Abstract
Abiy Ahmed’s assumption of power in Ethiopia in April 2018 brought positive changes that were lauded internationally but unwelcomed by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) –one of the coalition parties in the Ethiopian government. In November 2020, the Ethiopian Federal Government commenced a massive ‘law enforcement operation’ in the Tigray region against the TPLF. Eritrea’s involvement in the conflict alongside the Ethiopian government internationalised it. This article analyses Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray conflict. Since their 1998 border war over the Badme region, Eritrea and Ethiopia have had frosty relations. To date, they are still mending these relationships despite their 2018 rapprochement. This article argues that the alliance of the Ethiopian government with Eritrea against the TPLF could be a case of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ and thus examines Ethiopia–Eritrea relations and their strategic considerations that necessitated this alliance. Adopting the realist theory of international relations, the study reviews literature and historically analyses the relations between the two countries. The study’s main objective is to understand their strategic considerations for conflict and cooperation at different times in history and particularly in the Tigray conflict. The study’s findings reveal that amid the Ethiopia‒Eritrea relations are Eritrean‒Tigrayan relations, anchored in issues of identity construction and deconstruction, statehood and sovereignty, animosity, mistrust and apprehension. The study recommends that the relations between Abiy Ahmed’s government, Eritrea and the TPLF should be keenly monitored and managed for the stability of the two countries and the Horn of Africa region.
Key words: TPLF, EPRDF, Ethiopia–Eritrea relations, Tigray conflict
1. Introduction
Ethiopia and Eritrea are two countries that are culturally related and historically connected. The two countries have had varying relations at different times in their history. Their relations have been characterised by a continuum of conflict and cooperation at different times in their long intertwined history. Less than ten years after Eritrea attained self-determination from Ethiopia, the two countries plunged into a border dispute that thawed their relations for close to two decades. Eritrea attained independence from Ethiopia in 1993. The two countries enjoyed cordial relations until 1997 when a border dispute between them led to two years of war from 1998 to 2000. Thereafter a situation existed of no-war-no-peace tensions until 2018 when the two countries made a historic rapprochement (Jima, 2023). Two years after the rapprochement, the Tigray conflict began in Ethiopia between the federal government forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Eritrea was one of the allies who cooperated with the Ethiopian government to fight the significantly militarily powerful TPLF (Ylönen, 2021). This article critically examines the relations of the two countries in light of the Tigray conflict. It also discusses Ethiopia–Eritrea relations over time and the strategic considerations from both countries and peoples that necessitated the cooperation of the two countries against the TPLF. The article’s overall conclusion is that Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray crisis is anchored in the historical experiences of and strategic considerations for both Eritrea under Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopia under Abiy Ahmed’s regime.
Methodologically, the article is based on desk research and a review of literature. It reviews scholarly literature on the history of Ethiopia and Eritrea and their relations, literature on foreign policy as well as peace and conflict in the Horn of Africa. Literature focusing on conflict and cooperation between Ethiopia and Eritrea over time was also reviewed to inform this study. Newspaper articles and other internet sources that provide current information about the phenomena under study were reviewed as well as legal documents such as signed agreements between the two countries. The article brings together key areas in international relations, such as foreign policy, international relations and peace and conflict. It takes a historical perspective going back to the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial relations of Eritrea and Ethiopia in order to identify patterns of relations.
2. Conceptual Context
The article uses the realist theory of international relations (IR) to argue that the two states have sought to pursue their national interests, which are sometimes an extension of the personal interests of the leaders. The realist theory places emphasis on the state as a key unitary and rational actor in the international system that is in constant pursuit of its national interests (Viotti and Kauppi, 2014). In line with Hobbesian realism, state leaders are also in pursuit of their individual interests, which foreign policy scholars argue are sometimes expressed as national interests. Waltzian realists, focusing on the distribution of power in the international system, argue that the international system plays a key role in influencing the choices and behaviour of states to respond to the changes in the international system that pose either opportunities or threats.
The article contends that resolution of the long-term conflict and the subsequent participation of Eritrea in Ethiopia’s war against the TPLF might have been driven by motives that can be explained by realism. They are rational choices made out of very carefully calculated considerations of the leaders. They are further informed by the need for personal and regime preservation. Eritrea’s constant pursuit of statehood, sovereignty and independence and Ethiopia’s (especially the Tigrayan’s) reluctance to let go of Eritrea can be viewed from a realist perspective. Eritrea’s decision to participate in the Tigray conflict and the Ethiopian government’s acceptance of (or request for) Eritrea’s hand in the conflict are both foreign policy decisions that can be looked at with a realist eye. The above factors are some of the reasons that informed the choice of the author to put on a realist lens to analyse the relations between the two countries.
3. Ethiopia’s Changing Regimes
Ethiopia is a country in the Horn of Africa. The country managed to escape colonialism when Emperor Menelik II defeated Italy in the battle of Adwa in 1896 and thus blocked Italy’s ambition of colonising it (Aweke and Seid, 2023). Later, Ethiopia was ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie until 1974 when his government was overthrown by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam who headed a military junta known as ‘the Derg’ or ‘Dergue’. He was a ruthless dictator whose regime was characterised by terror and suppression of political dissent and counter-insurgencies. Nevertheless, owing to Cold War politics, Mengistu Haile Mariam received support from the (then) Soviet Union which kept him in power despite growing domestic opposition.
The fall of the Soviet Union also ushered in Mengistu’s fall. In 1991, Mengistu’s regime (the Dergue) was toppled by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of four regional and ethnic insurgent groups, namely the TPLF, Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO), Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) and Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM) (Mesfin, 2012). The EPRDF fought alongside the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) to defeat the Derg regime. After the fall of Mengistu, Meles Zenawi, the chairman of TPLF, became the president of the transitional government under the ruling coalition of the EPRDF. In 1995, Zenawi became the prime minister and served in this position until his death in 2012. Zenawi’s regime was characterised by oppression of the opposition and autocratic decision making. He was succeeded by Hailemariam Desalegn Boshe of the SEPMD, one of the coalition parties of the EPRDF (De Wadla, 2018). Desalegn resigned in February 2018 following growing anti-government protests owing to, among other factors, the government’s gross violation of human rights and freedoms, and economic and political marginalisation by the TPLF-dominated government (De Wadla, 2018). Desalegn’s resignation paved the way for the current Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, to come to power in April 2018. Within a short time in office, Ahmed enacted sweeping changes domestically and within the region, which led to his being awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. However, about a year later Ahmed’s government engaged in massive violence in the Tigray region that watered down the gains he had made for peace (Ylönen, 2021).
4. Ethiopia’s Geopolitical Position and Foreign Policy
After Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia became a landlocked country. Ethiopia, however, possesses key national attributes, such as population, territorial size, geographical location and a rich history, which lend themselves to the country’s foreign policy (Le Gouriellec, 2018). With a large population of over 100 million people, Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous nation (Mohammed, 2018; Sheikh et al., 2018).The country has several ethnic groups, the largest and most politically active being the Oromo, the Amhara and Tigreans (Mesfin, 2012:88). Ethiopia’s geostrategic location and power in the Horn of Africa cannot be overlooked (Mesfin, 2012).
The country is large in geographical size and it is endowed with a topography characterised by high mountains that serve as natural barriers to external attacks (Mesfin, 2012:89). It also has various natural resources, such as water, and minerals, such as copper, platinum and gold. Ethiopia contributes a substantial amount of water to the river Nile. The country shares porous borders with all the Horn of Africa countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan. Aware of the militarist nature of the region, Ethiopia has established a powerful military. Ethiopia has the third largest force in Africa with its military capability ranging from conventional warfare through counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism to peacekeeping operations (Le Gouriellec, 2018:1064). The flipside is that the country has, on several occasions, used the military to suppress political opposition. This has curtailed democracy and caused gross human rights violations.
Ethiopia occupies a central position in the Horn of Africa region (Ylönen, 2021) and has considerable influence in the African Union (AU) as it plays host to the organisation’s headquarters. Moreover, owing to its location in the Horn of Africa and its proximity to the Red Sea, the gateway to the Arab World and the Middle East communication and trade routes, Ethiopia has had to contend with foreign powers seeking to strategically position themselves in the Horn of Africa (Mesfin, 2012:90).
5. Eritrea and its Changing Identities
Eritrea is a country in the Horn of Africa that shares a wide border with Ethiopia in the northern region and that is home to the Tigrayan people. In 1991, after the defeat of the Mengistu Haile Mariam’s military junta in Ethiopia, the EPLF entered Asmara, signalling the emergence of a de facto independent state of Eritrea (Negash and Tronvoll, 2000:31). However, Eritrea remained legally a part of Ethiopia until April 1993 when a referendum was held and the country was formally declared an independent state on 24 May 1993. In 1994, the EPLF dissolved itself and became the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), the only legal party in Eritrea with Afwerki as its chairman and head of state (ICG, 2010), a position which he still holds. Since its independence, Eritrea’s relations with its neighbours have been violent and hostile, while those between the country, the major powers and rest of the international community remained strained (Nur, 2013:76).
The 30-year struggle for Eritrea’s independence was filled with promises and dreams of peace and justice by nationalist leaders. In the years following independence, Eritrea was hailed internationally and domestically for upholding democracy, protecting human rights and freedoms, and having an institutional set up and atmosphere that seemed to deliver the promised hope, peace and justice (Hepner, 2014:154). However, following the end of the border conflict with Ethiopia in 2000, things took a dramatic turn. Citing security concerns and vulnerability to attacks by Ethiopia and other international enemies, the government embarked on massive repression and torture of religious leaders, real or perceived political dissidents, journalists and student union leaders, among others, which led to gross human rights violations. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and human rights organisations were expelled from the country (Hepner, 2014: 160). People began fleeing the country such that between 2011 and 2012, relative to its small population, Eritrea produced the highest number of refugees and asylum seekers in the world (Jopson, 2009 as cited in Hepner, 2014:154, UNHCR 2013 as cited in Poole 2013:68). President Afwerki dismissed reports about his repressive government as a “boring joke” based on fabrications (Hepner, 2014:153).
Eritrea has also been accused of destabilising the Horn of Africa region by supporting militia groups against the governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan (Ewing, 2008; ICG, 2010; Plant, 2000). The United Nations (UN) has, on various occasions, imposed wide ranging sanctions on Eritrea, such as arms embargoes, asset freezes and travel bans on top leaders (Plaut, 2010:576). Indeed, the UN declared Eritrea an international pariah state in 2013 and the country alienated many of its former friends. Eritrea’s foreign policy is also characterised by unprovoked aggression towards her neighbours, including Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen (Milkias, 2004:70). Consequently, the country has suffered isolation not only regionally but also internationally. Eritrea’s foreign policy is strongly anchored in the personality of Afwerki and the unconventional methods that he uses to make decisions and implement them (Mesfin, 2012:103). Since her independence from Ethiopia, Eritrea has not experienced any regime change and has only had one president.
The rapprochement with Ethiopia in 2018 significantly changed Eritrea’s image internationally, particularly from a pariah state to one that had embraced peace and was geared towards actively participating in the search for regional stability in the Horn of Africa. Thus, the country’s participation in the Tigray crisis was a shock to many. The following section takes a historical review of the relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia during the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial periods.
6. Precolonial and colonial history, and relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea
Ethiopia and Eritrea are two culturally linked countries, especially with regard to the Tigray population. Indeed, as Zewde (1991) pointed out, most central and southern parts of Eritrea were once part of Ethiopian territory. The modern history of Ethiopia indicates that from the mid-nineteenth century, Ethiopia was ruled by key political figures, namely Tewodros II, Johannes and Menelik II (Reid, 2007:240). These three ruled an imperial polity popularly known as Abyssinia and later Ethiopia and were revered as symbols of Ethiopian nationalism. The purpose of these leaders was to create regional unity. Johannes was a Tigrayan and thus remained a political icon and a major force behind Tigray’s push for nationalism. Menelik II was a Shewa (Shoa) from the Shewa region of Ethiopia (Dixon, 2019) and Tewodros II was from Amhara (Crummey, 1971). Johannes and Menelik detested Eritreans who tried to fight for Eritrean nationalism. The kingdom of Tigre, which included Eritrea, was regarded as a significant region of Abyssinia because of its access to the Red Sea ports (Reid, 2007: 243). Emperor Johannes claimed that the Red Sea was the natural frontier of Abyssinia (Reid 2007:245). Eritreans and Tigrayans were lumped together as northern Abyssinians, an indication of their intertwined history.
Colonialism played a key role in shaping the identities and relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Italians tried to colonise Ethiopia but were defeated, making Ethiopia the only country that successfully managed to resist colonialism (Reid, 2007). Under Menelik II, Ethiopians fought, defeated and humiliated the Italians in the battle of Adwar in 1896, which put Ethiopia in the limelight while thwarting Italy’s imperial objectives in the Horn of Africa. While Menelik II managed to defeat Italian ambition to colonise Ethiopia, the Italians remained on the periphery and created the colony now called Eritrea (Aweke and Seid, 2023; Negash and Tronvoll, 2000).The failure of Menelik II to pursue and expel the Italians after defeating them was received with bitterness by the Tigrayans who viewed it as a move by the emperor to divide and weaken the Tigrinya speaking people (Bereketeab, 2010:35). Thus, the Tigrayans who reside in the northern most Tigray region of Ethiopia have never come to terms with the existence of Eritrea as a state because they view the country as an extension of Tigray.
Eritrea’s experience of colonialism set the territory apart from Ethiopia and gave it a distinct identity (Bereketeab, 2010: 47). This gave Eritrea a sense of nationhood and the need to fight for independence from the Italians and later from Ethiopia. Ethiopians fought for the independence of Eritreans from the ‘aliens’ (at first Italians and later the British) (Pankhurst, 1952:59). Their interest was, however, not for the independence of Eritrea as a separate entity but rather to unify the territory which they considered to have been wrongly named Eritrea by the Italians. They also wanted to gain access to the Red Sea ports and to unify the entire Ethiopian population, which to them was inclusive of the Eritreans (Pankhurst, 1952:59).
While Ethiopia did not experience colonialism, Eritrea was colonised by the Italians from the late 1880s (Dixon, 2019) until 1941, and later by the Ethiopians until 1991. During the colonial period, Eritrea and Ethiopia also developed different economic systems. Eritrea’s economy was characterised by a colonial political economy while Ethiopia maintained a precolonial social economic formation. As such, Eritrea’s economy thrived and attracted the migration of many Ethiopians, mainly Tigrayans, to Eritrea – especially in the 1920s and 1930s (Bereketeab, 2010:29). Thus, many Tigrayans were pushed by poor economic, social and political conditions to migrate from Ethiopia to Eritrea and were pulled to Eritrea by prospects of better living conditions. Similarity of culture, language, religion, geographical and culinary habits between Eritreans and Ethiopians made it favourable for Tigrayans to settle in Eritrea (Bereketeab, 2010). In order to make the colonial experience attractive, the Italians were determined to ensure that the Eritreans were more privileged than their Ethiopian counterparts. They ensured that the Eritreans had better access to services and a better way of life than the Ethiopians (Bereketeab, 2010). This further widened the gap between the Eritreans and the Tigrayans in Ethiopia. Thus while Ethiopia and particularly Tigray were poor, Eritrea did well. Many Ethiopian Tigrayans moved to Eritrea, ready to do any job, even the menial ones. The privileges enjoyed by Eritreans over the Ethiopian Tigrayans created a sense of inferiority among the Tigrayans and superiority among the Eritreans. Consequently, a deep resentment developed in the Tigrayans over the Eritreans (Berhe, 2004).
6.1 Eritrea’s struggle for independence from Ethiopia (1961–1991)
The journey to Eritrea’s independence began with colonisation by Italy until the defeat of Italy during World War II in 1941. From 1941, Eritrea was administered by the British until 1950 and then it was federated with Ethiopia as an autonomous entity under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Emperor (Abbay, 2001; Negash and Tronvoll, 2000:9; Tesfay, 2012:164). This federation was interpreted differently by Ethiopians and Eritreans: while the latter took it as UN acknowledgment of the integrity and continuity of the colonially created entity, Ethiopians perceived it as the UN’s acknowledgment of its claim on Eritrea. Ethiopia thus abrogated the federation and created Eritrea as a province of Ethiopia, something that the Eritreans resisted (Bereketeab, 2010:287).
The Tigrinya of Eritrea and the Tigrayans of Ethiopia were of the same ethnic group but belonged to different political entities. In 1961, the Eritreans formed a movement called the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and began an armed struggle for independence from Ethiopia (Abbay, 2001:481; Makinda, 1982). However, it was kept at bay by the powerful Ethiopian military. The Ethiopian governments and the Eritreans had different perceptions of the struggle. While the Eritreans viewed it as a popular uprising in pursuit of self-determination, the Ethiopian monarchy under Haile Sellasie and Mengistu’s Dergue viewed the Eritrean struggle as an act of banditry. The Eritrean liberation fighters were viewed as shiftas who were in pursuit of their own selfish interests and were devoid of support from the large Eritrean populace (Bereketeab, 2010:28). In 1975, the TPLF, which had been formed in Ethiopia to fight against the repressive military junta of Mengistu Haile Mariam, supported Eritrea’s struggle for independence (Negash and Tronvoll 2000:10).
7. Uniting against a common adversary: TPLF and EPLF against Mengistu and the subsequent peaceful secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia (1974–1991)
Regime changes are known to cause many changes in a country, including the reorientation of foreign policy and changing relations domestically and internationally. The EPLF and the TPLF found themselves fighting Mengistu’s regime as a common enemy and so they became friends as a result (Addis et al., 2020): ‘The enemy of my enemy is my friend’. The two movements had sharp disputes, particularly in 1976 and 1984, because of a clash of interests in their motivations for their struggle. For the EPLF who started their struggle earlier, the objective for self-determination from Ethiopia was clear (Addis et al., 2020; Lata, 2003). The TPLF’s objective of self-determination and the creation of a greater Tigray people’s nation was viewed by EPLF as a deterrence to the achievement of their goal (Lata, 2003:373). Later the TPLF retracted on its objectives and instead decided to fight for a democratic Ethiopia, emancipation from the oppressive regime and acquisition of political leadership within Ethiopia. This resolved the dispute and so the EPLF, having more military experience, offered training to TPLF members (Lata, 2003) These TPLF leaders later became leaders in the post-Cold War Ethiopia.
Aweke and Seid (2023:764) point out that the two friendly parties (EPLF and TPLF) were characterised by a strong rural social base and strict party discipline. These qualities greatly contributed to their win in 1991 against Mengistu Haile Mariam’s militarily powerful but politically weak regime. The TPLF region of Ethiopia also borders Eritrea. Thus, their geographical proximity helped them to coordinate and work together. The choice of the TPLF and EPLF to work together was a case of strategic friendship and cooperation for purposes of conquering a common enemy.
7.1 Ethiopia–Eritrea temporary cordial relations: 1991‒1997
After defeating Mengistu, relations between the TPLF and the EPLF remained cordial. Indeed, relations between the two countries became examples to be emulated by countries that had suffered protracted conflicts (Bereketeab, 2010:16). The TPLF and other ethnic-based forces became political parties and joined forces to form a ruling coalition known as the EPRDF, with the TPLF as the dominant party in the coalition (Aweke and Seid, 2023:764). The EPLF remained in control of the province of Eritrea but with cordial relations with the TPLF. In spite of this, the two parties pursued diametrically opposed goals of statehood. While the EPLF was focused on secession and independence from Ethiopia, the TPLF’s goal was the affiliation of Eritrea to Ethiopia. Thus, the EPLF continued preparing the people of the Eritrean province for a referendum and creation of an Eritrean state. During the celebration of Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Isaias Afwerki and Meles Zenawi – who had become the prime minister of Ethiopia – both spoke about a future of collaboration, foregrounding the two countries’ commonalities and their shared desire to heal the wounds of the past (Müller, 2021).
The two leaders undertook to work together, to cooperate and uphold peace and democracy, and to work towards development. A Friendship and Cooperation Agreement (FCA) was signed anchored on three essential points: i) the application of a common currency (the Ethiopian Birr) until Eritrea was able to issue its own currency, ii) that Ethiopia would have free access to the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa, and iii) that Ethiopia would run and maintain the Assab oil refinery without paying taxes and duties (Bereketeab, 2010:18; Mesfin, 2012; Negash and Tronvoll, 2000:35).
In spite of the spirit of cooperation extended to each other, economic and political tensions persisted and ultimately resulted in the deterioration of relations. The agreement on a common currency was watered down a few years later in 1997, when Eritrea introduced a new Eritrean currency (the Nafka) without consultation with Ethiopia (Negash and Tronvoll, 2000:35). The Eritrean government proposed that the two currencies (the Birr and the Nakfa) have the same value and be used in both countries, but the Ethiopian government rejected this proposal and insisted that all trade transactions should be carried out using foreign currency (Bereketeab, 2010:18; Mesfin, 2012:97; Negash and Tronvoll, 2000). According to Bereketeab (2010), each of the two states had their national interest at hand in this agreed upon cooperation: while Eritrea’s objective was to exploit the Ethiopian market to rebuild the war-torn nation, Ethiopia’s calculation was that Eritrea’s economic dependence would ultimately lead to political dependency, hence tying Eritrea back to Ethiopia (Bereketeab, 2019). Unable to reach an agreement, Ethiopia boycotted Eritrean seaports and instead redirected its trade through Djibouti (Bereketeab 2010:18). This worsened the already deteriorating relations and set the stage for the 1998 border war.
7.2 Friends become foes: Border conflict and twenty year hostility (1998–2018)
In spite of Ethiopia granting Eritrea a peaceful secession and the efforts of the two countries to maintain friendly, foreign policies towards each other and amicable relations, disputes and tensions persisted. Critics pointed out that the major shortfalls of the cordial relations between the two countries was that it was not anchored in institutions and popular support, but rather on the guerrilla organisations (TPLF and EPLF) that ascended to power ‘through the barrel of a gun’, and more precisely on the personal good relationship between Zenawi and Afwerki (Mengisteab and Yohannes, 2005; Negash and Tronvoll, 2000). National institutions, such as the parliament, the judiciary, the press and civil society bodies, were not properly informed and involved. Decisions were carried out in limited circles. Also, when problems began to emerge, they were kept secret from the public until they escalated and could no longer be kept covert.
7.2.1 The Border War (1998–2000)
The border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea began in May 1998 when Eritrean soldiers allegedly crossed into territories that were under the Ethiopian administration. This sparked a shootout between Eritrea and Ethiopian forces (Tronvoll, 2009). The Eritrean army later invaded the Badme area and occupied several villages that were considered to be in Ethiopian territory, which then elicited Ethiopia’s reaction. Badme, the area of contention, has surprisingly been described as a barren strip of land or piece of desert (Connell, 1999; Khadiagala, 1999). In a month’s time, what started as border skirmishes escalated into an all-out war that attracted international attention and caused deep-seated tension and suspicion between the populations of the two countries, especially the Tigray people of Ethiopia and the Eritreans. Abbink (2003:409) observes that Ethiopia and especially the population of the frontline regional state of Tigray, which borders Eritrea, experienced the war as an unfathomable ‘stab in the back’ by their former allies in the struggle against the Mengistu regime. The TPLF, which had been instrumental in granting Eritrea independence, further considered Eritrea’s provocation for war as a show of a lack of gratitude (Abbink, 2003). It was also perceived as a war between brothers since there were also Tigrayans in Eritrea who had historical ties with those in Ethiopia. In an interview with Paul Henze in the 1990s, Meles Zenawi revealed the following regarding the relationship between Tigray and Eritrea: “There are many Tigrayans in Eritrea. They are concerned. They don’t want to be treated as foreigners there. There has always been close connections between Tigray and Eritrea for the highland people are all the same. They have the same history” (Henze, 2012). The war was further viewed not as a war of all of Ethiopia against all of Eritrea, but a war between the Tigrayans who dominated Ethiopian politics and Eritreans owing to conflicting interests and aspirations (Lata, 2003:370).
The international community expressed concern about the outbreak of aggression between two of Africa’s poorest and most militaristic countries (Tronvoll, 2009:4). A joint proposal by the United States of America (USA) and Rwanda for a peace negotiation was accepted by Ethiopia but rejected by Eritrea (Khadiagala 1999; Tronvoll, 2009). Afterwards, the Organization of African Unity (OAU, now AU) and the UN took over the responsibility of resolving the conflict. International mediators moved between Addis Ababa and Asmara, trying to broker peace, without success. Skirmishes continued intermittently for the next two years.
In May 2000, Ethiopia launched a major offensive leading to a de facto victory of its army and the withdrawal of the Eritrean army from the border deep into Eritrea. The Ethiopian Army took control of a wide stretch of Eritrean territory along the common border (Tronvoll, 2009:5). In addition to the casualties, several people were internally displaced and others became refugees. Moreover, Ethiopia deported over 75 000 Eritreans while Ethiopians of Eritrean origin were deported and stripped of their citizenship rights. Eritrea expelled over 70 000 Ethiopians working in Eritrea (Tronvoll, 2009:5). A UN peacekeeping mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) – was deployed in 2001 to temporarily guard a buffer zone between the two armies. It was withdrawn in 2008.
A Boundary Commission was constituted by the OAU, Ethiopia and Eritrea after the signing of the Algiers Agreement (Algiers Agreement, 2000) with a mandate to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable international law (EEBC, 2002). The two countries agreed to accept the decision of the Commission as final and binding. The Commission’s decision on Badme, the disputed region, was that the Badme Plain was largely on the Ethiopian side but the village of Badme was on the Eritrean side of the border (EEBC, 2002). While Eritrea welcomed the decision, Ethiopia challenged it, arguing that the decision divided local communities and families on each side of the border. “We are not in a position to take a decision that puts a quarter of a family on one side of the border and three-quarters of the same family on the other side,” Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said in an interview (Sudan Tribune, 2002). A nation-wide protest pressured the Ethiopian government to reject the Commission’s decision to grant Badme village to Eritrea. The Commission’s decision to adopt virtually demarcated borders on electronic maps rather than a physical demarcation on the ground was accepted by Eritrea while Ethiopia rejected it as “legal nonsense”. In an interview with Voice of America, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi commented as follows: “As far as the virtual demarcation of the boundary is concerned, I have heard well-respected diplomats and lawyers describe it as ‘legal nonsense’,” he said. “Our lawyers agree with such characterisation. Until the boundary is demarcated on the ground, it is not demarcated” (Heinlein, 2007; ICG, 2008; Bereketeab, 2019).
The border war led to a 20-year military standoff between the two neighbours. The border remained closed, separating families, relatives and friends. Tens of thousands of Eritreans who had resided in Ethiopia for several decades were expelled from the country (Reid 2007:253). The respective embassies of both countries were closed, economic relations frozen and Ethiopia could no longer access the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa. Enemy perceptions characterised the two countries’ foreign policy and relations towards each other. As the impasse between the two countries prevailed, both parties continued engaging in a war of words and proxy in order to sustain their entrenched political positions (Ewing, 2008). The two states began supporting dissident groups to destabilise each other. The Tigray-dominated Ethiopian government accommodated some Tigrayans in Eritrea and also supported some ethnic Eritrean organisations (such as Kunama and Afar) that had secessionist visions which led to Eritrea suspecting the TPLF (Bereketeab, 2010:42). Ethiopia also accused Eritrea of supporting and arming rebel and terrorist groups in Ethiopia in order to destabilise the country (Negash and Tronvoll, 2000:88).
7.2.2 Regime change and change of relations: The rapprochement in 2018
Following continued anti-government riots, major changes occurred in Ethiopia in April 2018 with Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn resigning and being replaced by Abiy Ahmed. This marked the end of close to three decades of domination of the TPLF in political leadership of Ethiopia. Abiy Ahmed comes from the Oromo community, a majority community that had suffered marginalisation for a long period. Abiy Ahmed was the deputy chairman of the Oromo Democratic Party, a constituent party of the EPRDF (Addis et al. 2020:115). The change in regime heralded several other changes in the domestic and international arenas. At the domestic level, Abiy Ahmed undertook swift reforms, including loosening of restrictions on internet use, lifting much-criticised terrorist ascriptions that had been applied to several opposition groups, merging the EPRDF into a single political party known as The Prosperity Party and setting out to open the country’s economy (Klobucista, 2020). Internationally, the most prominent change that the new leader effected was the resolution of the 20-year-old conflict and consequent reconciliation with Eritrea. Haile Mariam Desalegn’s government had also made efforts to resolve the conflict but the Eritreans were still suspiciously adamant. However, the coming to power of Abiy Ahmed seems to have given the Eritreans confidence that a resumption of diplomatic relations would not be detrimental (Aweke and Seid, 2023:770). Some of the motivations for the rapprochement were the regime change in Ethiopia and the trust that Eritreans had in the new leadership, national interests, and the need of Ethiopia under Abiy Ahmed and Eritrea to cooperate owing to the threat posed to the leaders’ political survival by the Tigrayans who were now out of the national government (Bereketeab, 2019).
The resumption of cordial relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea reverberated in the region and resulted in unprecedented cooperation within the Horn of Africa. One of the glaringly visible moves towards cooperation was the proposed new regional block referred to as the Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC) which would bring together Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia (Henneberg and Stapel, 202:340). Although it was a move that would bring previous rivals to cooperation, the HoAC was criticised by scholars as one that could isolate other states within the Horn and even derail the objectives of some regional blocs within the Horn, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Mutambo, 2020). The HoAC was also viewed as signalling imperial realignments (Munene, 2020). The survival of the HoAC still hangs in the balance. In fact, at the time of writing of this article, relations among the three states were shaky. Abiy Ahmed’s recognition of and signing an agreement with Somaliland, a region that claims independence but whose sovereignty Somalia claims, rattled Somalia and led to an alliance between Somalia, Egypt and Eritrea that could isolate Ethiopia (Bekit, 2024).
8. The Tigray conflict in Ethiopia
The change of regime in Ethiopia brought to an end an almost 30-year domination of the TPLF in Ethiopia’s government. Consequently, the Tigrayans were discontented with Abiy Ahmed’s leadership, which resulted in tensions between the federal government and the government of the Tigray region. The escalation of tensions led to a military confrontation between the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and the TPLF starting in November 2020 when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declared a ‘law enforcement’ operation in Tigray (Gavin, 2021). The government cited a series of provocations by the TPLF, including defiantly holding local elections that the federal government had delayed citing COVID-19 concerns. Nevertheless, the immediate trigger of the attack was reportedly a TPLF attack on federal forces stationed in the Tigray region (Hurley 2023; Jima, 2023; Ylönen, 2021).
What began as a law enforcement operation escalated into a war that involved the TPLF on one side and the Ethiopian military on the other together with its allies, the Eritrean troops and ethnic militias from various regions of Ethiopia (Ylönen, 2021). Ethnically targeted attacks, large-scale looting, sexual violence, aerial and ground bombardments and denial of access to humanitarian aid caused indiscriminate suffering in the Tigray region. Regional and international intervention led to the signing in Pretoria, South Africa of a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and the TPLF in November 2022 (AU, 2022).
8.1 Ethiopia – Eritrea Relations and the Tigray Crisis
The Tigray crisis later escalated into a civil war that involved the entire population, with the majority of the other ethnic groups such as the Afar, the Amhara and the Oromo all fighting alongside the Ethiopian government against the TPLF. As such, the Tigrayans seemed to be a common adversary to the Ethiopian government and the other ethnic groups (Bereketab, 2019; Lata 2003). This is to be found in the relationship between the Tigray people, especially the elites in government, and the rest of the Ethiopian people during the almost 30 years in which the TPLF dominated politics and leadership in Ethiopia. During the reign of the Tigrayans, the national government directed a lot of economic resources to the Tigray region, which led to vast economic growth and development of huge industries and infrastructural facilities while the other regions experienced little growth (Endris and Mengisteab, 2023). These horizontal economic inequalities created animosity between the Tigrayans and majority of the other ethnic communities in the country.
The participation of the Eritrean military in the Tigray crisis is a major foreign policy behaviour whose rationale can be found in the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the course of history. It entails a critical examination of the relations between the two countries with a keen focus on the Eritrea–Tigray relations (Bereketeab, 2019).
8.1.1 Eritrea–Tigray: A history of animosity and strategic cooperation
The animosity between Eritrea and the Tigrayans is as a result of deeply rooted historical factors that coalesce with social, political and cultural factors. These factors have to do with statehood, state interests and personal interests. Eritrean‒Tigrayan relations depict a history of animosity owing to precolonial and colonial experiences. They harbour enemy images of each other and deep-rooted revenge ambitions.
A close look at their precolonial history reveals a relationship of apprehension, fear and mistrust. For instance, Eritreans recount their suffering under repressive kings that were in charge of the Tigray region, such as Ras Alula who treated them ruthlessly during his reign (Bereketeab, 2010). Scholars observe that the Eritreans harbour strong feelings of apprehension towards the Tigrayans. Bereketeab (2010:33), for instance, gives the following account existent in Eritrea’s folklore about their perception of Tigrayans: “The road between Adi Tekelezan and Ela Ber’ed, along the highway of Asmara-Keren, Eritrea, is called l’bi Tigray meaning the heart of Tigray. The road is zigzag shaped and very treacherous. The reason it is called l’bi Tigray is to describe how difficult it is to find out how or what a Tigrayan thinks and how treacherous he/she is. The name of the road metaphorically represents what Eritreans think and feel about Tigrayans”. Bereketeab (2010:34) further points out that this perception has been so widespread that even Arab residents of Eritrea contributed to it through construction of corrupt forms of hybrid Arabo-Tigrinya proverbs. Such proverbs include expressions such as: Mata’emen Al Tigraway wala ashera mara yekun hiyaway (do not trust a Tigrayan even if he is ten times generous/honest), mata’emen al agame wala intemote wala intehameme (do not trust an agame even if he is dead or sick). Apparently those Arab residents, particularly of Asmara, had contributed to some of the prejudices and stereotypes of the Tigrinya speakers. This is clearly demonstrated in the perverted or corrupted linguistic mixture of Arabic and Tigrinya in the cited statements. Nevertheless, it depicts the popular apprehension of Tigrayans (Bereketeab, 2010:34).
Social construction and deconstruction of identities also shapes their relations. While the Tigrayans consider Eritrea as part of the Tigray region, the Eritreans prefer an identity independent of the Tigrayans (Bereketeab, 2010). The Italian colonisation of Eritrea lead to the construction of an Eritrean nationhood and the determination to fight for a statehood independent from Ethiopia. The Italians’ preferential treatment of immigrant Tigrayans who had gone to Eritrea to look for greener pastures exacerbated the situation as it led to feelings of superiority among the Eritreans. As such, Eritrea’s quest for independence was viewed by the Tigrayans as a demonstration of their superiority.
8.1.2 TPLF a common adversary necessitating an alliance between Abiy Ahmed’s government and Eritrea
The change of regime in Ethiopia when Abiy Ahmed came into power in 2018 altered the relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The rapprochement that resulted from Abiy Ahmed’s acceptance of the Algiers Agreement positively changed the relationship between the two countries. It is worth noting that Abiy Ahmed’s predecessor had also tried to make peace with Eritrea but Eritrea had been adamant. But when Abiy Ahmed extended a hand to the Eritreans, they accepted. This article argues that the friendship between Abiy Ahmed’s government and Eritrea was as a result of a perceived common enemy: the TPLF (The Guardian, 2020). The Tigrayans and TPLF were opposed to the rapprochement of Ethiopia and Eritrea and thus posed an impediment to the normalisation of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, owing to their (TPLF) pursuit of destabilisation in both Ethiopia and Eritrea and the Horn of Africa in general (Aweke and Seid, 2023:767). Abiy Ahmed’s government faced a threat from the Tigrayans, who were now out of government after dominating Ethiopian leadership for close to three decades. Isaias Afwerki’s government also faced a threat from the Tigrayans under whose leadership Eritrea had fought a bloody border war in Ethiopia and had thereafter tried to destabilise each other through proxy wars. Eritrea might have felt threatened by disgruntled Tigrayan elites who had retreated to their Tigray region at the Ethiopia–Eritrean border. These factors made the two leaders cooperate as a form of collective security in the face of an economically and militarily powerful adversary (the TPLF). As a result, when war broke out between Abiy Ahmed’s government and the TPLF, Eritrea joined in to support a friend against a common enemy. Afwerki’s participation in the Tigray crisis on the side of the Ethiopian government might also have been caused by the threat of having idle soldiers (after the peace deal, soldiers who had been deployed to the border would be idle) whom he feared would be tempted to plot against him owing to his iron-fist leadership of his country.
Sometimes leaders’ interests tend to be expressed as national interests. In such a case, the leaders make rational choices that lead them to achieve personal goals which are then presented as national interests. This could apply in the case of the friendship and cooperation between Ahmed and Afwerki. Aweke and Seid (2023:769), for instance, argue that the agreements that were signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea following the rapprochement were driven by and consequently reliant on the personal ambitions of Prime Minister Ahmed of Ethiopia and President Afwerki of Eritrea. Addis et al (2020:116) further point out that the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea mainly hinged upon the leaders’ interests and thus lacked institutionalisation and consultation of the general public in the two countries. During the period in which the TPLF dominated the Ethiopian government, the Ethio‒Eritrean relationship served the interests of the TPLF rather than those of Ethiopia as a country (Aweke and Seid, 2023: 770).Thus, for the rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia to work and be sustainable, the TPLF, which tries to come in between, has to be managed (Aweke and Seid, 2023).
Furthermore, political survival for Abiy Ahmed was paramount amid the power struggle, high internal divisions among the EPRDF member parties and intensification of ethnic (racial federalism) and language-based politics in the country (Addis et al., 2020:117). His change of the EPRDF from a coalition into a united party, the Prosperity Party – a move that was opposed by many politicians, observers and scholars as well as civil society groups – might have been a daring move that would deepen the existent suspicion between the EPRDF constituent parties and threaten the stability of the country.
9. Conclusion
The historical analysis of Ethiopia–Eritrea relations has revealed that when the situation called for unity against a common adversary, the two never hesitated to do so. The unity between the EPLF and the TPLF against Mengistu’s Derg was possible because they allied for purposes of defeating a common enemy. Following the defeat of Mengistu, a brief period of cordial relations ensued but, subsequently, they faced challenges due to divergent interests. The territorial dispute and border war between 1998 and 2000 led to foreign policies characterised by enemy images of each other. These relations changed in 2018 when there was a rapprochement between the two countries. The two countries, as realists argue, did not hesitate to cooperate when it was in their interests to do so and to engage in conflict when the situation called for it.
The Eritrea‒Ethiopia relations have been shaped to a great extent by the relationship between Eritreans and Tigrayans and have been further influenced by Eritrea’s quest for sovereignty, independence and recognition, which the Tigrayans, who had dominated Ethiopian politics for almost three decades, have resisted. The TPLF who pose an obstacle to Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s state survival and further to Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki’s political survival form one of the factors that necessitated a rapprochement between the two countries and consequently their alliance in the Tigray conflict. Be that as it may, the sustainability of Ethiopia and Eritrea’s cordial relations and cooperation seems to be highly dependent on a frosty relationship between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government. It would be interesting to watch how the relations unfold over time since the TPLF and the Ethiopian national government signed a peace deal in November 2022. It is thus important to note that the relations between Abiy Ahmed’s government, Eritrea and the TPLF need to be monitored and managed for a peaceful and stable Horn of Africa.
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