows for community input in developing a victim-centred justice and reconciliation strategy, including what communities view as prerequisites for the successful reintegration of ex-combatants, which is crucial to achieving lasting peace.
A whole-of-society approach could significantly promote the complementary Women, Peace and Security and Youth, Peace and Security agendas concerning DDRRR. Involving women and youth in the adaptive DDRRR processes for armed groups can help address the gender and age-related aspects of the ongoing crisis in the eastern DRC. This participation would enhance local capacities for achieving sustainable peace by empowering Congolese women and youth to take on leading roles in peacebuilding efforts. Additionally, it would ensure that the DDRRR programme is not only specific to the context but also responsive to the diverse needs, experiences, and statuses of women, men, and young people.
Dr Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa is a senior faculty member of Africa University and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of Johannesburg, and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), South Africa.
Dr Alexander M. Rusero is the Head of the Department of International Relations & Diplomacy at Africa University, Mutare, Zimbabwe, and a Research Fellow at Africa Centre for Inclusive Health Management, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.
