Operation Murambatsvina

Abstract

In April 2005, Zimbabwe held general elections which saw the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) emerge as victors for the umpteenth time. Despite this win, the ruling party seems to suffer paranoia, as manifested by the recent Operation Murambatsvina. A look at the Zimbabwean political history points to the fact that Zimbabwean elections have been characterised by violence which has landed the country in an economic morass. This paper looks at the dynamics of Zimbabwean political conflict using Operation Murambatsvina as a case study. The paper expresses the view that like many others of its nature, this operation was a purge against the people who are suspected to support the opposition parties, particularly the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

Introduction

The recent political and socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe has been the subject of discussion by commentators within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and beyond. At the centre of this topical issue is the intractable conflict between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Despite the fact that regular elections are almost guaranteed, civil freedoms remain a distant mirage in Zimbabwe. The country still finds itself trapped in a quagmire of political contestation and conflict. This is a setback that obliterates hopes for the consolidation of democracy in the region and in Africa as a whole. This state of affairs is attributed to the manipulation of the elections by the ruling party and the atmosphere of intimidation that exists during election periods. Besides this, some of the factors underlying the conflict are lack of good governance, high levels of poverty and inequitable distribution of resources.

This paper looks at the recent Operation Murambatsvina in relation to the dynamics and the escalation process of the Zimbabwean political conflict. In an attempt to understand this multifaceted conflict, the point of departure is to provide definitions of conflict and conflict escalation. Secondly, the dynamics of this conflict are also discussed with reference to the conflict escalation theoretical framework so as to provide a basis for the analysis of its escalation. Thirdly, Operation Murambatsvina is discussed so as to assess whether or not it is indicative of more political conflict to come in Zimbabwe.

Conflict

There are many ways in which conflict is defined. In this paper, conflict refers to a situation where two or more people or groups believe that their objectives are incompatible. People’s values may actually be different and as a result motivate them to engage in conflict in an effort to protect those values (Kriesberg 1998:2). Conflict can also be a consequence of failure by the parties in conflict to communicate. The management of conflict depends on the ability of the people to communicate. Looking at conflict, Shutte (1993:57) advances the view that people are imperfect individuals who make up imperfect communities. These imperfect communities depend on each other daily and, being imperfect beings, they communicate imperfectly. One thing that does not change about conflict though, is that it can never cease to exist. Shutte believes that the forging of relationships and attempts to continuously perfect them will always precipitate conflict. Put differently, the degree and the frequency of interaction determines how the conflict escalates. It is on the basis of this understanding that the discussion on escalation that follows is approached. It is important to underscore nonetheless that whilst conflict results from human interactions, it is also capable of changing the economic, social, cultural and political being of the people who give it life in the first place. As will be seen with the Zimbabwe case, conflict can in this way be both the result of relationships and the cause of relationships.

Conflict Escalation

Conflict escalation may be defined as an increase in the magnitude of disagreements or violence. For instance, in a family a father may forbid his son to go to a nightclub and instruct him to concentrate on his studies. If the son does not obey, the father may employ more strict measures in dealing with the boy, such as stopping to give him pocket money and taking away some of the privileges that the boy has in the family, in order to force him to study. The disobedience by the son and the use of a stronger approach by the father in reaction to the boy’s disobedience constitutes conflict escalation. The conflict may escalate further if the son reacts to his father’s actions in a contemptuous manner. Carlson (1996:3) reminds us that the centrality of escalation as a focus of theoretical and empirical inquiries varies a lot. It could be a stepping stone towards finding a solution to a conflict. She defines escalation as the imposition of costs on both the sender and the recipient of an action over time. This definition is consistent with the understanding of many people that escalation is the increase in the magnitude of hostility or the application of sanctions over time. The behaviour of one party is a response to both its internal needs and a reaction to the behaviour of the other party. Reacting to a particular behaviour of the other person is natural and innate to us. Thus, quite obviously, what becomes a problem is the way we react to the behaviour of others. Our reaction determines whether we can manage the conflict or escalate it.

Dynamics of Escalation

I have mentioned above that conflict will not cease to exist, so the best thing for us to do is to devise a means of managing it. Whereas there is almost a complete consensus with regard to the inevitability and the expensive nature of conflict, various authors provide explanations on this nature of conflict. For instance, a renowned conflict management author, John Burton (1990:50), points out that there is a progressive escalation of conflict which emerges alongside highly sophisticated strategies that are meant to manage conflict situations. Pruitt and Rubin (1986:64) prefer to call this ‘escalation transformations’. They add that these transformations happen separately to each of the disputant parties. The two parties are both affected by these changes because each one of them mirrors the transformation and acts in response to it. They describe this behaviour as a conflict spiral. This spiral increases as the parties in conflict persist with the hostility and aggression.

Pruitt and Rubin (1986:89-95) classify theories of conflict escalation into three models: the Aggressor-Defender Model, the Conflict Spiral model and the Structural Change Model. These three models are briefly looked at below as they help in analysing the dynamics and escalation processes of the Zimbabwean conflict.

The Aggressor-Defender Model

In this model, one party is the aggressor while the other is the defender. The aggressor uses mild to heavier tactics against the defender until the aggressor gets what he wants or gives up. The aggressor is the party who realises an opportunity to change things to meet his interests and therefore initiates the offensive. The defender on the other hand is the party who resists this change. It should be indicated from the onset that being the defender does not imply that one is automatically the weaker of the two parties. The defender could be the stronger of the two parties and can be weaker as well under certain circumstances. In other words, the two parties in a conflict can shift positions from being the defender to being the aggressor depending on the situation at hand. The defender’s interest is to maintain the status quo. During the National Party governance of South Africa for instance, many would argue that the National Party government was the aggressor. While this is undoubtedly true, evidence also exists that point to the fact that in the early sixties, the African National Congress (ANC) became the aggressor particularly when it started its underground operations. The ANC wanted freedom for the indigenous and majority people of South Africa. Negotiations between the ANC and the government were fruitless as the government only made platitudinous statements regarding freedom that never translated into action. The ANC then opted for the last resort, which was the use of violence. The National Party government, as the defender in this case, strengthened its police and the defence forces in order to withstand the challenge of the ANC and clampdown its activities.

The Conflict Spiral Model

This is the model that demonstrates escalation as a result of the response and retaliation by the defender against the aggressor. This retaliation invites further action by the aggressor so that the whole circle is completed – and it may repeat itself again. As it repeats itself, the conflict does not continue at the same level. In the example of the conflict between the ANC and the apartheid government above, what happened is that as the conflict intensified, the government also went out to hunt ANC activists outside South Africa and killed many of them together with local people as well as destroying properties in Lesotho, Botswana and other neighbouring countries. In order to survive the ferocious reaction by the government, the ANC also intensified its activities using more attacks as its form of defence. The conflict, therefore, moved to an even higher level.

The Structural Change Model

The continuity of the spirals produces changes in the political and socio-economic spheres of the parties involved in conflict. This makes it difficult for conflict to be managed because both sides become even more determined to continue with the conflict, particularly when they have incurred loss of lives and property. The structural change model explains the effects of the protracted conflict emanating from the conflict spirals and escalations as explained in the previous models above. Under this model, people and groups’ perceptions change, and hostile and competitive goals develop within these communities. The aim becomes to punish, discredit, defeat and destroy the other party. The negative perceptions discourage conflict settlement and promote its escalation. Once escalation happens, the process repeats itself as has been said earlier and the structural changes also persist. This then has a direct effect on the human relationships.

Zimbabwean Political Conflict Flashback – 2000 to 2005

It is important to begin by indicating that the Zimbabwean conflict follows the trend that is characteristic of the current conflicts facing the world today. Unlike during the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War where nation-states were clear enemies, recent and emerging conflicts are highly destructive both within and across state boundaries. While these conflicts are political in nature, the underlying causes for these conflicts may be a dearth or absence of good governance, a scramble for natural resources, high levels of poverty, and an inequitable distribution of resources (Shale 2005:2; Matlosa 2005b:89).

A cause for concern with Zimbabwe is that despite the efforts that have been made (and continue to be made) by the SADC region to shift from authoritarian rule to multiparty rule (Matlosa 2005a:15), the Zimbabwean political conflict keeps escalating and there seem to be no mechanisms yet in place to deal with it. This conflict is looked at in respect to three phases which are the period 2000, the period 2002 and the period 2005 when parliamentary and presidential elections were held.

Parliamentary Elections 2000

Prior to the 2000 parliamentary elections, a new opposition party which promised to give ZANU-PF stiff competition was established. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) came out of the labour movement which derived support from a number of civic groups (Olaleye 2004:74). It is to be expected therefore that having monopolised the political arena since coming to power, ZANU-PF would naturally respond to the establishment of MDC by discouraging people from joining and subsequently voting for the MDC. It should not be forgotten that most nationalist parties in post-colonial Africa argued that any attempt to have an alternative political party was unpatriotic. Congruent with this perception, ZANU-PF did not throw confetti over the newly formed MDC. It has instead made allegations that the MDC party did not have the interests of the nation at heart but was serving the interests of the former colonialists, particularly the British. In terms of the three models above, the formation of a strong political party caused ZANU-PF to assume the defender status while MDC became the aggressor, particularly in the eyes of the ruling party.

The conflict during the 2000 parliamentary elections was mainly caused by dissatisfaction of the opposition parties with regard to the pre-election phase electoral processes. The parties protested that the voter registration had disenfranchised many eligible potential voters. The ruling party was also suspected of gerrymandering since the delimitation commission was established shortly before the elections, therefore making it difficult for parties to scrutinise its work. This conflict escalated when the supporters of the ruling party barred the opposition parties, particularly MDC, from campaigning. Sachikonye (2003:130) states that violence against opposition party members and candidates was reported in places which were declared as ‘no-go areas’. About 30 people were killed before the elections and this made the cycle of conflict continue. The use of violence by the ruling party was therefore its response to the new wave of political pressure that was unleashed by the MDC.

Presidential Elections 2002

Similar to the parliamentary elections, the presidential elections were marred by conflict. The key issues of contention with these elections, as with all the rest, were around the voters roll which was not availed to the wider spectrum of society. The apogee of this conflict was the government’s orchestration of violence on farmers and their workers using war veterans. The controversial land redistribution policy saw many farmers evicted from their farms and severely beaten while their workers were chased away. According to Sachikonye (2002:446), 14 people died within two months before the elections. Despite these constraints, MDC performance in the polls was expected to improve and probably even cause an upset. There is no gainsaying that it is precisely this likelihood that caused concern to the ZANU-PF thus compelling it to protect its interests.

Given that when conflict tension mounts parties tend to shift positions depending on their goals, the occupation of farms by war veterans prior to the 2002 elections led to MDC and ZANU-PF taking new positions. In other words, ZANU-PF shifted to the aggressor mode by unleashing the war veterans on the farms under the pretext of empowering the people. MDC got into the defender mode, condemning what it saw as ‘illegal’ occupation of farms. The MDC assumed the role of the voice of the ‘oppressed’, calling for international intervention against the human rights violations in Zimbabwe. The role that each party played in terms of this dichotomy invited a counter role by the other, thereby increasing the conflict not only between the two political parties but also between ZANU-PF and the farmers.

Again, prior to the elections, the armed forces commanders,¹ realising the possibility of MDC victory in the elections, threw its weight behind Mugabe saying that they would not support any one who had no revolution credentials. The position of the army widened the political cleavage between the two parties. The involvement of the military brings an interesting dimension to the Zimbabwean political conflict – where the army sees its interests being threatened by a growing political competition between MDC and ZANU-PF. Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005:359) appropriately capture the political developments from June 2000 as follows:

…in essence, ZANU-PF’s struggle for survival became a military operation, and Zimbabwe was turned into an ‘operational zone’… and military coercion became the currency of politics…

Chitiyo and Rupiya further suggest that there was a move to identify MDC supporters who would be punished while loyal ZANU-PF supporters would be rewarded. The active role of the military in Zimbabwean politics, culminating in its public pledge to only support candidates with revolution credentials, vindicated MDC’s claims (which ZANU-PF used to deny) that the government was using the armed forces to quell political challenge.

Parliamentary Elections 2005

Despite significant electoral reforms prior to the 2005 general elections, incidents of conflict were still reported countrywide where the opposition supporters were mainly the victims. As Kagwanja (2005:1) puts it, the 2005 elections were an opportunity to end Zimbabwe’s political turmoil. On the contrary, the win by ZANU-PF which was predicted by observers even before the polls further propelled the protests by the opposition against the regime – they accused the regime of manipulating the election results. This allegation against the government is substantiated by Maroleng (2005:1) who asserts that in the run up to elections, opposition parties’ campaigning was stifled by legislation which placed severe restrictions on their activities. This legislation, particularly the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), favoured the ruling ZANU-PF. In evoking the provisions of POSA, the ruling party ensured that it campaigned without hindrance, while the opposition parties were denied the opportunity to use public venues for their rallies (Masterson & Moloi 2005).

A worrying factor is that despite such laws being enacted in Zimbabwe, the African Union (AU) and SADC have remained silent and have not been actively involved in trying to de-escalate the Zimbabwean conflict. Their unchanging position on Zimbabwe and continued endorsement of the election results perpetuates the intractability of the conflict as the two parties remain deadlocked. This also makes the instruments that the two organisations use to measure the freeness and fairness of elections questionable. There is no denying that with no pressure coming from the neighbouring South Africa nor the SADC region, President Mugabe will remain adamant that he will not hold talks aimed at resolving the Zimbabwean conflict, particularly if the Western countries are the ones who want this to happen. It is fitting, therefore, that the next section looks at the escalation of the Zimbabwean conflict which manifests itself in the recent countrywide Operation Murambatsvina.

Operation Murambatsvina

Following the 2005 elections which saw ZANU-PF victorious yet again, an unthinkable development took place. The government embarked on a country-wide ‘Operation Murambatsvina’. This name is translated differently by different people. In some articles it is said to mean ‘throw out the trash’ or ‘restore order’ (Olaleye & Tungwarara 2005) while in others it is called ‘clean out the rubbish’ (Movement for Democratic Change 2005, Slaughter 2005). Whatever the name means, it is clear that there are two distinct interpretations regarding Murambatsvina. On the one hand is the interpretation of the government, while on the other hand there is the interpretation of the affected people supported by MDC and government critics. It follows therefore that such interpretations depend on which side of the divide one is on.

Targeted at the illegal street vendors and illegal structures such as shacks, markets and houses, Operation Murambatsvina has been carried out with military precision and involved the security organs of state, including the Police. Maximum force was used to ensure that the operation was executed with minimum or no resistance at all. The use of violence against the people of Zimbabwe by the ruling ZANU-PF has intensified in recent years. Sachikonye (2004:189) indicates that the orchestration of intimidation and political violence has gained momentum, particularly from 2000 when the authoritarian legislation such as POSA and AIPPA referred to earlier were passed.

The immediate conclusion that one may come up with is that the use of the military and or the police in a conflict such as the one in Zimbabwe is an admission of failure in regard to the peaceful handling of the problem at hand. In fact, a look at the history of post-colonial Zimbabwe points to the fact that the use of violence and intimidation against opposition and ordinary citizens has been the preferred way by the ruling ZANU-PF (see Sachikonye 2002, Sachikonye 2004, Chitiyo & Rupiya 2005). Table 1 (see page 118) illustrates the belligerents’ opposite paradigms from which they understand the issues.

Table 1 shows that the government’s rationale for Operation Murambatsvina is that all the buildings and shacks are illegal dwellings and a breeding ground for crime. The government therefore does not only regard this as a transgression of the urban area rules and regulations, but a transgression of the country’s laws and social norms – hence the need to clean them up. In other words, the government sees the shack settlements as the flotsam and jetsam of the urban areas.

The table further shows that the government deems the use of force, bulldozers and arrests as the appropriate dosage to deal with the situation. The victims (and those who sympathise with them) on the other hand, view the whole issue from a human needs theory perspective. They see shelter as a fundamental basic need. According to this perspective, the use of force to demolish houses and belongings of the urban dwellers is indicative of the violation and non-protection of the people’s basic need. Critics of Operation Murambatsvina have also quoted a number of international treaties that the ZANU-PF government has violated even though it is signatory to them.

Table 1: Competing Paradigms of Thinking

The competing paradigms of thinking analysis tool has been adapted from Douwes-Dekker et al 1995.

Following an international outcry about the operation, the United Nations (UN) had to see first-hand the extent of the problem, so the logical move was to have a fact-finding mission in the form of a UN Secretary-General Special Envoy. When reporting on the magnitude of the operation, the United Nations’ Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe, Anna Tibaijuka, (2005) says that the operation which by July 2005 had taken away the livelihoods of and displaced about 700 000 people across the country,

…was carried out in an indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference to human suffering, and, in repeated cases, with disregard to several provisions of national and international legal frameworks…

While the above criticism of the operation by the UN Special Envoy is valid, it does not help the situation which looks more likely to continue. Due to the difficult nature of this conflict, even the UN does not have a readily available solution to deal with it. It has become apparent that the first track diplomacy is not suitable in the Zimbabwean situation. Not even the crisis diplomacy, which Matthews (1993:94) says is the ideal diplomacy that can be used to establish control over situations such as the one in Zimbabwe, can work smoothly.

The likelihood is that whatever the UN tries to do will be eyed with suspicion by Harare which might be even more determined to achieve victory over the MDC – the effect of which will be more escalation of the conflict and subsequent suffering of the ordinary people. The UN is therefore caught in a ‘catch-22’ situation and is losing face in the eyes of other nations. It cannot force Harare to effect any political changes and to conform to principles of democratic governance. On the other hand, if the UN lets the situation stay as it is, Mugabe will get away with atrocities – a reality which has already come to pass. This state of affairs sets a bad precedent for other conflict-prone countries to follow. The UN’s failure to get support from member states, and particularly from the AU and SADC, who think that Zimbabwe’s problems should be solved internally by Zimbabweans themselves, aggravates its woes.

What Triggered Murambatsvina?

There are many ways in which analysts explain the reasons behind the Zimbabwean government’s sudden clean-up campaign in all the urban areas. As indicated earlier, the ruling party has often resorted to violence in sending out a sharp message to anyone who dares challenge it. According to Solidarity Peace Trust (2005:5) the government has already used the cleansing terminology when carrying out a purge against the Zimbabweans. In the 1980s about 10 000 civilians died from ‘Operation Gukurahundi’ which means ‘the spring rain that gets rid of the chaff from the last season’. The victims of this operation were supporters of the Zimbabwean African Peoples’ Union (ZAPU). In 1985, following parliamentary elections, about 20 people supporting ZAPU were killed and no action was taken by the police. The incident followed Mugabe’s speech in which he told the people to go out to ‘weed’ their gardens. During the land evictions between 2001 and 2002, television and newspapers reported incidents of the farmers and their workers being assaulted by the war veterans while the police did not intervene.

These repeated cases of purging of opposition parties and opposing views strongly suggest a strategy aimed at neutralising the bastion of MDC, which is mainly in urban centres. But the government claims that the growth of the informal sector activities and the construction of shack-dwellings and unapproved structures such as tuck-shops, dwelling rooms and business sites, some of which were in illegal areas, justified such interventions.

There has been an ongoing debate amongst academics and politicians around the agrarian question in Southern Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe. Even the UN Secretary-General affirmed the importance of land redistribution to economic growth and peace and stability (Mdlongwa 1998). While many agree that inequality of land ownership has to be addressed, there is a general disagreement when it comes to the government of Zimbabwe’s timing in dealing with the land question. The government’s cleansing action was suspected by others to be the ZANU-PF’s strategy for controlling elections. Irrespective of varying opinions on this issue, it is axiomatic that while it may not have been a mere strategy to win elections, the land issue contributed meaningfully to the victory of ZANU-PF in the 2002 presidential elections.

Based on the foregoing, it is not far fetched to suggest that even the recent Operation Murambatsvina was politically motivated. As the Solidarity Peace Trust (2005) puts it, the MDC had won most of its seats in the urban areas in the three consecutive elections and had so weakened the ruling party. Operation Murambatsvina is therefore widely seen in Zimbabwe and afar as a direct act of retribution against the urban electorate who are known or suspected for having voted against ZANU-PF. If this assumption were to be true, then the ruling party may have succeeded not only in causing panic and uncertainty in the electorate but also in weakening future support for MDC. As a result of the demolition of their shacks, the victims may develop a feeling of powerlessness at the hands of ZANU-PF and therefore become reluctant to vote in the next elections.

In terms of the structural change model, the more competition for power between ZANU-PF and MDC, the more the conflict escalation. According to this model the aims of the two parties become: to punish, discredit, defeat and destroy the other party. The operation is also a continuation of the historical trend towards violent conflicts inflicted by the ruling party on opposition parties and dating back to the 1980s. For instance, Operation Gukurahundi in the 1980s weakened the support of PF-ZAPU² as some victims become refugees (some eventually settled) in neighbouring countries including Botswana and South Africa while other victims settled in urban centres and/or other areas where ZANU-PF had strong influence in the body politic. PF-ZAPU eventually signed the Unity Accord in 1987 before disappearing from the country’s body politic. Thus the government’s Operation Murambatsvina is a classic example of conflict which is explained by this model. Like in the case of Operation Gukurahundi, this operation reversed the rural-urban migration as many victims returned either to their rural homes or new farming communities. This generates three scenarios. First, it fuels the demand for land thereby boosting the ongoing land reform programme. Second, it creates potential reserves of cheap labour for the ‘new farmers’, in a situation of limited economic opportunities facing returnees in an environment of hunger, limited basic social services and economic activities. Third, it justifies reducing constituencies in urban areas where the MDC has an upper hand. Though the operation affected supporters of the ruling party, there is a strong perception that post-Murambatsvina programmes initiated by government such as ‘new sites for informal traders’ and ‘new housing schemes under Operation Garikayi’³ were meant to benefit them.

Implications for the Future

The escalation of conflict leads to the conflict process repeating itself and the structural changes also persist. The Zimbabwean conflict has transcended the political boundaries and has evidently caused fissures in the human relationships. This direct effect on the human relationships has already created another form of conflict which is community conflict. The structural changes do not only occur in terms of mounting hostilities and aggression but affect the material dimension as well. The pain and suffering inflicted on the people of Zimbabwe (the majority of whom are poor) by fellow Zimbabweans, has left them traumatised. The result of this volatile situation is polarisation, mistrust and hostility within the community. This kind of polarisation remains the potential cause of future conflicts between and among the peoples of Zimbabwe, as those whom were once oppressed may seek revenge later.

In view of the fact that Operation Murambatsvina has not entirely stopped, there is reason to believe that the Zimbabwe conflict has the potential to become more intense in the future. Since the historiography of elections in Zimbabwe points to the fact that Zimbabwean elections are always accompanied by violent conflict, the possibility of having similar kinds of conflict in future elections can not be ruled out. It can only be hoped that some form of settlement between the two parties is reached before the next presidential elections in 2008. The scenario, however, seems to be one of limited faith in internal political dialogue involving all political parties and other stakeholders in the country, and in political mediation efforts. Moreover, the aftermath of Operation Murambatsvina has also shaken the MDC leadership, which is now split into two factions led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Professor Arthur Mutambara.

Failure to reach settlement between ZANU-PF and the MDC will mean that Zimbabwe’s political and socio-economic morass will continue for years to come. It is sad that there can be no prognosis of the length of time it will take before the conflict de-escalates.

Conclusion

Operation Murambatsvina is an operation which is typical in its effects on ordinary people. As observed by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe, operations carried out by the police and/or the military involve the use of force and have little or no consideration for the property and general well-being of the people. These kinds of operations are usually carried out in a hasty manner, hence their effects are even more severe on the ground. This paper has shown that Operation Murambatsvina has perpetuated hatred within communities and has actually furthered economic collapse.

The paper has also demonstrated that ZANU-PF and MDC, which are the principal parties in the Zimbabwean conflict, have fixed positions which have prolonged the conflict. The paper has further illustrated that as far as Operation Murambatsvina is concerned, the involved parties’ understanding of issues is dichotomised. This dichotomy contains dynamics that cause conflict escalation. It is fitting, therefore, to conclude that the polarisation that exists both with regard to the issues and the positions in the Zimbabwean political conflict creates an intractable conflict. The challenge remains for the UN, the AU and SADC, and particularly South Africa, to persuade the government in Zimbabwe to open doors for inclusive democracy and refrain from its proclivity to use violence to address political problems. Are the Zimbabwean authorities insistent on bringing about political and socio-economic recovery without giving much attention to processes of nation-healing and the promotion of tolerance in the communities? This remains a big question.

Sources

1. Burton, J. 1990. Conflict: Resolution and Provention. New York: St Martins Press.
2. Carlson, L.J. 1996. A Theory of Escalation: The Use of Coercive Bargaining strategies In International Conflict. Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services.
3. Chitiyo, K. & Rupiya, M. 2005. Tracking Zimbabwe’s political history: The Zimbabwe Defence Force from 1980-2005. In Rupiya, M. (ed) Evolutions and revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
4. Douwes-Dekker, L., Majola, A., Visser, P. & Bremner, D. 1995. Community Conflict: The Challenge Facing South Africa. Cape Town: Juta.
5. Kagwanja, P. 2005. When Locusts Ate Zimbabwe’s March 2005 Elections. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.
6. Kriesberg, L. 1989. Transforming Conflicts in the Middle East and Central Europe, in Kriesberg, L., Northrup, T. & Thorson, S., Intractable Conflicts and their Transformation. New York: Syracuse University Press.
7. Maroleng, C. 2005. March 10 Zimbabwe’s 2005 Elections: An Overture or Finale? In: ISS Situation Report. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
8. Masterson, G. & Moloi, M. 2005. Political Violence and Intimidation in Zimbabwe’s 2005 Parliamentary Elections. <http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/elec/050510eisa3.asp?sect0>.
9. Matlosa, K. 2005a. Electoral Systems, Constitutionalism and Conflict Management in Southern Africa. African Journal on Conflict Resolution 4 (2).
10. Matlosa, K. 2005b. From a destabilising factor to a depoliticised and professional force: The military in Lesotho, in Rupiya, M. (ed), Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
11. Matthews, K. 1993. The Gulf Conflict and International Relations. New York: Mdlongwa, F. 1998. Zimbabwe Presses Land Distribution. Africa Recovery <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/123land.htm>.
12. Movement for Democratic Change 2005. Operation Murambatsvina: An Overview and Summary. <http://mdczimbabwe.org/blogg/index. php?blog=5>.
13. Olaleye, W. (ed) 2004. Negotiating the Impasse: Challenges and prospects for democratisation in Zimbabwe. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.
14. Olaleye, W. & Tungwarara, O. (eds) 2005. An Analysis of the Demolitions in Zimbabwe. Johannesburg: ActionAid International.
15. Pruitt, D.G. & Rubin, J.Z. 1986. Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement. New York: Newberry Award Records Inc.
16. Sachikonye, L.M. 2002. Zimbabwe, in Lodge, T. et al (eds), The Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.
17. Sachikonye, L.M. 2003. The Electoral System and Democratisation in Zimbabwe Since 1980. Journal of African Elections 2 (1).
18. Sachikonye, L.M. 2004. Constitutionalism, the Electoral System and Challenges for Governance and Stability in Zimbabwe. African Journal on Conflict Resolution (4) 2.
19. Shale, V.R. 2005. Post Cold War Diplomatic Training: The Importance of Multistakeholder Approach to Inter and Intra-State Conflicts. Mdina, Maltese Islands: Diplomatic Foundation.
20. Shutte, A. 1993. The Mystery of Humanity. Cape Town: Smil Press. 124
21. Slaughter, B. 2005. Zimbabwe: Mugabe’s ‘Operation Murambatsvina’, in World Socialist Web Site (WSWS) News & Analysis: Africa, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/jul2005/zimb-j16.shtml>.
22. Solidarity Peace Trust 2005. Interim Report on the Zimbabwean Government’s ‘Urban Cleansing’ and Forced Eviction Campaign May/June 2005. <http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/Discarding%20Filth.html>.
23. Tabaijuka, A.K. 2005 Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina, July 2005. Unpublished report.

Notes

1. The commanders of ground forces, the air force, prisons and intelligence.
2. Zimbabwean African Peoples’ Union – Patriotic Front (PF placed first in the acronym).
3. Operation Live Well, a government programme meant to provide houses close to basic social services for those who were victims of Operation Murambatsvina.