The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) was predictably on the agenda of the recent SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government convened in Zimbabwe. The Mission was established on 8 May 2023 according to the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. It was officially deployed on 15 December 2023 to help the Congolese government restore peace in eastern DRC. SAMIDRC’s mandated priority tasks are to support the Congolese army in neutralising armed groups, such as the March 23 Movement (M23) and the protection of civilians (POC). On 4 March 2024, the Mission’s mandate was endorsed by the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). Since its deployment, several SAMIDRC soldiers have been killed or maimed, which raised concerns about the Mission’s operational and logistical capabilities. The communiqué issued by the recent SADC Summit highlighted several important issues, including the need for diplomatic solutions to the conflicts in eastern DRC and financial and logistical support for SAMIDRC.
First, the SADC leaders commended Angolan President João Lourenço, the outgoing chair of the bloc, for brokering a truce between the DRC and Rwanda through the Luanda regional peace process. The Luanda Process seeks to address the inter-state dimension of the crises in the eastern DRC through dialogue between the two countries. The SADC leaders indicated the ball is firmly in the DRC and Rwanda’s court by calling on the two countries to cease all hostilities. The SADC leaders’ appeal acknowledges that there can be no military solution to the well-documented, cyclical, crosscutting and multifaceted conflicts in the eastern DRC. From several Summit communiqués, it can be inferred that the SADC leaders had a plan for SAMIDRC’s deployment to serve a political end goal from the outset and have consistently adhered to this plan. For example, the July 2023 Summit, which “approved the mandate and supporting legal and operational instruments for deploying” SAMIDRC “reiterated its call for the immediate cessation of hostilities by all armed groups and unconditional withdrawal from the currently occupied areas, and committed to exploring additional measures to the current diplomatic efforts, to force the M23 and other armed groups to abandon all forms of attacks.” SADC’s stance on the diplomatic resolution of the eastern DRC conflicts is in tune with other key regional and global actors, including the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), AU and United Nations (UN).
[T]he SADC leaders commended Angolan President João Lourenço, the outgoing chair of the bloc, for brokering a truce between the DRC and Rwanda through the Luanda regional peace process.
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Second, the recent SADC Summit welcomed the efforts of both the AU and the UN Secretary-General to explore various options to support the SAMIDRC. This aligns with the SADC leaders’ earlier expression of gratitude to the AU and UN “for the solidarity and support towards the SAMIDRC, a SADC regional response which complements other on-going diplomatic and political processes in support of the Government of the DRC.” Crucially, the provision of inadequate or inappropriate assets and capabilities has been identified as a significant challenge for SAMIDRC. For example, analysts have criticised the Mission’s lack of air and technical assets, such as transport and attack helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs, also known as ‘drones’), which are deemed vital for SAMIDRC to effectively subdue M23 and other armed groups in the rugged eastern Congo terrain
The PSC, for instance, asked the AU Commission to expedite funding for the SAMIDRC from the AU Peace Fund crisis reserve facility. It also exhorted the Commission to ensure the transfer of equipment donated to SADC by the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in Douala, Cameroon, to support the implementation of the Mission’s mandate’s. The African 3 plus members of the UN Security Council, Algeria, Mozambique and Sierra Leone, along with Guyana, firmly campaigned for financial and logistical support for SAMIDRC. After some deliberation, the recently adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2746 authorises the UN mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to assist SAMIDRC, including through improved coordination, information sharing, and technical and logistical support.
[T]he recent SADC Summit welcomed the efforts of both the AU and the UN Secretary-General to explore various options to support the SAMIDRC.
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The decision aims to strengthen SAMIDRC’s operational and logistical capabilities. It critically builds upon at least four possible SAMIDRC enablers. First, SAMIDRC’s streamlined mandate avoided the “Christmas tree” approach, often seen in peace missions, where critical priorities are obscured by lengthy lists of tasks. Second, as incumbent SADC Summit chair, the DRC played a dual role in the SAMIDRC mandate negotiations as both penholder and host government. Third, the needs assessment nature of SAMIDRC’s priorities and possible joint operations with the Congolese army bode well for the Mission to communicate and work closely with the host government to implement the mandate. Fourth, the three troop contributing countries (TCCs), Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania, demonstrated the political will and commitment to use their valuable past peace enforcement deployment experience in eastern DRC with the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within MONUSCO. The FIB, established in March 2013, is the only UN peacekeeping force with an offensive mandate like SAMIDRC. These TCCs have a pool of combat-ready troops and officers who have served on several deployments in the FIB and are therefore familiar with the terrain and the context. Their previous UN experience will also help to facilitate the coordination between the SADC and UN forces. For example, SAMIDRC’s Force Commander Major General Monwabisi Dyakopu from South Africa has had three prior deployments with MONUSCO’s FIB.
Notwithstanding the crucial support from the AU and UN for SAMIDRC, it is important to recognise that there will be no military solution to the conflicts in eastern Congo. SAMIDRC serves a political end-goal, its aim is to complement ongoing diplomatic processes and to help implement any agreements reached.
Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa is a senior faculty member of Africa University, Zimbabwe and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of Johannesburg. Gabriel G.G. Malebang is a Political Science Lecturer in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Botswana. He was previously Head of Politics and Diplomacy at the Southern African Development Community.
