Somalis have a very unique conflict resolution method and style. They first sign an agreement and only then seem to start the “real” negotiations. This may seem counter-intuitive and bewildering to foreigners, but has its logic and roots in traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, honed over centuries.
The latest accord has created a new positive dynamic and momentum, much of it owed to PM Roble’s role. The country, however, is not yet out of the woods@HShPrez2Ware
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Elders separate issues into grievance, eed, and substantive issue, isaayo. The latter could be stolen camels or demarcation of a farm boundary – a relatively straight-forward dispute that may be resolved through arbitration, compromise, or concession. Grievances driven by a complex emotional and psychological dynamic, such as humiliation, threat to honour, loss of face, demonization and verbal abuse, on the other hand, tend to become eed: intractable. In fact, this category of grievance can easily spoil the atmosphere and prevent or prolong a resolution of the substantive causes of disputes and conflict. The best means to address it, usually, is through building trust, goodwill, and, most especially, by way of empathy – garaawshiyo.
The September 17 Agreement resolved the central substantive issue of the 2020-21 election cycle: the election model. Before the start of the Dhusamareb process, there were deep divisions on this issue. President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo staked his reputation on holding a one-person-one vote. He believed that this would be his lasting legacy and would favor him as a candidate. The Federal Member States (FMSs), without exception, believed that security, legal, and logistical realities on the ground, made the holding of a credible one-person-one vote impossible. It is this singular, highly polarizing issue, which after a long and torturous process, the 17 September Agreement resolved. The consensus was that the country had no choice but to adopt the indirect vote model used in past electoral cycles.
What the agreement did not resolve, however, was the underlying sense of grievance that continued to fester and prevented any formal meeting between the president and the federal state presidents for over a year. This, in turn, impeded the implementation of the agreement. It also bled into the wider body politic and created a toxic environment. A schism developed that evolved into bitter personal animosities. Disagreements on a whole host of unresolved problems – power and resource sharing, the security architecture of the country, Somali National Army operations and conduct in the regions, interference in state elections, foreign policy differences (trigged by the Gulf crisis and divergence over relations with Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kenya) – became even more heated.
Multiple attempts to build on the September 17 Agreement and resolve these issues failed. The expectation to address some of the outstanding issues such the issue of Jubaland, and that of Gedo in particular, did not materialize. Fragmentation set in among the FMSs, encouraged by the federal government. Attempts by the presidents of Galmudug, Southwest, and HirShabelle to bridge the gap failed. Puntland and Jubaland joined the National Parties opposition to form the National Salvation Forum.
Two camps evolved. Supporters of the two sides began to demonize each other. Those of the president started labeling the opposition as nation-wrecking mercenaries ‘Qaran-dumis’, while opposition supporters characterized the president as an Afewerki-idolizing dictator-in-the making.
The crisis was no longer about the election anymore. The very survival of the nation was at stake. The president convinced himself that he had to move aggressively and take drastic action. He ordered an attack on the opposition. The opposition, in response, mobilized their supporters to prevent a dictatorship from taking root, before it was too late. Clashes erupted. Hundreds of thousands were displaced. The security forces fractured. We were at a moment of great peril.
The latest accord has created a new positive dynamic and momentum, much of it owed to PM Roble’s role. The country, however, is not yet out of the woods. As I see it, the deal faces a number of challenges and pitfalls, namely:
Role of the Prime Minister: The Prime Minister received the support and goodwill of all stakeholders to resolve the remaining issues and manage the election – and he has done an exemplary job so far. But goodwill is different from trust. He now has to translate the benefit of the doubt accorded to him from all sides into action. He feels the burden of high expectations. Can he resolve the thorniest issues, such as Gedo, and make the changes necessary to the Electoral Commission? Can he create the political space necessary for a free and fair election? Can he reign in the force commanders who have attacked the opposition and could do so again? Will the president let him? Can he push back if he doesn’t?
Somaliland: The signing ceremony of the 27 May Agreement was almost derailed by the Somaliland issue, bitterly contested by two camps led by the Speaker of the Senate, Hon. Abdi Hashi and the Deputy Prime Minister, HE Mahdi Guled, respectively. Last minute intervention by the opposition Council of Presidential Candidates averted a disaster. Additional concessions were also made by the prime minister on security and venue. Can the pledges and assurances be fulfilled? Can the two camps work harmoniously together on the committees, and on the election?
Election security: The attack by government forces on the compounds of the two immediate former presidents and the former Speaker of parliament, in addition to the use of live fire on a peaceful demonstrations in February, had a chilling effect and bodes ill for democracy. The PM, who is now in charge of election security (it is not clear whether he is in charge of general security of the country) needs to establish a secure environment that is conducive to free speech, free association, and the free conduct of campaigns. The role of AMISOM and coordination with local forces, needs to be spelt out in detail and with total clarity.
Womens’ quota: Every speaker at the podium at the signing ceremony of the May 27 agreement, spoke about the importance of respecting the 30% women’s quota agreed upon by all stakeholders. But there is a glaring absence of a framework on how this would be achieved. Will an agreement be reached, for example, on how sub-clans nominate women candidates? Are there mechanisms to enforce compliance if they don’t? If a voluntary mechanism is assumed, the stated target will not be met. The PM needs to take the lead and deliver on this.
International assistance: Although much of their interventions were behind the scenes, and through diplomatic channels, members of the International Community played a crucial role in resolving the election impasse and bringing the parties together. Their engagement to help steer the process, provide advice and arbitration when needed, and to call out spoilers will continue to be necessary. With the limited resources of the FMSs to conduct the election, financial assistance from the donors will also be essential. AMISOM is a key agency entrusted with election security but has in the past been drawn into partisan politics. The partners of Somalia must give it support and provide oversight to ensure it delivers on that mandate impartially and effectively.
State-building roadmap: The most significant but under-reported aspect of the May 27 Agreement, is the ‘Roadmap’ appendix attached to the signed document. It lays out a vision of the pending state-building tasks that ought to be prioritised by the next government. It includes, among other things, the completion of the constitution review process, reform of the security sector, and settlements of the status of Somaliland and Mogadishu, the capital. This part of the document dispels doubts about prospects of non-constitutional usurpation of power by the president and provides clarity on safe-guarding the constitutional order and the nature of the future Somali government. It puts Somalia on a healthy trajectory and tackles many of the issues that precipitated the Mogadishu clashes. This vision statement needs to be preserved, emphasized and disseminated more widely – not permitted to become yet another dead letter of good intentions.
In conclusion, I hope the worst is behind us and we can now, at last, expect a smooth vote.
Mohamed Abdi Ware is the former President of HirShabelle State and a signatory of the 17 September Agreement. This op-ed was first published in The Somali Wire.
